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Abstract 
The auditing profession is performing a vital role in societies through the credibility that the 
external auditor's report adds to the financial statements of enterprises which help several 
interested parties in their economic decision process. It has been argued that this credibility 
depends mainly on the outsiders' perceptions of auditor independence. Therefore, auditor 
independence is considered as the essence and the cornerstone of the auditing profession. 
For that reason, the main objective of this study is to investigate the effect of nine factors 
(audit firm size, audit firm tenure, competition, auditors' economic dependence on clients, 
audit committees, status and financial condition of the audit client, financial and personal 
relationships and provision of non-audit services (NAS)) on perceptions of auditor 
independence held by participants from four sample groups (external auditors, auditors 
from the Institute of Financial Auditing, Taxation Board auditors and bank loan officers) in 
the Libyan context and to look at the reasons behind these perceptions. In addition to this 
main aim, the study sought to examine the attitudes of the participants about the accounting 
and auditing profession and its related environment. 
In order to achieve the research objectives and to answerer the research questions, a mixed 
research methodology was adopted. This implied using two types of research methods for 
collecting data: questionnaire and semi-structured interview. To produce the findings from 
the quantitative and qualitative data, three main analysis techniques where used. These 
included descriptive statistics, parametric tests such as the one-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) and Duncan post-hoc comparison test, and the Content analysis technique. 
The findings of the study showed that auditor independence was perceived to be 
undermined when an audit is performed by a sole practitioner or by a small audit firm, an 
audit firm audit the same audit client for a long period, the existence of competition 
between audit firms, auditors are economically dependent on their audit clients, the audit 
client is in the private sector or is in a strong financial condition, personal and financial 
relationships and when NAS were provided by the audit firm to its audit clients. On the 
other hand, auditor independence was perceived to be enhanced when an audit is performed 
by a big or medium audit firm, the existence of an audit committee in the audit client's 
company, the audit client is in the state sector or is in a weak financial condition and when 
the audit firm did not provide any kind of NAS to its audit clients. In addition to these main 
findings, it was revealed that rules and regulations in the Libyan laws were seen as not 
including comprehensive provisions that could enhance and maintain auditor independence. 
Moreover, the accounting and auditing profession in general and auditors in particular were 
perceived to enjoy reasonable respect and status in Libyan society by the sample groups 
except for the EA group who perceived the opposite. Also the Libyan Accountants and 
Auditors Association (LAAA) were considered as not performing an important role in 
either developing the accounting and auditing profession or in maintaining auditor 
independence. 
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1.0: Introduction. 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an introduction to the study and a brief overview of 
its contents. For this reason, the chapter is divided into five sections. The first section 
provides the background of the study and identifies the nature of the research problem. 
Section two outlines the research objectives and research questions. The adopted 
methodology in this study is briefly in outlined in section three. Section four presents the 
main motivations behind this study. Finally, the structure of the study is summarised in 
section five. 
1.1: Background to the research problem. 
The main purpose of the external auditing profession is to assure financial statement 
users in particular and the public in general, that the financial statements of enterprises 
are reliable. Therefore, the value of the audit tends to depend mainly on the outsider's 
perception of the competence and independence of the external auditor (Flint, 1988). 
Competence relates to the technical capability of auditors to discover breaches in the 
accounting system, whereas independence depends on the degree of auditors being 
independent from their clients (Niemi, 2004; Jenkins and Velury, 2008). Flint (1988) 
argued that education training and experience to acquire the necessary skills 
(competence) ultimately are critically dependent on the auditor independence. 
Furthermore, according to Boritz (1992) independence and integrity are the essence of 
the accounting profession, followed by professional competency. In other words, to 
provide quality audit services and meet the demands of financial statements users, 
auditors must be totally independent from their clients in doing their job. 
Independence is critically important to auditors as it is considered one of the basic 
requirements underlying the audit work (Firth 1980). If auditors are not truly 
independent, their opinions will add no value to their clients' financial statements. 
Consequently, auditor independence is often referred to as the cornerstone of the 
1) 
auditing profession (Abdul Nasser et al, 2006; Zhang and Emanuel, 2008). 
Independence in auditing was described by Arens et al (2003: 83) as: 
"Taking an unbiased viewpoint in the performance of an audit test, evaluating of 
results and the issue of the audit report". 
The concept of auditor independence has evolved over the years through several stages 
in the history of the development of the accounting and auditing profession which itself 
has evolved as a result of the socio-economic changes in societies (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1983; Vanasco, 1996; Higson and Tayles, 1998; Patel and Psaros, 2000; 
Sucher and Bychkova 2001; Sucher and Maclullich, 2004; Porter et al, 2004). The need 
for auditor independence became important when a separation of the management 
functions from the ownership were accrued, especially after the huge increase in the size 
of the enterprises after the industrial revolution in the late eighteenth century (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1983). Since then, most of the professional and governmental bodies, i. e. 
the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) and the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants (AICPA), have considered the importance of auditor independence 
and required that financial statements had to be audited by independent auditors. In 
addition several standards and guidelines were issued by such parties in order to enhance 
and maintain auditor independence. For instance, the AICPA in its second general 
standard of Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) required that: 
"In all matters relating to the assignment, independence in mental attitude is to 
be maintained by the auditor or auditors " (Vanasco, 1996: 6). 
The meaning of auditor independence is identified by the auditing professional bodies 
and researchers to have two separate components, namely, "Independence in fact" and 
"Independence in appearance". The former refers to the mental attitude of the auditor in 
terms of professional objectivity, while the latter refers to the public's or others' 
perceptions of auditor independence (Porter et al, 2004). Nevertheless, 
it has been 
argued that financial statement users when relying on audited 
financial reports for their 
economic decision process cannot easily observe or assess the real 
independence of the 
auditors. This is because independence in fact depends on the auditor's 
intangible 
personal characteristics such as integrity, dignity, 
honesty and fairness. Therefore, the 
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latter element of independence, i. e. perceived independence, has been recognised as a 
fundamental dimension of the concept of independence in protecting the interests of the 
financial statement users and the status of the auditing profession (Gorman and Ansong. 
1998; Beattie et al, 1999; Wines, 2006). 
Subsequent to the latest corporate collapses and corporate scandals across the world 
such as Enron, WorldCom, and Sunbeam in the USA; Independent Insurance in the UK; 
HIH and OneTel in Australia; and Parmalat in Italy, the notion of auditor independence 
has received substantial attention from the profession and regulatory bodies worldwide. 
Furthermore, a great scrutiny by the financial media was directed towards questioning 
auditor independence in particular and the quality and the importance of the audit work 
in general (Houghton and Jubb, 2003; Abu Bakar et al, 2005; Geiger et al, 2005; Wines, 
2006; Law, 2008). 
In order to retain the confidence of users of financial statements in the audited financial 
reports, policy makers have urgently responded to these crises by issuing a huge number 
of new regulations. Nevertheless, it has been argued that such regulations have taken 
place mainly by relying on subjective estimations of the best trade-off between 
advantages and disadvantages of such regulations without empirical evidence which 
should have considered the views of outside parties (Firth, 1980; Kilcommins, 1997; 
Awadallah, 2006). Therefore, it was suggested that if confidence in the role of the 
accounting and auditing profession in general and in auditors and their independence in 
particular needed to be maintained and enhanced, more empirical research is required to 
be undertaken (Awadallah, 2006). 
As a response to these critics, a considerable amount of attention and debate among 
researchers and academics on the two dimensions of auditor independence and an 
extensive theoretical and empirical literature on them has been developed. Notably, most 
of the research relating to this issue has been on identifying how auditor 
independence is 
perceived by different interested parties and what factors might 
influence it and 
assessing their impact upon perceived independence since 
independence in fact is 
unobservable (Beattie et al, 1999; Abu Bakar et al, 2005). 
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Nevertheless, the majority of previous research has been conducted in developed 
countries (e. g. the UK and the USA) and in some market economy developing countries 
(e. g. Hong Kong and Malaysia) but little is known about developing countries 
including Libya' where research on this area is very scarce (Hudaib, 2003; Abu Bakar et 
al, 2005; Awadallah, 2006; Alleyne et al, 2006 a). In this regard, Hudaib (2003) 
suggested that research on perceptions of auditor independence must be conducted 
within the context of the country examined since perceptions of auditor independence 
are mainly produced by a complex set of interrelationships of several interested groups 
in the audit work and a number of factors within a particular environment. Furthermore, 
Beattie et al (1999) argued that even within a single country, the effect on perceptions of 
auditor independence is likely to change over time due to changes in the local economic, 
political, cultural and regulatory environments. Moreover, due to differences of these 
environments across countries, they suggest that research on this issue, i. e. perceptions 
of auditor independence, should be undertaken in its own particular national setting. 
In addition to the above, the inconsistency of the results produced by a number of 
previous studies regarding the perceived effect of several factors on auditor 
independence and the reliance of those studies on either the quantitative or the 
qualitative approaches instead of using both of them, suggests opportunities for further 
research. It has been argued that when researchers use more than one approach, i. e. 
mixed research methodology (triangulation), various aspects of the same topic can be 
looked at and explored (Walsh, 2001). 
Therefore, a study on perceptions of auditor independence in the Libyan context 
especially after the changes that its social, political and economic systems have 
witnessed over the last two decades (see, chapter two, section 2.2.2) which might have 
an impact on the accounting and auditing profession in general and auditor 
independence in particular may help to fill the gap in and contribute to the existing 
literature by providing invaluable insights. 
- Although the phenomenon of auditor 
independence previously has been extensively investigated in many 
countries, only two studies (Mousa, 1992 and Almalhuf, 
2003) related to this topic were conducted in Lib\ a. 
These two studies however, as will be seen in chapter four, were 
limited in a number of issues such as the 
adopted methodology, sample size and the number of 
factors which were examined. 
1.2: The objectives and questions of the research. 
The main aim of the current study is to provide additional empirical evidence relating to 
the perceptions of auditor independence. More specifically, the study aims to investigate 
and explore the effects of nine selected factors (audit firm size, audit firm tenure, 
competition, auditors' economic dependence on clients, audit committees, status and 
financial condition of the audit client, financial and personal relationships and provision 
of non-audit services (NAS)) on perceptions of external auditor independence held by 
four Libyan groups (external auditors (EA), auditors from the Institute of Financial 
Auditing (IFA), Taxation Board auditors (TBA) and bank loan officers (BLO)). Two 
main criteria were set for selecting the factors used in the current study. These include 
a) the factors must have motivated some theoretical and empirical research and b) these 
factors were deemed by the participants in the focus group that was held at Liverpool 
John Moores University (LJMU) with 9 Libyan PhD accounting students' as the most 
important factors that might influence auditor independence in the Libyan auditing 
environment. 
In addition to the above main goal (i. e. examining perceptions of auditor independence), 
the study seeks to analyse the attitudes of the participants from the four targeted groups 
about the accounting and auditing profession and its related legal, educational, economic 
and social environments in the Libyan context. To achieve these aims, the following 
objectives were formulated. 
1. To explore the relevant literature to auditor independence in order to understand 
the nature and development of auditor independence and the factors that might 
affect it. 
2. To examine the effect of the above nine selected factors on the perceptions of 
auditor independence held by the four targeted groups in the Libyan context. 
3. To investigate the differences of the subject groups' perceptions of auditor 
independence with respect to the effect of the nine selected factors. 
1- All these students have a significant knowledge of accounting and auditing practices 
in the Libyan economic 
environment as most of them are lecturers at the 
Libyan universities. In addition, some of them used to work for 
audit firms or were partners of audit firms 
in Libya. 
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4. To measure the participants' attitudes about the auditing and accounting 
profession and its related environment in the Libyan context 
5. To assess the reasons for such perceptions being held by the participants from the 
four targeted groups with regard to both the effect of the nine selected factors on 
auditor independence and to their attitudes about the auditing and accounting 
profession. 
Objective one is concerned with reviewing the relevant literature (books, journals, theses 
and government and professional documents and publications) in order to gain a better 
understanding of auditor independence and to structure the theoretical framework of the 
study. Objective two assesses whether auditors were perceived to be more or less 
independent when any one of the above factors was present. Objective three investigates 
whether perceptions of auditor independence differ between participants of the four 
targeted groups. Objective four identifies and measures the attitudes of the participants 
in this study with regard to different accounting and auditing related issues such as legal, 
economic, social and educational systems in the Libyan context. Finally, objective five 
analyses the results obtained from the second, third and fourth enquiries by probing 
further into the reasons that the targeted groups, i. e. EA, IFA, TBA and BLO, hold the 
perceptions that they do. To address the gaps in the relevant literature and to achieve the 
objectives, the current study sets the following questions: 
1. How do audit firm size, audit firm tenure, competition, auditors' economic 
dependence on clients, audit committees, status and financial condition of the 
audit client, financial and personal relationships and provision of (NAS) affect 
perception of auditor independence held by EA, IFA, TBA and BLO? 
2. Do perceptions of auditor independence significantly differ between EA, IFA, 
TBA and BLO with respect to the impact of the above nine factors? 
3. How do participants from the EA, IFA, TBA and BLO perceive the auditing and 
accounting profession and its related legal, professional, social, and education 
environments in the Libyan context? 
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4. Do participants' attitudes from the targeted populations (EA, IFA, TBA and 
BLO) significantly differ about the accounting and auditing profession and its 
related environments in the Libyan context? 
5. Why are such perceptions of the impact of the above nine factors and the 
attitudes about the accounting and auditing profession and its related 
environments in the Libyan context held by EA, IFA, TBA and BLO? 
1.3: The chosen methodology of the research. 
As will be discussed in more detail in chapters five and six, there are two main 
methodologies that can be used in performing research in the social sciences: The 
qualitative approach and the quantitative approach. Both approaches and their methods 
of collecting data such as questionnaire surveys, structured, semi-structured and 
unstructured interviews have been used in previous related research to evaluate 
perceptions of auditor independence. Each method however, has its advantages and 
disadvantages. Studies that use only one method are more vulnerable to mistakes linked 
to that particular method than studies that use multiple methods where different types of 
data provide cross-data validity checks (Walsh, 2001; Robson, 2002; Collis and Hussey, 
2003). Therefore, to overcome the weaknesses of using either method and to obtain 
useful results, a mixed methodology research was used in this study by adopting both 
qualitative and quantitative methods of collecting data. 
Two stages of collecting data were conducted in this study. The first stage was based on 
a quantitative approach where structured questionnaires were used to clarify perceptions 
of external auditor independence and attitudes about the accounting and auditing 
profession held by four targeted groups (EA, IFA, TBA and BLO) in the Libyan context. 
The questionnaire was divided into three parts. In part one, participants were asked to 
provide some information about their background such as gender, age, occupation. 
Part 
two included 31 statements which described different auditor-client relationships 
followed by a five-point Likert scale and designed to measure the perceived effect of the 
nine selected factors on auditor independence. The last part of the questionnaire 
(i. e. 
part three), tended to measure the attitudes of the participants about the auditing and 
accounting profession and its related environments 
in the Libyan context. 
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In order to gain a more in-depth understanding of the perceived effect of the selected 
factors on auditor independence and attitudes about the accounting and auditing 
profession held by the subject groups in the Libyan context, a second stage using a 
qualitative approach collecting method was performed. In this stage data was collected 
through conducting semi-structured interviews with selected samples from the four 
targeted groups. In particular, semi-structured interviews were chosen for the current 
study among other types of interviews because they allow space for discussion and 
encourage participants to raise and elaborate on important related issues (Oppenheim, 
1997). 
Three main analysis techniques where used in this study to produce the findings from 
the quantitative and qualitative data. These included descriptive statistics, parametric 
tests such as the one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) and Duncan post-hoc 
comparison test, and content analysis technique. 
1.4: The motivations and justifications for the research. 
The incentive for conducting this study is due to the absence of extensive and in depth 
research exploring the effect of the above mentioned factors on perceptions of auditor 
independence in the Libyan context. This is especially important in the context of a 
developing country where significant changes in the political, social and economic 
systems are taking place. In particular, some of the main motivations for undertaking 
this study include the following: 
" As a result of the government policy in encouraging free market capitalism and 
boosting foreign investment into Libya, there has been a significant increase in 
public and joint venture companies in Libya over the years. As such, it is 
important to understand how auditor independence is perceived in Libya, 
especially for foreign investment company's confidence in the Libyan auditing 
profession to help them in their various investment decisions. 
" Through Libyan government economic development plans, the private sector 
has 
been encouraged to engage in major projects. As a result, significant growth in 
the public companies is expected in the coming years. In addition, the 
government has implemented policies on privatisation, thus, the need 
for auditors 
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and their services will increase, which in turn will affect the role of auditors and 
perceptions of their independence. 
" The results of this study will assist Libyan organisations related to the audit 
profession when making or adjusting policies regarding issues related to auditor 
independence. In addition, it will help in identifying which factors might 
significantly affect perceptions of auditor independence in Libya. 
Furthermore, the review of the relevant previous literature relating to auditor 
independence and the factors that might affect it (as will be discussed further in chapter 
four) revealed literature gaps that needed to be fully considered in order to gain better 
understanding of the nature of auditor independence and the factors that might have an 
effect on it. These issues include: 
" The majority of previous studies on perceptions of auditor independence were 
conducted in developed countries. Therefore, the results of this study will 
contribute to the auditor independence research literature by providing updates 
on information with respect to perceptions of auditor independence in a 
developing country, namely, Libya. 
" The conflicting results that some of the previous studies have arrived at with 
respect to the effect of certain factors on auditor independence. 
" Most of the previous research relied either on quantitative or qualitative 
approaches instead of using. 
1.5: The structure of the research. 
This study consists of ten chapters: 
Chapter one addresses several issues including the identification of the area of study, 
research objectives and questions, the chosen research methodology and the structure of 
the study. 
Chapter two presents an overview of some aspects of the Libyan environment in 
relation to its geography, population, history, culture, political system, economic 
developments and accounting and auditing profession and its related regulations. 
Chapter three provides a review of the development, nature and the importance of 
auditor independence in order to fully understand the 
issue under investigation. 
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Chapter four deals with the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence of the most 
related factors which were considered to be suitable for the purpose of this study. These 
included the size of the audit firm, tenure of the audit firm, competition among audit 
firms, auditors' economic dependence on their audit clients, audit committees, status and 
financial condition of the audit client, personal relationships, financial relationships and 
provision of non-audit services (NAS). 
Chapter five describes the research methodology in general. The two main paradigms, 
i. e. the Positivist and the Phenomenological, are going to be illustrated. In addition, a 
description of the three dominant research approached, i. e. the quantitative, the 
qualitative and the mixed research approach as well as the main methods of collecting 
data (questionnaire and interview) will be provided in this chapter. 
Chapter six outlines the chosen research methodology and the justification behind that. 
Both quantitative and qualitative methods (mixed research methodology) are adopted in 
this study. 
Chapter seven discusses the results from the analysed data from the questionnaire. 
These include results relating to part one, two and three of the questionnaire. 
Chapter eight analyses the results derived from the analysed data of the semi-structured 
interviewees. 
Chapter nine covers a broad discussion on the main finding of the study relating to the 
participants' perceptions from the four targeted groups with respect to the effect of the 
nine selected factors on auditor independence and to their attitudes about the accounting 
and auditing profession. 
Chapter ten provides an overview of the whole study, presents a summary of the 
research findings, outlines the research recommendations, highlights the study's 
potential contribution to the accounting and auditing profession and 
literature and 
finally, explains the limitations of the study and suggests areas of further research. 
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Chapter two: 
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Chapter two: 
An overview of the context of the research. 
2.0: Introduction. 
The main purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the environmental 
characteristics within Libya in order to provide insight into the country's social, 
political and economic context. These interrelated factors may influence individual's 
values, attitudes and behaviour towards and about perceptions of auditor 
independence. Thus understanding these factors may be helpful in understanding and 
explaining perceptions of auditor independence held by the participants of this study 
in the Libyan context. 
The chapter is divided into four main sections. The first section deals with the social 
and political environment. The second section outlines the Libyan economy (before 
and after the discovery of oil). The third section examines the accounting and 
auditing environment in Libya. The final section provides a brief summary of the 
chapter. 
2.1: The social and political environment of the context. 
In order to gain better understanding of the concept of auditor independence and the 
perceived effect that some factors could have on it, it is very important to provide an 
overview of the social and political environment in the Libyan context as follows: 
2.1.1: Geography and population. 
The current official name of Libya is the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya (GSPLAJ). Throughout this study, it is referred to as "Libya". Libya is 
one of the Arab countries located in the North Central part of Africa. It is bounded 
(see figure 2.1) on the north by the Mediterranean Sea, on the east and south east by 
Egypt and Sudan, on the south and southwest by Chad and Niger, on the west by 
Algeria and on the northwest by Tunisia. The area of Libya is 1,759,540 Square 
Kilometres (1,092,882 Square Miles) which ranks it as the fourth largest state in 
Africa and the fifteenth largest in the world. Most of the country's land 
forms part of 
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the vast plateau of North Africa that extends from the Atlantic Ocean on the west to 
the Red sea on the east. 
Figure (2.1) Map of Libya 
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Libya, previously was divided into three regions; Tripolitania in the northwest, 
Cyrenaica in the northeast and Fezzan in the south. More than 90 per cent of the 
Libyan's land area is unoccupied land. In particular, 94.73 per cent desert, 3.94 per 
cent agricultural and 0.29 per cent forests. This fact created an unbalanced 
demographic situation where most of the population of the country centred in the 
main coastal cities such as Tripoli (the capital of Libya), Benghazi, Misratah, 
Az -Zawia and Darnah (Ahmad, 2004). 
The last official census which was conducted in 2005 showed that the population of 
Libya is 6,000,566 (Libyan Secretariat of Economic and Planning 2007). Islam is the 
state religion and the official language of Libya is Arabic though English and Italian 
are used in trade. The climate of Libya is a Mediterranean one where temperature 
may reach up to more than 45C° in the southern areas in summer time and 
drops to 
below OC° in the northern areas in winter. 
2.1.2: Historical background. 
The strategic location of Libya in the Mid-Mediterranean part of 
North Africa, 
occupying nearly 1,900 kilometres of coastline with the 
Mediterranean Sea, made it a 
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favourable target to several invasions throughout history. The history of Libya has 
been one of the long-time colonisation. For a period of about 3000 years the country 
was subjected to several waves of military invasion and colonisation including the 
Phoenicians, the Greek, the Roman, the Vandals and the Byzantines (Farley, 1971; 
Nyrop, 1973; Fisher, 1985; Ahmad, 2004). 
During the first half of the 7th century, Libya as well as all of the other countries in 
the north of Africa was invaded by the Arab Muslims who overrun the country and 
captured Tripoli in 643 AD. Since then, Libya turned away from the identification 
with European world to the culture and influence of Islam and Arab (Nyrop, 1973). 
Steel (1967: 191) points out that: 
"With the Arabic conquest, beginning in 643. AD, the history of Libya took an 
entirely different course, its culture was changed and so were its language, 
religion and population. In a few years the Arabs were able to do in Libya and the 
rest of North Africa what neither the Romans nor the Byzantines were able to do in 
centuries ". 
During this era, the country was subject to different Christian invaders such the 
Sicilians (1146-1158), the Spanish (1510-1530) and the Knights of Malta (1530-1551) 
(Aghila, 2000). Because the Islamic religion and the Arabic language are the two 
dominant elements in Libya, the locals asked the Islamic Ottoman Empire (Turkey) 
to help them to be freed from the Christian invaders. As a result, the Ottoman fleet in 
1551 bombarded and captured Tripoli and the Turkish domination over Libya lasted 
until 1911 when they were overthrown by the Italians. 
On 29th September 1911, Italy, declared war on Turkey and on 3rd October 1911 its 
troops took most of the Libyan coastal cities such as Tripoli, Benghazi and Tobruk. 
The Italian colonisation of Libya lasted until the end of the Second World War. 
Following the defeat of the Italians and their Germans allies, the British and the 
French established their administration over the whole country. Tripolitania and 
Cyrenaica were under the British control whereas Fezzan was under the French 
control. This situation lasted until 24th December 1951 when the United Nations 
declared Libya as an independent United Kingdom ruled by King Idris of the Sanusi 
family. 
On September 1,1969, the monarchy was overthrown by a group of military officers 
who took power and gained control of the entire country. The 
Revolutionary 
Command Council (RCC) which formed a new government headed by an army 
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officer called Muammar Al Gadhafi declared the country to be a free and sovereign 
state called the Libyan Arab Republic. Freedom, Socialism and Unity were declared 
to be the principles of the revolution. In line with its intended populist and socialist 
character, in 1977 the official name of the country was changed to be the Socialist 
Peoples' Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. 
2.1.3: Social and cultural aspects. 
Libya and the Libyan people are considered to be part of the Arab World. `Arab' 
refers to inhabitants in Africa (Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, 
Sudan and Somalia), Western Asia (Jordan, Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi 
Arabia, Yemen, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and Oman) who 
speak Arabic and identify themselves with what is generally recognised as the Arab 
culture. 
Similar to other Arab countries, Libya is characterised by the extended family, clan, 
tribe and village. These play a chief role in the community's life and people's 
relationships with each other (Agnaia, 1997). Furthermore, personal connections and 
kinship play a significant part in business and economic relationships and career 
promotion is though these rather than practical experience or academic qualification. 
In Arab societies, occasional loyalty to family, clan and tribe outweigh loyalty to 
profession or law (Ahmad, 2004). The tribal system's structure and perceived kinship 
was one of the most powerful bonds which every person inherited upon birth, 
irrespective of government, religion or race (Hudaib, 2003). 
Families in Arab societies, consist of wide connections that usually include parents 
and their unmarried and married sons and daughters with their families as well as 
many other distant relatives such as grandparents, aunts, uncles and cousins. 
Commenting on the role of the strong bonds between individuals and their families 
or tribes, Agnaia (1996) states that because the individual is identified with his 
family, his good or bad deeds bring collective fame or shame to both his/her family 
and tribe. The individual is responsible for the wellbeing of his family and his/her 
acts are carried out in terms of his/her family's needs. Thus, the behaviour of the 
individual in various life situations is essentially an expression of his/her family, 
patterns. The individual has to obey and respect the rules and traditions of 
his/her 
family, clan, tribe and village. 
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Besides family, clan and tribe as the basis of the development of the Arabian social 
characteristics, Islamic religion is another important factor that plays a vital role in 
the community's life and people's relationships with each other in the Libyan culture. 
In this vein, El-Fathaly (1977: 12) states that: 
"The strong role of religion in a traditional Islamic society like that of Libya has 
produced a society with special features. Conservative attitudes have been 
predominant in every respect. People 's values and behaviour have been a function 
of their religious background and attachment; hence, evaluation and acceptance of 
innovation and change have been subject to religious beliefs and notion ". 
Most of the values and ideals of the Libyan society are driven from the teachings of 
the Islamic religion that supports integration and social harmony, equality among 
people, social justice, and tolerance to other religions, encourages thrift, induces hard 
work and permits trade but prohibits usury (Kilani, 1988; Ahmad, 2004). 
2.1.4: The Political System. 
In many countries, the political system and the type of the government would have 
an essential influence on the societal behaviour. For example, more freedom for the 
public to express their views and to take required actions would be expected to be 
provided by a democratic government. Whereas adherence to rules and less freedom 
for the society to convey thoughts would be expected to be found in a communist 
regime (Hudaib, 2003). In order to gain better understanding of the concept of the 
auditor independence, it is important to provide an overview of the political system 
of the Libyan context. 
Before the independence of Libya on 24th December 1951, the country had witnessed 
one of the longest period of colonisation. As previously mentioned, the Libyan 
region was ruled and governed by several invaders who implemented their own 
political systems. The tribe system, however, was dominant, and each tribe was to 
some extent free to run its own affairs as long as it was not involved in active 
political oppositions and payed the required tax (Buzied, 1998). 
On 24th December 1951, Libya was declared an independent united kingdom, with 
federal constitution. According to the federal constitution promulgated 
in October 
1951, the state of Libya was a federal monarchy ruled by king Idris Al-Sanusi and 
the country was divided into three regions; these were Tripolitania 
(in the north west). 
Cyrenaica (in the North east) and Fezzan (in the south) (Kilani, 1988). In April 1963. 
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legislation designed to transform Libya from a federal into a unitary state was 
introduced by the federal government. This led to dividing the country in to ten 
administrative areas instead of the three previous regions. 
On 1St September 1969, the Libyan political system was changed by a group of 
military officers who called themselves a Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) 
and proclaimed the Libyan Arab Republic (LAR). Their provisional constitution 
stated that supreme power would remain in the hands of the RCC. Arab nationalism 
was the main force underlying the revolution's policies. This led to strict laws 
requiring businesses operating in Libya to be controlled by Libyans, with banks 
being particularly affected, and most of the European and American Expertises were 
replaced by Arabs (Kilani, 1988). 
In November 1976, a provision under a decree promulgated by the RCC was made 
for the creation of the General National Congress of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) 
which was the country's only permitted political party. Afterwards, the ASU 
developed into the General People Congress (GPC) in 1977 when Libya became a 
"state of the Masses" or a Jamahiria, after the Declaration of the people's Authority 
on the 2nd of March of that year. This declaration became from then on the 
cornerstone of the Libyan political system based on the "Third Universal Theory" of 
the Green Book'. It includes the following points: a) the official name of Libya will 
be the Socialist Libyan Arab Jamahria; b) the Qur'an is the law of society; c) popular 
direct authority is the basis of the political regime of the country. The people practise 
their power through Basic People Congresses (BPC), people committees, trade 
unions, professional unions and the GPC and d) the defence of the homeland is the 
responsibility of all men and women citizens. According to this declaration, the RCC 
disappeared and the GPC was established. As well, the Council of Ministers was 
replaced by the General People's Committee whose members were Secretaries of 
departments. 
1- Green book is a political work published by Colonel Mummer al 
Qaddafi, the leader of Libya, covering 
political, economic and social problems and solutions 
in Libya. It is based on the third Universal Theory as a 
new way rather than capitalism theory 
in western economies and classical theory of Marx in former eastern 
economies. 
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2.2: The economic environment of the context. 
The need for the external auditor's services in any society are influenced to a great 
extent by the stage and type of the economic development in that society which in 
turn affects the meaning of auditor independence (Hudaib, 2003). This section will 
analyses the development stages that the Libyan economic system had witnessed. 
These include two main stages; the Libyan economy before the discovery of oil and 
the Libyan economy after the discovery of oil. 
2.2.1: The Libyan economy before the discovery of oil. 
Prior to the discovery of oil in Libya in 1959, the country was described as one of the 
poorest countries in the world. The Libyan economy during this period as many 
economists mentioned was a defect economy. For example, Benjamin Higgins 
(1959), cited in Bait El-Mal et al, (1973: 84), who worked as an economic advisor to 
Libya and its prospects for development in the early 1950's, stated that: 
"Libya's great merit as a case study is as a prototype of poor country. We need 
not construct models of an economy where the bulk of the people live on a 
subsistence level, where per capita income is well below $50 per year, where 
there are no sources of power and no mineral resources, where agricultural 
expansion is severely limited by climatic conditions, where capital formation is 
zero or less, where there is no skilled labour supply and no indigenous 
entrepreneurship ... 
Libya is at the bottom of the range in income and resources 
and so provides a reference point for comparison with all other countries. ... if 
Libya can be brought to a stage of sustained growth, there is hope for every 
country in the world". 
Before the discovery of oil, nearly 80% of the Libyan population were engaged in 
agriculture and animal farming while in the main time, only few opportunities were 
available to the locals, and those were mainly confined to textile and handicrafts. The 
few large enterprises in the country at that time were owned and managed by Italian 
expatriates. This situation of the Libyan economy as many authors suggested was 
caused by the Italians during their colonisation of the country. Commenting on this, 
Bait El-Mal et al (1973: 85) mentioned that: 
"The country's background had the unfortunate result of reserving most of the 
skilled jobs for Italian immigrants as this group appeared to 
be more qualified 
than the indigenous population. Very little seems to have been done to prepare the 
country for self-government. The educational and technical training of 
Libyans 
was neglected; to a large extent they were excluded 
ftom administrative positions 
in government and private enterprise ". 
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For nearly five decades prior to the discovery of oil (1911-1960), the Libyan budget 
was operating in deficits to an extraordinary extent. These deficits were reduced by 
grants, expenditures and investments of foreign governments mainly from the UK 
government and the USA government (Mahmud, 1997). Libya in that period was not 
only in need of monetary support; the rate of illiteracy was high (94%) with very 
limited skilled labour (Wright, 1982; El Fathaly, 1977). Therefore, the country 
depended heavily on advisors, including technicians from the USA, the UK and the 
United Nations in establishing its different systems (Abbas, 1987; Kilani, 1988). 
Overall, the Libyan economy during the period before the discovery of oil was 
heavily reliant on two main sources of finance for public expenditures; these were 
the domestic revenues and the foreign grants and aid. Consequently, due to the 
deficits of these two main financial resources, the economic development was 
restricted to a few programs supported by some foreign countries with the major help 
being provided by the UK and the USA. 
2.2.2: The Libyan economy after the discovery of oil. 
Following the discovery of crude oil and natural gas in commercial quantities in the 
late 1950s, the Libyan economy grew rapidly. This made the oil sector as the major 
source of revenues for the government budget and contributed to the bulk of total 
resources. As a result, extraordinary modifications to all aspects of life in Libya were 
made. Libya in a short time after the discovery of oil had changed from one of the 
poorest countries in the world to become one of the richest countries. Financial aid 
was no longer required and dependence on foreign grants and aid, however, was 
replaced by dependence on foreign oil companies who rushed to invest in the country 
(Bait El-Mal et al, 1973). In 1955 the Libyan government, in an attempt to encourage 
oil companies to explore and carry out oil development operation enacted the Libyan 
Petroleum Law (Abbas, 1987). 
Crude oil and natural gas revenues have had a tremendous impact on the 
development of the Libyan society. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and per capita 
income increased substantially, the relative importance of the other economic sectors 
(agriculture, industry and services) changed and the surplus in the balance of 
payment increased from one year to the other making 
it the most important source of 
capital formation (Mousa, 2005). As a result, the government was encouraged 
to 
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channel these revenues towards the growth of the national economy with a serious of 
ambitious economic development plans. 
The structure of the Libyan economy after the revolution of 1969 however, has 
witnessed dramatic changes due to the belief of the new leaders that the international 
foreign companies who were operating in Libya were exploitative and needed to be 
nationalised. Therefore, a number of steps were taken by the new administrations to 
reorganise the dominant state of the economy. The socio-economic policy that was 
adopted had changed the country from capitalism to socialism. State intervention in 
the economy has increased and the expanding of the public sector and reduction of 
the private sector were notably performed by the government. Commenting on these 
changes, Kilani (1988: 55) points out that: 
"The whole private sector was to be completely abolished by the end of 1981, to be 
replaced by people's economic committees. Indeed, the private sector is being 
dismantled progressively and inexorably, and progress has now reached the point 
where private bakeries, butchers, and barber shops have been taken over by the 
public sector". 
Due to the crises that the Libyan economy had faced during the late 1980's and 
1990's as a result of the worldwide sharp drop of oil prices, the state introduced a 
series of liberalisation measures for the first time since 1969 which included a 
significant role for the private sector. The main objectives of these measures were to 
cut public spending, to gradually withdraw subsidies and to promote and encourage 
the private sector initiatives (Vandewalle, 1998). For example, in 1992, the 
government issued the Act No 9 to regulate and enhance the role of the private sector 
activities in the economy. According to this Act, new bases for individuals to engage 
in different activities as sole owners or in partnerships were provided. Act No 9, 
specified the areas of which the private sector and individuals can operate in. These 
include agriculture, industry, commerce, tourism, transport, finance and the private 
practice of professionals. 
Furthermore, in order to attract foreign investments and to accelerate the social and 
economic development, Law No. 5 of 1997, relating to encouraging 
foreign 
investment was enacted by the GPC. Specifically this Law allows for 100% equity 
ownership of companies licensed under the Law. The provisions of 
Law No 5, 
attempts to lower the tax and customs fee burden on qualifying companies. 
Moreover, 
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in 2004, the government commenced a program of privatisations of 360 state-owned 
enterprises (US & Foreign Commercial Services, 2007). 
As a result of these development plans and decisions to reorganise the structure of 
the Libyan economic system, the GDP has remarkably increased during the period 
between 2000 to 2005, as can be seen from table 2.1 which illustrates the 
contribution of different sectors in the Libyan GDP for that period. The socialist- 
oriented economy of Libya depends primarily upon revenues from the oil sector, 
which consists of practically all export earnings and over half of GDP. The oil 
revenues and a small population gave Libya one of the highest per capita GDP in 
Africa (US$12.404 in 2006) with a real GDP growth rate of 5.6 % for the same year 
(US Department of State, 2008). 
Table (2.1): The Libyan GDP by sectors over the period from 2000 to 2005 (in 
Libyan Dinars) 
The Economic Sectors 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing 1437.7 1392.0 1348.8 1375.8 1439.3 1554.5 
Oil and Natural Gas 7761.9 6784.2 13630.6 18940.5 27228.0 39937.5 
Mining and Quarrying 293.9 306.7 387.1 360.2 411.0 495.5 
Manufacturing 889.7 877.8 813.1 764.7 761.1 799.0 
Electricity, Gas and Water 270.0 284.6 293.7 303.1 334.4 379.0 
Construction 1013.9 1063.4 1342.3 1249.0 1424.9 1718.0 
Trade, Restaurants and Hotels 1685.9 1882.4 2089.5 2193.9 2392.1 2797.9 
Transportation, Storage and Communication 1213.9 1299.3 1429.2 1515.0 1663.6 1947.5 
Finance insurance and Ownership of 
Dwellings 
357.2 377.2 414.9 439.9 478.9 560.1 
Ownership of Houses 475.5 499.0 515.0 534.1 591.6 614.1 
General Services (includes Education and 
Health) 
2665.8 2901.4 3222.3 3606.5 4286.0 4682.4 
Other Services 391.5 411.1 427.5 448.9 475.5 539.3 
Total GDP 18456.9 18079.1 25914.1 31731.8 41486.2 56025.2 
% of Oil and Gas Sector to Total GDP 42.05 37.53 52.60 59.67 65.63 
71.28 
% of Other Sectors to Total GDP 57.95 62.47 47.40 40.33 
34.37 28.72 
MEM 
Sources: Central Bank of Libya (2006). 
2.3: Accounting and auditing environment in the context. 
The purpose of this section is to present an overview of the accounting and auditing 
profession in Libya in terms of its development and related regulations in order to 
gain better knowledge of the status of the profession which in turn might 
help in 
understanding how auditor independence is being perceived in the Libyan context. 
1 Exchange Rate L. D 1= US$ 0.78 (Central Bank of Libya, 2006). 
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2.3.1: Development of accounting and auditing. 
Various colonial systems have influenced the Libyan social, political and economic 
environment, including the accounting and auditing environment. According to 
Kilani (1988) the historical development of accounting knowledge and the profession 
in Libya was the product of the intervention of foreign countries and companies in its 
internal affairs. 
The Ottoman Empire occupied Libya for more than three centuries (1551-1911). 
During this period as Buzied (1998) points out, there was no strong evidence that 
indicates whether modem accounting or auditing was implemented or not. He argued 
that accounting during this period of colonisation was confined to simple book- 
keeping (Single entry) in order to compute and meet the requirements of the Tax and 
Zakat'. Specifically, Buzied (1998: 128) stresses that: 
"During the Turkish rule there was no organised or fixed taxation system: most of 
the tax systems (methods and basis) were imposed according to the personal 
judgement of the Pasha or Shaik ". 
During the Italian colonisation era (1911-1943), Libya was politically and 
economically considered as an extension of the Italian mainland (Ghanem, 1982). 
Therefore, Italian legal and management systems were implemented and were to a 
great extent the same as those in Italy. The accounting system was not an exception. 
The Italian accounting profession and the Italian tax laws were the two main factors 
that contributed to the formation of the shape of the accounting system in Libya 
(Kilani, 1988). As a result of this consideration, the Italian enterprises as well as the 
Italian government departments brought with them their accountants who 
implemented the same Italian accounting profession and practices in Libya. During 
the Italian occupation, however, financial accounting was the only branch of 
accounting that was practiced, and there was no evidence of any auditing or other 
professional activities (Kilani, 1988). 
The second factor that had an impact on the development of accounting in Libya was 
the 1923 Italian tax law. According to this law, each registered company was 
required to provide financial statements and other accounts at the end of each year to 
the tax authority (Bait El-Mal, 1981). Despite that this law was not particularly 
'- Zakat is an annual payment which is obligatory for all Muslims. It is payable on all 
kinds of wealth 
that has the capacity to grow such as gold and silver, cash, land's products and 
fruits ( Buzied, 1998). 
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designed for the Libyan context, Buzied (1998) contends that there was evidence that 
it was in effect until 1968. He suggests that this is an indication that the accounting 
system and practices in Libya continued to be indirectly influenced by Italian 
accounting systems. The Italian accounting practices, however, did not last for a longg 
time because most of the Italian enterprises and government departments did not 
employ Libyans in administrative and accounting jobs. The educational and technical 
training of the native people was neglected during the Italian colonisation era (Bait 
El-Mal, et al, 1973). 
After the Italians were defeated in the Second World War, the British and the French 
took control of administering Libya until its independence in late 1951. During this 
period, there were no major changes in the economic or policy aspects and the 
Italians continued to control most of the country's enterprises. Therefore, neither the 
accounting profession nor the accounting practices have witnessed any important 
changes (Buzied, 1998). After the independence of the Libyan state in 1951, the 
Libyan accounting profession witnessed dramatic changes which were widely 
influenced by several factors. These factors include accounting education, accounting 
academics, international accounting firms, international enterprises and the rapid 
changes in the Libyan social, economic, political and legal environment. These 
influential factors have caused the Libyan accounting profession to follow the same 
path as its counterparts in the UK and the USA (Kilani, 1988). 
Due to the exploration of oil and natural gas in the late years of the 1950's and the 
start of exporting in the early years of the 1960's, the country has witnessed huge 
development that led to businesses in both the private and public sectors. 
Consequently, investors, creditors, management and government agencies needed 
much more reliable financial information in order to help them in their decision- 
making process (Kilani, 1988). As a result, many foreign accounting firms 
from 
different countries such as Egypt, Italy, the USA and the UK opened branches in 
Libya in the 1960s (Bait El-Mal et al, 1973). These foreign enterprises were free to 
implement their home country accounting policy standards and practices. It has been 
argued by many authors that these accounting philosophies of the original companies 
continued to be applied in the Libyan enterprises even after 
being nationalised (Bait 
El-Mal et al, 1973; Kilani, 1988; Buzied, 1998). 
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As a result of the increase in Libyan graduate accountants from the Libyan university 
and the return of others from abroad who graduated in the 1970's, many Libyan 
accounting firms were established. There was an increased number of accounting 
firms who were not properly controlled in terms of regulations related to accounting 
and auditing standards and procedures. This led to an urgent need to set up a 
professional body which could take responsibility for developing a general 
framework of accounting and auditing in Libya. To meet this demand, the Libyan 
Accountants and Auditors Association (LAAA) was established in June 1975 under 
law No. 116 of 1973 with the aim of achieving the following objectives: 
1. To organise and improve the conditions of the accounting profession and to 
raise the standards of accountants and auditors professionally, academically, 
culturally and politically. 
2. To organise and participate in conferences and seminars related to accounting 
internally and externally and to keep in touch with new events, scientific 
periodicals, lectures and so on. 
3. To establish a retirement pension fund for its members. 
4. To increase co-operation between its members and to protect their rights. 
5. To take action against members who violate the traditions and ethics of the 
profession. 
Although it has been more than thirty years since the establishment of the LAAA, 
there is a general agreement among accountants, academics and researchers that most 
of these objectives have not been achieved yet. For instance, several remarkable 
points have been concluded by many researchers such as failure to develop 
accounting and auditing standards or a code of ethics, the limited role in conducting 
effective research programs and the weak professional control over accounting 
practices and policy and deficiencies in monitoring accounting education (Kilani, 
1988; Bengharbia, 1989; Mahmud, 1997; Buzied, 1998; Ahmad, 2004). The main 
possible reasons for this limited role of the LAAA as Mousa (2005) suggests are the 
small size and the limited authority of the LAAA. 
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In addition to the LAAA, the Institute of Financial Auditing' (IFA) is another 
governmental body that has the responsibility for auditing all of the government 
organisations' accounts, organisations aided or receiving loans from the government, 
any other corporations to which the state contributed more than 25 % of its capital 
and foreign companies operating in Libya. This institute is directly responsible to the 
GPC to whom it should report. In practice, and for many reasons such as the shortage 
of qualified staff, delay in auditing the accounts of the above organisations has 
become a major problem for the IFA. Therefore, most of these tasks are being 
transferred to external auditors. 
2.3.2: Related accounting and auditing regulations. 
Accounting and auditing practices are regulated by direct legislation in many 
developing countries (Saleh, 2001). Libya is not an exception. The major impact on 
accounting and auditing practices in Libya has come from several regulations such as 
the Libyan Commercial Code (LCC), Income Tax law, Petroleum law, and the 
Accounting and Auditing Profession law. A brief overview of these laws will be 
provided in this section as follows: 
The Libyan Commercial Code: 
The Libyan Commercial Code (LCC) was enacted on November 1953, and has since 
been partially amended a number of times in order to meet the changing 
requirements of Libyan society. The LCC was first issued after Libya was granted its 
independence in 1951 to organise trading activities. This law was designed to cover 
seven commercial aspects: 1) Merchant and commercial activities; 2) Commercial 
contracts; 3) Banking transactions; 4) Negotiable instruments; 5) Commercial papers; 
6) Commercial companies and 7) Bankruptcy and its prevention. 
According to the LCC every enterprise has to keep a number of records such as a 
Journal, Inventory and Balance Sheet. The Journal should include any daily 
transactions related in any way to the enterprise's activities as well as its monthly 
1- The IFA through out its development has witnessed several changes in terms of 
its name, objectives and to 
home it should be responsible. At first it was established 
by law No. 31 of 1955 and was called the State 
Accounting Bureau (SAB). In 1988 and under law No. 7, the SAB became the Institute of Public Follow-Up 
(IPFU). IN 1996 by law No. 11, the IPFU changed to be the Institute of the public Control (IPC). Law No. 
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of 2001 renamed the IPC to become the 
Institute of Public Control and Investigation (IPCI). Recently, the 
IPCI once again has changed its name 
by law No. 3 of 2007 to be the Institute of Financial Auditing (IFA). 
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total expenditures. The Inventory and the Balance Sheet Book consists of an annual 
inventory list, a profit and loss account and a balance sheet 
In order to ensure that all the enterprises' accounts, records and financial statements 
are correct, the LCC required that every corporation should have an independent 
Controlling Committee consisting of three to five members (shareholders or others). 
This Committee is responsible directly to the shareholders and its main purpose is to 
observe the company's management to ensure that its activities and responsibilities 
are carried out in accordance with the existing related laws. Specifically this 
Committee has to make sure that the company's accounting system is operated in 
accordance with accounting rules and procedures as specified by law and the 
company's financial statements agree with the data in the company's records. To 
meet these obligations, the LCC required that at least one of the Controlling 
Committee members should have accounting knowledge. 
Although the LCC drew attention to accounting practices and methods and provided 
a broad framework regarding some of the accounting aspects, only little detail on the 
form and design of the accounting records have been given. In addition, the 
principles and standards that should be adopted when practising the accounting and 
auditing were not specified (Buzied, 1998). 
The Libyan Income Tax Law: 
As discussed earlier, the 1923 Italian Income Tax Law was implemented and used in 
Libya with some modifications to suit the Libyan situation until 1968 when the first 
united Libyan Income tax law was issued on the 14th of April 1968. In 1973 the 1968 
Income tax law was eliminated due to the enactment of the Income Tax Law No. 64 
of 1973 which in turn was cancelled out in 2003. Currently, the Libyan income tax 
law No. 11 of 2003 is applied and consists of 112 Articles divided into five main 
parts: 1) General Provisions (Articles 1-34); 2) Tax on Individuals and small 
Businesses (Articles 35-71); 3) Tax on Companies (Articles 72-80); 4) Penalties 
(Articles 81-89) and 5) Final Provisions (Articles 90-112). 
According to the Libyan Income Tax law, enterprises are required to provide the tax 
authority with their balance sheet, trading account, profit and 
loss account, 
deprecation statement, and detailed statements of the company's expenses that are 
included in the profit and loss account. The application of Libyan income tax law has 
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had an impact on the companies accounting practices in that several corporations 
have adopted tax guidelines and requirements not only for tax purposes but for 
internal and external financial reporting as well (Bait El-Mal et al, 1988; Saleh, 
2001). 
The Libyan Petroleum law. 
The Libyan Petroleum law (LPL) No. 25 was enacted in 1955 as an attempt by the 
Libyan government to encourage the international oil companies to invest and 
explore for oil. According to Buzied (1998), the LPL expected to have an impact on 
the evolution and development of accounting practices in oil companies in particular 
and in non-oil companies in general through accountants and auditing firms working 
in both sectors. He argued that the country lacked qualified and experienced 
accountants by which the country could audit and impose Libyan accounting systems 
during that period of time (1950s). This led to all of the oil enterprises adopting their 
home countries' accounting systems. This viewpoint was shared by Kilani (1988) 
who discussed the influences of the LPL on the accounting practices in Libya. In this 
context, Kilani (1988: 150) stresses that: 
"It (LPL) explicitly opened the door for international accounting practices to be 
adopted by oil companies operating in Libya. In many instances, the law stated that 
oil companies might use the oil accounting practices applied in other oil exporting 
countries ". 
Although most of the accounting records and financial statements and their format 
and contents have been specified by the LPL No. 25, the oil companies were left free 
to adopt any accounting practices that suited their interests (Buzied, 1998). 
The Libyan Accounting and Auditing law. 
The first law that dealt with the accounting and auditing aspects in Libya was law No. 
116 of 1973. On 20th December 1973 the Libyan government enacted law No. 116 of 
1973 in order to regulate and organise the accounting and auditing profession. This 
law was divided into eight sections. These include: 1) the establishment of the 
Libyan Accountants and Auditors Association, 2) registration of accountants, 
3) exercise of the profession, 4) fees, 5) pension and contribution fund, 6) obligations 
of accountants and auditors, 7) penalties and 8) general and transitional provisions. 
29 
According to Articles No. 32, every accountant who wants to practice accounting 
and auditing in Libya has to be registered as a chartered accountant with the LAAA. 
There are two classifications of membership of the LAAA. The first includes 
working accountants and auditors which is further broken down into two groups of 
accountants and assistant accountants. The second membership classification is that 
of non-working accountants and auditors. This type is also divided into two groups 
of non-working accountants and auditors and non-working accountants and auditors 
assistants. In addition, Articles No. 24,26, and 28 of the law requested that every 
accountant is registered with the LAAA have to meet several requirements. These 
include: a) hold Libyan nationality, b) have a bachelor's degree in accounting, c) 
Enjoy political and civil rights, d) have the necessary conduct, reputation and 
respectability required for the profession and e) have five years' experience of 
accounting work in accounting office after education. 
Accountants who have a bachelor's degree in accounting without experience can be 
registered in the working assistants group while accountants who have a bachelor's 
degree in accounting and do not intend to practice the profession will be registered as 
non-working accountants. Accountants who hold a higher degree than a bachelor's 
degree in accounting are exempt from the experience requirement if the higher 
degree requires four or more years of study and training. Those accountants who are 
listed in the working accountants' registration have the right to certify accounts and 
balance sheets of any type of enterprises and taxpayers. The kind of services that 
accounting and auditing firms can offer in Libya include preparing financial reports 
(financial statements), auditing, tax services, offer bankruptcy, management 
consulting, accounting system design and installation. 
In an attempt to maintain auditor's independence (the main concern of the current 
research) in the Libyan context, law No. 116 of 1973 prohibited auditors from 
combining their status as public accountants with certain activities. These include: a) 
a ministerial position, b) any public post, permanent or temporary, with salary or 
compensation (unless he was permitted to do so according to the provision of this 
law), c) any commercial activities and d) all other activities which are not compatible 
with the profession. 
In addition to these prohibited activities, it is unlawful for auditors to advertise or to 
use mediators in order to practice the accounting and auditing profession, and all of 
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the members of the LAAA are required to meet all of the obligations that may be 
imposed on them by the law and by the ethics of the profession. The independence of 
the Libyan auditors in practice, however, is questionable. According to Kilani (1988), 
the appointment of the external auditors in Libya depends to a great extent on social 
and family ties. 
Law No. (134) of 2006 for establishing the Libyan Stock Exchange (LSE). 
On 3ed June 2006 the Libyan General People's Committee issued law No. 134 of 
2006 for the purpose of establishing the Libyan Stock Exchange as a joint stock 
company under direct control and observation of the General Public Committee of 
the Investment, Economic and Commerce with capital of 20 million LD, divided into 
2 million shares with a nominal value of 10 LD per share. Due to its recent 
establishment, the LSE has signed agreements with several countries' Stock 
Exchanges in order to develop the performance of the LSE's departments, systems 
and employees through conducting different workshop courses both locally and 
abroad. For example, on 18th October 2007, a cooperation agreement was signed in 
London between the LSE and the London Stock Exchange. 
The listed market securities include the National Mills and Fodder Company, the 
United Insurance Company, Bank of Deserts, the Libyan Insurance Company, Sahari 
Bank and the Hay Alandalus Domestic Bank. The main purposes and objectives of 
the LSE as stated in law No. 134 of 2006 are as follows: 
1. To prepare an appropriate investment environment in order to achieve the 
general welfare. 
2. To encourage the reservation habit and raise the investment knowledge in 
order to direct the reserves to the most beneficial sectors. 
3. To control and observe financial transactions. 
4. To serve the social and economic development. 
5. To contribute in the process of privatisation of state owned enterprises. 
6. To conduct research and collect statistical data about the listed enterprises. 
7. To establish the required standards to ensure and secure the correctness of the 
financial market's transactions. 
ýl 
8. To develop the competence of the LSE's employees by conducting the 
necessary training. 
9. To develop cooperative relationships with other regional and international 
financial markets. 
According to Article No. 55, until the establishment of national accounting and 
auditing standards, all listed enterprises' financial reports have to be prepared 
according to the international accounting and auditing standards. 
Law No. 3 of 2007 for establishing the Institute of the Financial Auditing (IFA). 
On 22nd January 2007, the Libyan GPC enacted law No. 3 of 2007 to establish the 
IFA1 as an independent institution directly under the control of the Libyan GPC. The 
main objective of the IFA is to audit the state organisations. This includes all of the 
government secretaries (Monasteries), departments, embassies and state companies. 
In addition, the IFA is responsible for auditing any organisation aided or receiving 
grants or loans from the government, organisations that the state contributed more 
than 25 % of its capital, social organisations supported by the state and foreign 
companies and its subsidiaries that operate in Libya. The IFA has the right to make 
contracts with external auditors to carry out the task of auditing state enterprises' 
financial statements. In such cases the external auditor will be directly responsible to 
report to the IFA instead of the management of these enterprises. 
To be a member of the IFA, an accountant must meet a number of requirements. 
These include: a) hold Libyan nationality, b) have a bachelor's degree in accounting, 
c) be active over political and civil rights and d) be of good conduct, reputation and 
respectability, commensurate with the profession and agree to perform with complete 
honesty and sincerity. 
Despite the fact that law No. 3 of 2007 has requested from all of the above 
organisations to prepare annual financial reports including an income statement and a 
balance sheet. It did not explicitly specify any particular accounting or auditing 
standards that have to be adopted. 
Overall, it can be seen that some of these laws have been issued a long time ago and 
some of them have not been modified to take into consideration the economic, 
1- For more details of the history of the development of the IFA, refer to page 
23. 
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political, and social changes in the Libyan environment. In addition, some of these 
laws were inherited or partially translated from the US, the UK or the Italian 
accounting laws and systems. Therefore, the Libyan systems and laws that related to 
the accounting and auditing profession and its practices, needed to be totally or 
partially amended in order to take into account the dramatic changes that the country 
has witnessed during recent decades. 
2.4: Summary. 
This chapter has provided an overview of some aspects of the Libyan environment in 
relation to its geography, population, history, culture, political system, economic 
developments and accounting and auditing profession and its related regulations. 
It was revealed that Libya is an Arab developing country located in the 
mid-Mediterranean North Africa with relatively small population compared to its 
large area. The official language is Arabic and Islam is the only religion in the 
country. Libya was subject to several waves of invasions throughout its history until 
1951 when it gained its independence. The country's political ideology is based on 
the thoughts of the Green Book theory which established Libya as the state of the 
masses or Jamahiria where people have direct control of the country's affaires. 
Libya after the discovery of oil in the late 19505 had changed from one of the poorest 
countries in the world to become one of the richest countries. Crude oil and natural 
gas revenues have made a tremendous impact on the development of the Libyan 
society. The accounting and auditing profession in Libya is oriented towards the 
accounting and auditing environment and the private sector of the UK and the USA. 
This was due to the huge impact of these two countries on the profession through 
several channels such as oil companies, aid agencies, constriction companies and 
accounting and auditing education systems. Some of the Libyan regulations that 
relate to the accounting and auditing profession and its practices were issued a long 
time ago and need to be amended in order to take into account the socio-economic 
changes that the country has witnessed in the last few decades. 
ýý JJ 
Chapter three: 
Auditor independence, its development, 
nature and importance 
Chapter three: 
Auditor independence, its development, nature and importance. 
3.0: Introduction. 
For several decades auditor independence has been one of the most researched subjects 
in the accounting and auditing literature. In order to fully understand its development, 
nature, meaning and importance, this chapter is organised into four sections. The first 
section commences with an attempt to trace the development of auditor independence 
since its early recognition. The second section discusses the nature and meaning of 
auditor independence. The third section illustrates the importance of auditor 
independence. Finally, the fourth section provides a brief summary of the contents of the 
chapter. 
3.1: Development of auditor independence. 
Discussing the foundation of the concept of auditor independence, Pany and Reckers 
(1983), emphasise that the concept is closely related with the existence of the auditing 
profession itself. They mentioned that the purpose of the external auditor's work, i. e. an 
independent audit, arises from the need for reliable financial information. An audit of 
financial statements has been defined by the American Accounting Association (AAA, 
1973) as: 
"A systematic process of objectively gathering and evaluating evidence relating to 
assertions about economic actions and events in which the individual or organisations 
making the assertions and established criteria, and communicating the results to users 
of the reports in which the assertions are made " (Committee on Basic Auditing 
Concepts, 1973, cited in Porter et al 2004). 
The main objective of auditing financial statements (e. g. statement of financial position, 
income statement and statement of cash flow) is to allow the auditor to issue an opinion 
on whether the overall financial statements were prepared in accordance with an 
identified financial reporting framework normally defined as Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP) (Soltani, 2007, Millichamp and Taylor, 2008). 
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Auditor independence has evolved through the development of the auditing profession 
which in turn is closely interwoven with that of accounting. Although there is no 
accurate data available to indicate where accounting was initially practiced, Kazas 
(1991) attempted to trace the development of accounting from the ancient times to the 
18th century. In this regard, he mentioned several events relating to the historical 
evolution of accounting and auditing as follows: 
1- The first traces of commercial and accounting laws can be found among the 
Ninevites of Babylonia circa 3000 B. C. where persons called secretaries who noted all 
important transaction on plaques and then legalised them with their signatures. 
2- In ancient Egypt, audits were initiated by the state itself in order to protect the 
interests of the Pharaoh. A group of people called Epistates (overseers) was instituted 
and trained in the temples to monitor and record the grain harvest which constituted the 
main source of tax funds and the Pharaoh's primary source of revenue. 
3- The first proof of the practice of financial control appeared in ancient Greece in 
about 6h century B. C. In that time an institution called the Logistes (accountant) was 
established in Athens to supervise the management of public funds and was entrusted to 
bring to justice all those who were apprehended in some unlawful act. Also in 400 B. C. 
business accounts were required by law to be published for the first time in Athens. 
4- In ancient Rome, consuls, censors and appraisers were commended to oversee the 
public finances. They had to examine the accounts in the provinces and supervise the 
public treasury and were required at regular intervals to submit all their accounts to the 
senate for approval. 
5- Early in 13th century, the Chancellor of the Exchequer in England used a procedure 
of internal control that required the accounts to be maintained and monitored by two 
different people who had to keep two parallel sets of book. Also, the term of "auditor" 
appeared for the first time in 1285 during the reign of King Edward I. Auditors were 
those who served the king as administrators and chamberlains and their task was to keep 
regular books and to be accountable for their work. 
6- The 15th' century witnessed the appearance of the double-entry bookkeeping method 
in Italy. The first fully documented use of this method was observed in the books of the 
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Soranro brothers in Geneva in 1406 which was followed a little later by the famous 
financial treatise of Luca Pacioli. 
7- In the late 17th century in France, the Court of Auditors was set up in Paris where its 
director for many years was the distinguished mathematician Bertrand-Francois Bareme, 
who wrote a book on the double- entry bookkeeping method. The court of auditors 
frequently assigned persons to conduct bookkeeping checks and valuations by experts 
(Kazas, 1991). 
Up to and including 18th century, auditing had little commercial application and the role 
of the auditing profession was almost exclusively confined to public finance. This was 
mainly due to the fact that up to the end of 18th century, with very few exceptions, there 
were no private businesses with considerable accumulations of capital or involved in 
important business activities. Industry was primarily based on relatively small 
enterprises that were frequently owned and managed by the same individuals. Therefore, 
there was no need for the business managers to report to the owners on their supervision 
of resources and no need for such reports to be audited (Porter et al, 2004). 
The industrial revolution, in the late 18th century, with its associated factories and 
machine-based production, created the need for funds to be available for investment. 
This led to the contribution of small amounts of capital that were channelled into large 
industrial and commercial activities which, in turn, over a period of time, grew 
remarkably in both size and number (Higson and Tayles, 1998; Porter et al, 2004). After 
the beginning of the industrial revolution, tremendous changes in the socio-economic 
environment were witnessed. In particular, there was the establishment and growth of 
huge industrial and trading companies, the separation of the ownership and management 
functions and the emergence of new interested parties, other than shareholders, in the 
operations of the new business activities. The more important result of the above 
developments was the separation of the ownership and management functions. The 
management and control of enterprises was increasingly given to a small group of 
qualified, professional, salaried managers who ran the corporations on a 
day-to-day 
basis and more often than not, owned no shares in the companies they managed. 
In this 
situation, the managers served as agents for the stockholders and 
fulfilled a stewardship 
function by managing the company's assets. 
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Since the custody and management of financial and other economic resources are in 
different hands from those of the owners, an examination or audit is needed from time to 
time to report on the work of the management in order to judge its success or failure. 
The fact that the management's report is an indicative of its performance raises the 
likelihood of a conflict of interest, in that there could be a propensity on the part of the 
management to hold back or misrepresent information that might cast a negative slant on 
its performance. As the management function is specialised and complex, the interested 
parties such as the shareholders, the wider stockholders, and society in general requires 
the services of another group of specialist professionals known as auditors to verify the 
accounts presented by the management of their performances and to form an opinion 
thereon (Rahman, 1996). 
Because most the developments that business activities and auditing have witnessed in 
the beginning of the industrial revolution centred in the UK1, the passages of the 
Companies Acts were one of the earliest steps in recognition of the need for audits. The 
UK's 1844 Act required the directors to keep accounts and that those accounts be 
audited by individuals other than the directors or their clerks. Where no other 
qualification were needed, every auditor was required to hold at least one share in the 
company that he audited but did not allow him to hold any office in the company or be 
in anyway interested in its concerns, except as a shareholder. (Vanasco, 1996) 
An auditor had to be selected by shareholders of the companies and had to examine the 
company's records at reasonable intervals during the year. The auditor was required to 
report to the company's shareholders whether, in his opinion, the balance sheet gave a 
correct view of the company's position. In that period of time, the independence of the 
auditor from the company's management was not needed, nor the qualification of the 
auditor. In practice, a shareholder was usually appointed as auditor by his 
fellow 
members (Porter et al, 2004). 
1 Tracing the development of auditing and accounting in this section will be confined only to the UK and the US 
because most of the developments in the auditing and accounting practices 
during and after the industrial 
revolution were in these two countries. In addition, other countries' efforts 
have been influenced and based on the 
UK and the US efforts (see, Watts and Zimmerman, 1983; 
Vanasco, 1996; Patel and Psaros, 2000; Sucher and 
Bychkova 2001; Sucher and Maclullich, 2004; Porter et al, 2004) 
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The condition for shareholding, however, has not been retained in the UK as an auditor 
qualification as evidenced by the 1862 Companies Act, which permitted but did not, 
requires shareholding (Watts and Zimmerman, 1983). In the 1900 Companies Act, an 
auditor was still not required to be a qualified accountant but the need for auditors to be 
independent of management was recognised. The Act made a condition that neither a 
director nor an officer of the company could be selected as auditor (Porter et al, 2004). It 
was not until the Companies Act of 1948 that public companies were required to be 
audited by professional auditors. In 1979 auditors were forbidden from holding shares in 
their client companies by the ICAEW (Kilcommins, 1997). 
Recently, companies Act 2006, in section 1212 has identified who can be qualified as an 
auditor. In particular, it states that: 
"An individual or firm is eligible for appointment as a statutory auditor if the individual 
or firm: a) is a member of a recognised supervisory body, and b) is eligible for the 
appointment under the rules of that body (Millichamp and Taylor, 2008: 23). 
In order to protect the independence of auditors from their audit clients, the companies 
Act 2006 in section 1214 identified a number of people who are ineligible to act as 
auditors. These include officers and employees of the company, partners or employees 
of such persons or a partnership of with such a person is a partner, persons who have a 
connection with an associate of his/her of any description specified in regulations made 
by the secretary of state (Millichamp and Taylor, 2008) 
Before the stock market crash of 1929, there was little regulation of the securities of 
markets in the United States. In order to retain faith in the capital markets that had been 
weakened by the crash and the Depression that followed it, the US Congress issued the 
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. These two Acts 
mandated that all publicly traded companies file financial statements that were certified 
by independent public accountants, in their first public stock offering and on an annual 
basis thereafter. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was established by the 
1934 Act and was given the authority to issue standards for financial accounting and 
auditing (Berryman, 1978). 
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The SEC has tried to define independence in a series of rules and regulations which has 
played a major role in the development of auditor independence. Several 
pronouncements over the years have been issued by the SEC related to auditor 
independence. For example, in 1933, the SEC adopted the following resolution: 
"The Commission will not recognize any such certified accountant or public accountant 
as independent if such accountant is not in fact independent. Unless the Commission 
otherwise directs, such accountant will not be considered independent with respect to 
any person in whom he has any interest, directly or indirectly, or with whom he is 
connected as an officer, agent, employee, promoter, underwriter, trustee, partner, 
director, or person performing similar functions " (Berryman, 1978: 143 ). 
The American Institute of Accountants (AIA) 2 did not recognise that a conflict of 
interest may arise when auditors verify financial reports of companies in which they 
have a substantial interest until 1934 when it stated that: 
"No member or associate shall not certify the financial statements of any enterprise 
financed in whole or in part by the public distribution of securities if he is himself the 
actual or beneficial owner of a substantial financial interest in the enterprise or if he is 
committed to acquire such an interest" (Berryman, 1978: 144). 
In addition, as a part of its code of professional ethics conduct the AICPA in 1962, 
adopted a rule on independence that prohibited direct financial interest in an enterprise 
under audit by a member. Specifically, it states: 
"A member or associate will be considered not independent, for example, with respect to 
any enterprise if he, or one of his partners, (a) during the period of his professional 
engagement or at the time of expressing his opinion, had, or was committed to acquire, 
any direct or material indirect financial interest in the enterprise, or (b) during the period 
of his professional engagement, at the time of expressing his opinion or during the period 
covered by the financial statements, was connected with the enterprise as a promoter, 
underwriter, voting trustee, director, officer or key employee " (Berryman, 1978: 148). 
This rule made the AICPA position closer to that of the SEC in prohibiting direct and 
material indirect financial interests in the audit client and for the first time prohibiting 
particular employment relationships, such as director or officer of the audit client during 
the period of the professional engagement. Furthermore, in November 1972, the AICPA 
Committee on Auditing Procedures issued Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 1 
which put more emphasis on auditor independence and states: 
2- The AIA was established for the firs time in 1887 and later changed 
its name to be the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). 
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"To be independent the auditor must be intellectually honest; to be recognized as 
independent, he must be free from any obligation to or interest in the client, its 
management, or its owners" (Vanasco, 1996: 7). 
According to what has been mentioned above it can be seen that the concept of auditor 
independence has evolved over the years through several stages in the history of the 
development of the accounting and auditing profession which in turn has evolved as a 
result of the socio-economic changes in societies. The need for auditor independence 
became important in times where a separation of the management functions from the 
ownership were accrued, especially after the huge increase in the size of the enterprises 
after the beginning of the industrial revolution in the late eighteenth century. As a result 
of these developments in the socio-economic structure of societies, different interested 
parties in the financial statements of the entities other than the shareholder emerged such 
as potential investors, creditors, employees, government agencies and the society in 
general. Auditor independence became a social requirement worldwide. To fulfil this 
requirement, most countries have followed the UK and the USA in requiring that 
financial statements be audited by independent auditors. 
3.2: The nature and meaning of auditor independence. 
According to Mautz and Sharaf (1961: 246): 
"The significance of independence in the work of the independent auditor is so well 
established that little justification is needed to establish this concept as one of the 
cornerstones in any structure of auditing theory". 
The concept of auditor independence, however, is very difficult to be recognised in a 
precise way due to its dependence on the personal attributes of the auditor himself which 
cannot be directly observed or assessed (Wines, 2006). In order to understand the nature 
of independence in auditing, D' Silva (1992) maintained that the definitions of auditor 
independence are useful commencement points. Independence in general meaning 
according to the Oxford Dictionary (2001: 382) means: 
"Not dependent on another person's livelihood or opinion, unwilling to be under an 
obligation to others; or not dependent on something else for its validity, efficiency, 
value ". 
Auditor independence has received considerable attention from both the auditing 
profession and researchers, who have attempted to define what 
is meant by auditor 
independence. A dual connotation in the concept of independence has been recognised 
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by the auditing profession; independence in fact and independence in appearance (Mautz 
and Sharaf, 1961). Independence in fact, in the auditing profession has been defined in 
terms of honesty, objectivity and a mental attitude. For instance, the American Institute 
of Accountants (AIA) in its 1947 tentative statement of auditing standards specifically 
declares that: 
"Independence is an attitude of mind, much deeper than the surface display of visible 
standards". (Carey and Doherty, 1966: 39). 
In addition, the second general standard of Generally Accepted Auditing Standards 
(GAAS) requires that: 
"In all matters relating to the assignment, an independence in mental attitude is to be 
maintained by the auditor or auditors " (Vanasco, 1996: 6). 
Similarly, auditor independence has been defined by the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) in its 1997 Guide to Professional Ethics 
Statement (GPES) 1: Integrity, Objectivity and Independence as: 
"Objectivity is essential for any professional person exercising professional 
judgement... objectivity is the state of mind which has regard to all considerations 
relevant to the task in hand but not other, it is sometimes described as `independence 
of mind " (Para. 2) 
The International Ethics Standards Board (IESBA) of the International Federation of 
Accountants (IFAC, 2005) has defined the concept of independence in fact in the code 
of ethics for professional accountants section 290 Independence. Assurance 
engagements when it states: 
"The state of mind that permits the expression of a conclusion without being affected 
by influences that compromise professional judgment, allowing an individual to act 
with integrity, and exercise objectivity and professional scepticism ". 
As can be seen from the previous definitions that the auditing profession viewed auditor 
independence as the auditors' state of mind, their ability to make objective and unbiased 
audit decisions. Independence according to these definitions refers to the mental attitude 
of auditors in terms of professional objectivity, that is unobservable and cannot 
be 
measured or assessed by financial statement users, due to 
its dependence on the personal 
characteristic of each auditor (Gorman and Ansong, 
1998; Beattie et al, 1999; Wines. 
2006). As such, many interested parties including academics, practitioners and 
42 
regulatory and professional bodies in developed countries such as the USA and the UK 
have attempted to define independence in a more precise way. As a result, another 
concept of auditor independence has been established "Independence in appearance". 
This notion of independence requires auditors to avoid any relationships with their 
clients which might lead financial statement users to doubt their independence. 
The auditing profession has acknowledged this concept of auditor independence and 
emphasis has been put on it by most auditing professional bodies worldwide. For 
example the AICPA mentions the following: 
"Public confidence would be impaired by evidence that independence was actually 
lacking and it might also be impaired by the existence of circumstances which 
reasonable people might believe likely to influence independence. To be independent, 
the auditor must be intellectually honest,; to be recognized as independent, he must be 
free from any obligation to or interest in the client, its management, or its owners. " 
(AICPA, 1991). 
The Auditing Practicing Board (APB, 2004) Ethical Standard (1) defines independence 
as: 
"Freedom from situations and relationships which make it probable that a reasonable 
and informed third party would conclude that objectivity rather is impaired or be 
impaired. Independence is related to and underpins objectivity. However, whereas 
objectivity is a personal behaviour characteristic concerning the auditor's state of 
mind, independence relates to the circumstances surrounding the audit, including the 
financial, employment, business and personal relationships between the auditors and 
their client" (Para. 12) 
The IFAC (2005) has defines auditor independence in appearance as: 
"The avoidance of facts and circumstances that are so significant that a reasonable 
and informed third party, having knowledge of all relevant information, including 
safeguards applied, would reasonably conclude a firm 's, or a member of the 
assurance team 's, integrity, objectivity or professional scepticism had been 
compromised". 
In addition to these efforts, many attempts were made by researchers to clarify and 
define the meaning of auditor independence. Some researchers, who were concentrating 
on independence in fact, defined independence in terms similar to those used 
by the 
professional bodies. For example, Bartlett (1993: 55) argues that 
independence in many 
early studies was not specifically defined and attempted to 
define auditor independence 
in terms of empirically observable behaviours as: 
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"An unbiased mental attitude in making decisions about audit work and financial 
reporting ". 
Other researchers, attempted to clarify and operationalise the meaning of independence 
beyond its psychological meaning, i. e. state of mind. For instance, Mautz and Sharaf 
(1961: 278) recognised three phases of independence in auditing. They underline the 
first phase as: 
"That independence of approach and attitude which any professional man should 
have ". 
They argued that this kind of independence is a combination of self-reliance, freedom 
from client control, expert skill and ability and judgment based on training and 
experience that is not possessed by those who are not members of the profession. This 
type of auditor independence was also recognized by Carey and Doherty (1966: 38), 
who note that: 
"Independence, in the sense of being self-reliant, not subordinate, is essential to the 
practice of all professions. No self-respecting professional man - physician, lawyer or 
certified public accountant - will subordinate his professional judgment to the views of 
his patient or client. He cannot evade his professional responsibility for the advice, 
opinions and recommendations which he offers. If his patients or clients do not like 
what he says, the practitioner may regret it; but no one would condone his changing 
his honest opinion in order to avoid giving offence or to secure his fees ". 
The second and third phases of auditor independence were seen by Mautz and Sharaf 
(1961: 278) as being peculiar to the auditing profession. They called the second phase 
"Practitioner independence" and view it as: 
"That required by an auditor if he is to perform his function of review and verification 
in a satisfactory manner. Independence here consists of freedom from bias and 
prejudice, whether recognized or not". 
To obtain this type of independence, the auditor must be aware of the various, as well as 
potential, influences on the auditor's task. Within this phase of independence, three 
dimensions were identified as follows: 
1. Programming independence: freedom from control or undue influence in the 
selection of audit techniques and procedures and in the extent of their 
application. 
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2. Investigative independence: f eedom from control or undue influence in the 
selection of areas, activities, personal relationships, and managerial policies to 
be examined. 
3. Reporting independence: fteedom from control or undue influence in the 
statement of facts revealed by the examination or in the expression of 
recommendations or opinions as a result of the examination. (Mautz and Sharaf, 
1961: 247). 
The third phase of independence was named "Professional Independence". This phase of 
auditor independence focuses on the public's recognition and acceptance of auditors as 
an independent professional group in performing their work. Mautz and Sharaf argued 
that the profession as a whole has to convince all interested parties of its purpose as an 
independent verifier of financial reports in order to insure the successful 
accomplishment of its purpose. Specifically, they stated: 
"The profession as a whole must avoid any appearance of lacking independence. 
Unless the general public as well as the direct users of audit reports have confidence 
in the independence and integrity of the profession, the individual practitioner will not 
have maximum opportunities for service " (Mautz and Sharaf, 1961: 252). 
The second phase of auditor independence "Practitioner independence" is different from 
the third phase "Professional independence". The former, requires the auditor as an 
individual professional to judge situations which may compromise his independence, 
whereas, the latter recognised that the auditing profession as a whole has to convince the 
public of its independence. 
Similarly, Carmichael and Swiernga (1968) identified three phases of independence; 
they called the first phase "professional independence". They maintained that this type 
of independence is important to the practice of any profession. For the auditor to attain 
this kind of independence, he must adopt an approach and attitude that makes him self- 
reliant and not subordinate to his client. The second phase was called "audit 
independence". This type of independence is peculiar to the auditor's function of 
examining and expressing opinions on financial statements. For the auditor to attain this 
type of independence he must not only refrain from intentionally favouring the client's 
interests in planning his examination, gathering evidence, and expressing his opinion, he 
must also avoid any unintentional feelings that might cause 
him to take such actions. 
The third phase, called "Perceived independence". Carmichel and Swiernga argued that 
this phase of independence has a two-fold nature; they maintained that this phase 
is 
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composed of two elements; "Individual perceived independence", i. e. the public's 
perceptions of independence of the auditor as an individual practitioner, and "Group 
perceived independence", i. e. the general public's perceptions of the independence of 
the auditing profession as a whole. They refer to the former as an evaluation of singular 
circumstances, while the latter as a matter of professional image 
Some other researchers recognised that auditor independence exists within two broad 
dimensions, i. e. fact and appearance. For instance, Higgins (1962: 699) suggests two 
separable phases of independence as follows: 
"There are actually two kinds of independence which a CPA must have independence 
in fact and independence in appearance. The former refers to a CPA's objectivity, to 
the quality of not being influenced by regard to personal advantage. The latter means, 
his freedom from potential conflicts of interest which might tend to shake public 
confidence in his independence in fact ". 
Arens et al (2003: 83) defines independence in auditing as: 
"Taking an unbiased viewpoint in performing audit tests, evaluating the results, and 
issuing the audit report ". 
In addition, they identified the two phases of independence when they emphasised the 
need for auditors to be both independent in fact and in appearance. They stated: 
"Not only is it essential for auditors to maintain an independent attitude in fulfilling 
nancial statements have their responsibilities but it is also important that the users )ff, 
confidence in that independence. These two objectives are often identified as 
independence in fact and independence in appearance. Independence in fact exists 
when the auditor is actually able to maintain an unbiased attitude throughout the 
audit, whereas independence in appearance is the result of others' interpretations of 
this independence " (Arens et al, 2003: 83). 
Porter et al (2004, p. 47) highlight the two types of independence "independence in fact" 
and "independence in appearance" as follows: 
"Independence in fact: that is, the auditor maintains an unbiased, objective attitude of 
mind which enables him or her to evaluate a set of financial statements 
(and 
supporting evidence) in an impartial manner, and to form and express an opinion in 
the audit report uninfluenced by personal bias. 
Independence in appearance: that is, avoiding situations which might cause others to 
conclude that auditor might not be maintaining an unbiased objective attitude of mind, 
for example, by having mutual or conflicting interests with the audit client or 
its 
management ". 
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Auditor independence was viewed by other researchers such as Goldman and Barleu 
(1974), Aranya and Sarell (1975), Nichols and Price (1976) and Flint (1988) as a result 
of interactions between different factors and parties in a particular society where an 
auditor performs his work. For instance, Goldman and Barleu (1974) and, Nichols and 
Price (1976), defined auditor independence as the outcome of reactions to conflicts of 
interest and the balance of power between the concerned parties, whereby independence 
is a result of a cost-benefit calculation based on inputs into these decisions. Similarly, 
Flint (1988) argued that attainment of independence is the result of interactions between 
various parties and factors within the society where the auditor performs his task. Flint 
(1988: 59) views auditor independence as: 
"The product of a combination of personal qualities, organizational arrangements and 
environmental circumstances or constraints. It is how auditors act and the conditions 
under which they act which determine whether it is possible for them to be 
independent, whether they are in fact independent, and whether they are perceived to 
be independent. It is on these factors that belief in the independence of audit will 
depend". 
De Angelo (1981 a: 116) in an attempt to define independence said: 
"The level of auditor independence is defined as the conditional probability that, a 
given breach has been discovered, the auditor will report the breach ". 
Watts and Zimmerman (1983: 615) put forward a similar definition when they said: 
"The probability that the auditor will report a discovered breach is effectively the 
auditing profession's definition of independence". 
To sum up, the review of the literature in this section revealed that the meaning of 
auditor independence was first defined by the auditing professional bodies and 
researchers as being a "state of mind", which is an intangible quality of the auditors' 
mental attitude that cannot be easily observed or assessed due to its dependence on the 
personal characteristic of each auditor. Therefore, attempts were made to operationalise 
the meaning of independence. As a result, two kinds of auditor independence have been 
identified, namely, "Independence in fact" (actual independence) and "Independence in 
appearance" (perceived independence). The former refers to the mental attitude of the 
auditor in terms of professional objectivity, while the latter refers to the public's or 
others' perceptions of the auditor independence. Since the 
former element of auditor 
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independence cannot be easily observed or assessed, the latter element of auditor 
independence has been seen to be more important in protecting the status of the 
profession in society. 
3.3: The importance of auditor independence. 
Independence of the auditor is a crucial attribute of a credible audit when reporting on 
the reliability of the companies' financial reports. Skills and expertise to identify errors 
and fraud are expected to be possessed by most audit firms but the reporting of those 
errors and or insisting on changes to the accounts is a function of the auditor 
independence (Firth, 2002). Independence requires a freedom from bias, personal 
interest, or susceptibility to undue influence or pressure (Sutton, 1997). Independence is 
critically important to the auditor as it is considered as being one of the basic 
requirements underlying the audit work (Firth 1980). If auditors are not truly 
independent, their opinions will add no value to their clients' financial statements. For 
that reason, auditor independence is considered the hallmark of the auditing professions. 
This belief in the importance of auditor independence has its logical foundations in the 
assumption that management of companies may not always presents full and fair 
financial information about their companies to the financial statements' users. Therefore, 
there is a need for an independent, external system of examination. This external system 
of audit which produces an audit opinion, adds credibility to the financial statements of 
enterprises in order that it could be relied on and used for economic decisions process 
(Sucher and Bychkova, 2001). It has been suggested that the need for an independent 
external audit to verify the financial statements of corporations is justified for four 
reasons; conflict of interests, consequences, complexity and remoteness (Committee on 
Basic Auditing Concepts, AAA, 1973). 
Conflict of interest: A conflict of interest might be created between the management of 
corporations as preparers and providers of financial statements and users of 
financial 
statements (mainly shareholders) who need to know that the corporation's 
financial 
performance, position and cash flow as accurate as possible. 
Users of financial 
statements perceive however, that the management may not always present 
full and fair 
financial information and bias could be present in its reports. Therefore, the opinion of 
48 
an independent external party plays a crucial role in helping to assure the fair 
representation of the company's financial dealings. 
Consequences: Users of a company's financial statements could suffer grave financial 
loss as a result of basing their decisions on unreliable financial information. Thus, before 
taking any decision, they need to be assured that the financial statements are dependable 
and present full and fair financial information. 
Remoteness: As a result of the separation of the ownership and the management 
functions in modern corporations, shareholders and other interested users of a 
company's financial statements do not have the possibility to directly verify the 
reliability of the financial statements. This can be caused by legal or institutional 
barriers, or by time, distance or cost constraints that prevent users from performing their 
own audit investigation. Accordingly, the need for an independent external party to 
consider the reliability of the information on behalf of those users has been created. 
Complexity: As a result of the increased financial connections that modern companies 
have witnessed in recent years, economic transactions, and the accounting systems 
which capture and process them, have become very complex. This complexity of 
financial information and reporting processes may create the possibility of unplanned 
errors in published financial information. Additionally, with this increasing complexity, 
the average users of external financial information are not knowledgeable enough to 
evaluate the quality of the information. Therefore, the need for an independent external 
auditor, who has the required competence and expertise to provide an unbiased opinion 
on the company's financial statements, is increasingly justified. 
Regulatory and Professional bodies such as AICPA, SEC, ICAEW, IFAC and many 
others have recognised the importance of auditor independence in its two dimensions, i. 
e. independence in fact and independence in appearance, and codified it in their 
regulations and professional codes of ethics. For instance, the Council of the AICPA 
states: 
"Independence, both historically and philosophically, is the foundation of the public 
accounting profession and upon its maintenance 
depends upon the profession 's 
strength and its stature " (Berryman, 
1978: 141). 
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In addition, the second general standard of Generally Accepted Auditing Standards 
(GAAS) requires that: 
"In all matters relating to the assignment, independence in mental attitude is to be 
maintained by the auditor or auditors "(Vanasco, 1996: 6). 
As well, the SEC for many years has considered independence as one of the most 
important characteristics that auditors should have when performing their duties. 
Recently, the rulings of the SEC (2003) and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 have 
emphasised the importance of auditor independence. For example, The SEC's 2003 
rulings and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 planned to support the auditor independence 
from management in the following ways: 
" Provide a clear definition of types of Non-Audit Services (NAS) that would be 
considered to harm independence. 
" Requiring audit committees to pre-approve each engagement of the auditor to 
perform audit or NAS for his client. 
" Requiring the rotation of audit partners on the engagement team in order to 
ensure a periodic fresh look at the accounting and auditing issues related to the 
issuer's financial statements. 
" Requiring an accounting firm not to audit an issuer's financial statements if 
certain members of management of the issuer have been members of the 
accounting firm's audit engagement team until a `cooling off period' has passed, 
to ensure that personal relationships and the knowledge of the new member of 
the company's management regarding the audit plan do not damage the audit 
process. 
" Requiring issuers of financial statements to disclose information relating to audit 
and NAS provided by, and fees paid by the issuer to, the auditor of the issuer's 
financial statements. (Sections 201,202,203,204,206 of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act 2002). 
In the UK, the (APB, 2004) Ethical Standards emphasised the importance of auditor 
independence and identified six different types of potential threat that might face 
auditors when performing their tasks. The 
APB warned auditors that these threats might 
adversely affect their objectivity and 
independence and recommended several 
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safeguards that auditors should take to protect their independence. The main types of 
threat that were identified by the APB are: 
Self-interest threat: this threat arises from auditors favouring or being perceived to 
favour self-interest over their interests in performing an unbiased audit. Such self- 
interest might develop from auditors' financial, emotional, or other personal interests. 
For instance, this threat could occur if auditors have direct or indirect financial 
investment in the audit client, business relationships with the audit client, and family 
relationships with members of the management of the audit client. 
Self-review threat: this threat relates to the difficulty of maintaining objectivity in 
performing self-review procedures. For example, where the audit firm has been involved 
in maintaining the accounting records, or undertaking valuations that are incorporated in 
the financial statements, or when any outcome or judgement of a previous audit or non 
audit services (NAS) assignment performed by the auditors or their firm needs to be 
challenged or re-evaluated to reach a conclusion on the current audit. In such situations, 
auditors may be or may perceive to be reluctant to take an objective stance of relevant 
aspects of those financial statements. 
Management threat: this threat arises when an audit firm performs duties that should 
be undertaken by the audit client's management. For example, if the audit firm has been 
involved in designing and implementation of financial information systems for the audit 
client, the audit firm's interests may become closely aligned with the management's and 
this could impair auditors' objectivity and independence (or may be perceived to be 
impaired). 
Advocacy threat: this threat arises when auditors become advocates for, or against, the 
client's position in any adversarial proceedings or situations. Such behaviour can be a 
threat to serving as unbiased auditors of the financial statements and may include for 
example, auditors dealing in or promoting shares or securities in the audited company, 
acting on behalf of the audit client in litigation, or when the client litigates against the 
auditor. These acts put auditors in a position closely aligned to that of the client's 
management which might create both actual and perceived threats to auditors' 
objectivity and independence. 
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Familiarity (or trust) threat: this threat arises from auditors compromising objectivity 
because of being influenced by a close relationship with the audit client. For example, if 
auditors have a particular or long-standing personal or professional relationship with a 
client. In such situations, the auditors may become over-influenced by the client's 
personality and qualities, and consequently become too sympathetic to the client's 
interest. 
Intimidation threat: this threat arises from auditors being deterred from performing 
objectively because they are being, or believing that they are being, overtly or covertly 
intimidated by the audit client or by other interested parties. Such threats could accrue if 
an audit firm is threatened with replacement over a disagreement with the client's 
management about an application of an accounting principle. (APB 2004, Standard 1, 
Para. 28). 
Based on the above, it can be seen that the independence of auditors was considered to 
be one of the most important characteristics that auditor should have when conducting 
their duties. This unique characteristic is critically needed to provide confidence in the 
issued financial statements of enterprises in particular and to the role which the auditing 
profession is performing in the economic activities of society in general. 
3.4: Summary. 
The concept of auditor independence has evolved over the years through several stages 
in the history of the accounting and auditing profession. Independence became an 
important characteristic of auditors during and after the industrial revolution when 
separation of the management functions from the ownership accrued following the huge 
increase in size and number of the enterprises. As a result most countries worldwide 
have required that financial statements be audited by independent auditors. Two kinds of 
auditor independence have been identified in the auditing literature; independence in 
fact (actual independence) and independence in appearance (perceived independence). 
The former refers to the mental attitude of the auditor in terms of professional 
objectivity, while the latter refers to the public's or others' perceptions of auditor 
independence. Finally, auditor independence has been perceived to be one of the most 
important characteristics that auditors should possess when performing their duties. 
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Chapter four 
Academic studies on auditor independence 
4.0: Introduction. 
Since the main objective of this study is to provide additional empirical evidence 
relating to perceptions of auditor independence, an extensive review of the existing 
accounting and auditing literature relevant to the purpose of this study is provided in this 
chapter. To achieve this objective, the chapter is divided into three sections. The first 
section reviews of the relevant literature (theoretical arguments and empirical studies) 
related to the perceived effect of the nine selected factors on auditor independence. The 
second section analyses the identified gap in previous literature. Finally, a brief 
summary of the chapter is outlined in the third section. 
4.1: Perceptions of auditor independence. 
A comprehensive review of the accounting and auditing literature concerned with 
auditor independence revealed that a substantial amount of academic research has been 
undertaken which examines, either analytically or empirically, the impact of several 
factors on perceptions of auditor independence. Nine factors, suggested to have the most 
influence on perceptions of auditor independence, were selected for the purposes of this 
study. These included: audit firm size, audit firm tenure, competition, auditors' 
economic dependence on clients, audit committees, status and financial condition of the 
audit client, financial and personal relationships and provision of non-audit services 
(NAS). The likely impact of the above factors on perception of auditor independence in 
both the theoretical arguments and the empirical research are presented as follows: 
4.1.1: Size of the Audit Firm. 
The large size of the audit firm was considered to have a positive impact on the 
perceptions of auditor independence (Abu Bakar et al, 2005). It has been suggested that 
large audit firms are usually perceived as more capable of maintaining an adequate 
degree of independence than their small counterparts. For instance, Mautz and Sharaf 
(1961) argued that large audit firm would not be as economically dependent as a small 
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firm on any one client due to the associated fees that usually constitute a smaller 
proportion of the audit firm's total revenues. In the same vein, Shockley (1982) 
contended that certain characteristics inherent in small audit practices may increase the 
danger of impairment such as the nature of the typical small firm client or the tendency 
towards a more personal mode of service and close relationship with the client. A 
similar idea is shared by Gul (1991) who believes that smaller audit firms were more 
likely to lose their independence due to their tendency towards a personalised mode of 
service and close relationships with their clients. Furthermore, Lennox (2005) argues 
that large audit firms' opinions are more accurate compared with those of small audit 
firms due to the high quality audits that large audit firms provide compared with small 
audit firms. 
Empirically, audit firm size was one of the most researched factors that received 
attention in many countries. For example, Gul (1989) conducted a study in New Zealand 
to investigate the effects of five factors including audit firm size on bankers' perceptions 
of auditor independence. Audit firm size was described as large or small. Large audit 
firms refers to those which provide auditing services to registered companies on the 
New Zealand stock exchange, while small audit firms refers to those which do not have 
the required resources to serve the needs of large corporations. The research 
questionnaire was sent to 64 bank loan officers and a 76 per cent response rate was 
obtained. Subjects were required to make a subjective estimate of the relative strengths 
of eight different scenarios using a7 point scale. The effects of each of the factors was 
tested using a combination of a between and within-subjects' multi factor ANOVA 
design. The results indicated that the effects of the audit firm size factor was found to 
influence perceptions of bank loan officers regarding auditor independence, with 
bankers perceiving large audit firms to be more independent than small audit firms. 
Lindsay (1990) investigated how the size of the audit firm as well as three other factors 
was perceived by Canadian bank loan officers to affect the ability of an auditor to resist 
management pressure. The size of the audit firm was described as being one of the 
largest national audit firms in Canada or as being a local one-office audit firm with a 
'-A between-subjects methodology requires subjects to respond to only one level of manipulated variable, 
whereas a within-subject methodology require subjects to response to more than one 
level of the manipulated 
variable (Pany and Reckers, 1987). 
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staff of fifty professionals. The experiment was a full-factorial, repeated measure 
analysis of variance design with four independent variables, each of which had two 
treatment levels. The respondents were required to record the likelihood that the dispute 
depicted would be resolved in favour of the alternative desired by client management 
rather than the auditor. Out of 80 research questionnaires, only 55 usable responses were 
received that made a response rate of 68.75%. The results indicated that bank loan 
officers perceived small audit firms as being less able to resist management pressures 
than large firms. 
In another study, Gul (1991) used a multi-factor ANOVA experimental design to 
examine the effects of four factors including audit firm size on bankers' perceptions of 
the auditors' ability to resist management pressure in an audit conflict situation in New 
Zealand. Audit firm size was described as large or small. Large audit firms refer to one 
of the big eight audit firms and small firms refer to local audit firms without national 
affiliations and as a rule with fewer resources to service the needs of large corporations. 
Questionnaires were sent to 72 Bank lending officers, from whom 49 usable responses 
were received which made a response rate of 67%. Subjects were asked to make a 
subjective judgment on a7 point scale of the likelihood that management would obtain 
its preferred resolution to a dispute between the auditor and the client concerning the 
materiality of certain unrecorded liabilities discovered by the auditor, which consisted 
primarily of expenses incurred in the previous year which were neither paid nor 
recorded until the following year. The results of this study indicated that small audit 
firms were perceived to be more likely to resolve the conflict in favour of the 
management's client than large audit firms. 
Gwilliam and Kilcommins (1998) examined the effects of audit firm size and audit 
committees on perceptions of auditor independence held by corporate lenders, 
investment managers and financial analysts in Ireland. Audit firm size was described as 
Big Six audit firms or Non-Big Six audit firms. Big-Six audit firms were Arthur 
Andersen, Coopers and Lybrand, Craig Gardner/ Price Waterhouse, Deloitte and 
Touche, Ernst and Young; and Stokes Kennedy Crowley/ KPMG, while Non-Big Six 
audit firms included all other audit firms. The study methodology combined the use of 
mail questionnaire and semi-structured interviews. Participants 
in the mailed 
56 
questionnaire were presented with a number of statements and were asked to indicate on 
a five point scale their agreement with each statement. Out of the 196 mailed 
questionnaires, 148 usable responses were received that made a response rate of 75.5%. 
In addition, 30 semi-structured interviews were conducted with sub-sample of those to 
whom the questionnaire was sent. The results showed that perceptions of auditor 
independence were enhanced if the auditor was a member of one of the Big Six audit 
firms. 
In order to explore the potential of regulatory reforms in the United Kingdom to 
strengthen the independence framework, Beattie et al (1999) measured the UK interested 
parties' (financial directors, audit partners and financial journalists) perceptions of the 
influence on auditor independence of a large set of economic and regulatory factors. 45 
audit environmental factors were used as proxy measures for the generic factors 
including audit firm size. Audit firm size was classified as: Small local firm, regional 
firm, a non-big six international or national firm and a big six firm. 415 usable 
questionnaires were received out of 657 research instruments mailed which made a 
response rate of 69%. Respondents were required to indicate on a five point scale the 
extent to which each of the factors listed has an impact on the independence of auditors. 
Results indicated that the participants of this study considered auditor independence to 
be undermined in the cases of small local firms and regional firms. 
Regarding auditor independence in the Libyan context, Almalhuf (2003) investigated the 
effect of four factors including audit firm size on perceptions of auditor independence. 
Audit firm size was divided into two categories; small and large. Large audit firms were 
defined as those which composed of more than one partner whereas small audit firms 
were defined as those which composed of one partner or as a sole practitioner. The Chi- 
square statistical technique was used to analyse collected data related to the effect of the 
four factors on auditor independence. The research questionnaire was sent to 80 external 
auditors and 65 financial statement users (bank loan officers, Taxation Board auditors 
and Stat auditors). The participants were asked to indicate their agreement or 
disagreement with regard to the effect of each factor on auditor independence by 
selecting either "yes" or "no". 97 usable questionnaires were collected which made a 
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response rate of 67%. The results revealed that auditor independence was perceived not 
to be effected by the size of the audit firm. 
Tahinakis and Nicolaou (2004) assessed the perceived effects of audit firm size among 
three other factors on the risk that independence of auditors may be become impaired. 
Four criteria were used to determine the size of the audit firm. These include: a) the total 
assets are more than ¬ 381.511, b) net value for provision of services is more than 
¬ 763.023, c) the mean of certified auditors of the specific audit firm is more than 50 
auditors and d) the conduct of audit controls in more than one firms admitted to the 
stock market. Factorial analysis of variance was used to analyse judgments obtained 
from three subject groups in Greece: certified auditors, bank executives in loan decisions 
and financial analysts. 144 usable questionnaires were received out of 601 mailed, 
obtaining a response rate of 24%. The results indicated that participants of this study 
considered that small audit firms are more likely to lose independence than larger audit 
firms. 
In Malaysia, Abu Bakar et al (2005) among six factors studied the effect of audit firm 
size on perceptions of auditor independence as held by bank loan officers. Out of 240 
questionnaires mailed to bank loan officers, data were gathered only from 86 usable 
questionnaires, producing a response rate of 35.8%. Results of this study indicated that 
bank loan officers perceived that the larger the size of an audit firm, the more likely that 
auditor independence would be enhanced. Similar result was reported by Alleyne et al 
(2006 a) in Barbados, when they investigated how perceptions of several groups 
(auditors, financial directors, credit managers, investment analysts, fund managers, 
shareholders, and government departments) would be influenced by a set of 39 audit- 
related issues categorised under a number of generic factors including audit firm size. 
Audit firm size was classified as: being a sole practitioner, being a non-big four audit 
international firm and being a big four international firm. Respondents were required to 
indicate on a five point scale the extent to which they think these issues might affect 
auditor independence. Results indicated that small firm size and being a sole practitioner 
were found to negatively affect perceptions of auditor independence; in contrast, 
large 
audit firm was found to be positively affecting perceptions of auditor 
independence. 
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Awadallah (2006) examined the effects of four factors including the size of an audit firm 
on Egyptian auditor's ability to withstand client management pressure in a dispute. The 
research instrument (questionnaire) described a public company listed on the Cairo and 
Alexandria stock exchange where client management and the auditor disagree on the 
materiality of certain unrecorded liabilities discovered by the auditor. The experimental 
task that was used was a repeated-measure design consisting of all sixteen possible 
combinations of the four factors, each having two treatment levels. Audit firm size was 
divided as large or small. Large audit firms refer to those which provide auditing 
services to companies in the stock exchange, while small audit firm refer to those which 
do not provide such services to listed stock exchange companies. Participants were 
asked to indicate for each scenario on a seven point Likert scale how likely it was, in 
their opinion, that uncovered liabilities would be ignored for purposes of the auditor's 
report. 106 usable questionnaires were received from 150 mailed questionnaires which 
made a response rate of 70.66%. The overall ANOVA analysis results showed that the 
respondents perceived small audit firms were more likely to lose their independence 
than were large audit firms. 
Based on the above theoretical arguments and empirical results, it can be seen that size 
of the audit firm has an impact on perceptions of auditor independence. Large audit 
firms were perceived to be more independent than smaller audit firms due to several 
reasons such as, large audit firms are not being economically dependent on one or few 
clients for their income, not having a personalised mode of client service, not having 
close relationships with their clients, and having numerous experienced and qualified 
staff that allows them to provide high audit quality. However, as Goldman and Barleu 
(1974) mentioned it should not be concluded that large audit firms are immune to 
pressure by their clients that might impair their independence, especially when there is a 
high level of competition among large audit firms for clients. In addition, most of the 
previous studies were conducted in the developed countries but very few studies carried 
out in developing countries such as Libya, where different political, economic and social 
systems exist which might shape the perceived impact of size of the audit 
firm on 
auditor independence. 
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4.1.2: Audit firm tenure. 
An audit firm tenure, which is the length of the relationship between auditors and their 
clients, has been considered to have an impact on auditor independence (Abu Bakar et 
al, 2005). Relationships between auditors and their clients can create closeness with 
management that may adversely affect auditor independence and reduce the reliability 
and quality of the audit. It is alleged that close relationships have led to the external 
auditor's inability to examine transactions and contributed to recent remarkable audit 
failures at several high-profile companies such as Enron and World Com (Gates et al, 
2007) 
It has been argued that long association between audit firms and their clients may lead to 
such close identification of the audit firm with the interests of its clients' management 
that truly independent decisions by the audit firm becomes difficult (Abu Bakar et al, 
2005; Gates et al, 2007). Many years ago Mautz and Sharaf (1961) state that in many 
cases the greatest threat to auditor independence is a slow, gradual, almost casual 
erosion of "honest disinterestedness". Similarly, Shockley (1982) shared this concern 
when he pointed out that an audit firm may become less innovative in its audit 
techniques and may use less strenuous audit procedures due to the acquired confidence 
in the client. Additionally, he argued that an audit firm may become so closely 
associated with management that it subconsciously or consciously loses the objectivity 
necessary for independence. In the same vein, Flint (1988) contends that a lengthy 
tenure in office may cause the auditor to develop "over-cosy relationships" as well as 
strong loyalty or emotional relationships with their clients, which could reach a stage 
where auditor independence is threatened. Furthermore, Petty and Cuganesan (1996) 
argue that in extreme cases, a long relationship between auditors and their clients could 
result in collusion between the two parties which would destroy the audit process. 
The Guide to Professional Ethics Statement (GPES 1.201, Para 2.5) of the ICAEW 
(1997) recognised that long association between auditors and their clients may be 
perceived as a threat to auditor independence and recommended that auditors should 
avoid situations that may lead them to become over-influenced or to be too trusting of 
the client's directors and key personnel which could consequently lead to audit staff 
being too sympathetic to the client interest. Similar concerns were shared by the IFAC 
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(2005). In order to maintain public confidence in the audit function and to protect 
auditor independence, regulations that disallow auditors from developing personal 
relationships with their clients that may give rise to a potential conflict of interest were 
adopted by some regulatory and professional bodies in developed countries such as the 
UK and the US (Abdul Nasser et al, 2006). For instance, the Metcalf Committee (1976) 
in the US considered that long association has serious dangers which are enough to 
recommend the mandatory rotation of audit firms after a given period of time. 
Proponents for audit firm rotation suggested that it may reduce the economic 
relationship between the auditor and the client and lessen certain judgment bias. The 
auditor will have less incentive to seek future economic gain from a specific client and 
will, therefore, be less likely to bias reports in favour of management as the auditors 
would know that their tenure and related revenues are for a limited term (Gates et al, 
2007). 
On the other hand, short relationships between auditors and their clients were considered 
to have a negative impact on auditor independence. For example, Gul, et al (2007) 
argued that auditors with short tenure are likely to lack adequate knowledge of their 
clients' accounting and control systems which might give their clients' management an 
opportunity to manage its reported earning. Furthermore, they went on to say that 
auditors with long tenure are likely to be more concerned of their reputation protection 
than auditors with short tenure who are likely to place more emphasis on profit (quasi 
rents) than reputation protection. In line with this argument, the Cohen Commission 
(1978) in the US asserted that rotation would result in increased audit fees as the 
benefits to be gained from subsequent lower cost after the initial years of any audit 
would not be fully realised. Opponents of rotation believe that the costs of audit firm 
rotation outweigh the benefits and the experience and knowledge that is gained over 
time in improving quality of audit work would be wasted with the appointment of a new 
auditor (Arel, et al 2005). Similar concern about audit firm rotation was expressed by the 
European Federation of Accountants (2002). The FEE believed that rotation leads to a 
loss of cumulative audit knowledge and increases the risk of audit failure in the first 
years after rotation (Soltani, 2007). 
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Nevertheless, the Auditing Practices Board (APB, 2004) stated that UK audit 
engagement partners should rotate every five years and key audit partners should rotate 
every seven years (APB Ethical Standard, No. 3, Para. 12). Similar rotation was required 
in the US by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) that audit engagement partners involved in 
the SEC registered companies were prohibited from providing audit services for the 
issuer for more than five consecutive years, depending on the partner's involvement in 
the audit. In Italy, the audit engagement could last three years and it could be renewed 
twice (Stevenson, 2002). The issue of audit firm tenure and interval rotation of audit 
firms or audit partners in Libya however, were not explicitly, or implicitly addressed in 
any of the relevant official documents such as the 1953 Libyan Commercial Code and its 
amendments and the 1973 law No 116 that regulates accounting and auditing practices. 
The impact of audit firm tenure on perceptions of auditor independence has attracted 
considerable attention and has been investigated in many previous studies. For instance, 
Schleifer and Shockley (1990) investigated auditors (Big Eight audit partners and Non- 
Big Eight auditors) and financial statement users (Bank loan officers and certified 
financial analysts) perceptions of fourteen policies were discussed in the Cohen 
Commission report (1978) designed to enhance auditor independence. Two of the 
fourteen polices were related to the rotation of auditors. The seventy two participants in 
the study from the four groups were asked to indicate whether they agree or disagree 
that such polices would enhance auditor independence. Results from this study showed 
that the majority of the respondents agreed that such polices would enhance auditor 
independence. 
Mousa (1992) studied the impact of-some factors on auditor independence in the Libyan 
context. Among these factors was audit firm tenure. The research instrument 
(questionnaire) was sent to external auditors and financial statement users (Taxation 
Board auditors and State auditors). The results of this study revealed that 36% of the 
participants from the external auditors group acknowledged that they continued to audit 
the financial statements of their audit clients for more than three years. According to this 
result, the researcher concluded that auditor independence could be seriously 
undermined in such situation. 
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Hussey and Lan (2001) investigated the opinions of UK finance director about three key 
questions posed by the Board for Chartered Accountants in Business (1990). One of the 
questions was about compulsory rotation of audit firms. A questionnaire composed of 
six statements on various aspects of audit was developed and mailed to 3000 UK finance 
directors. Respondents were asked to provide their measure of agreement with each of 
the statements. A total of 776 usable questionnaires were received which made a 
response rate of 25.9%. The results showed that the perception of auditor independence 
would be enhanced by prescribing the rotation of auditors. 
In Saudi Arabia, Hudaib (2003) used a qualitative research (unstructured interviews) 
methodology to explore and analyse how various factors at the three levels: macro, 
micro (including audit firm tenure), and personal shaped the perceptions of auditors and 
financial statement users regarding auditor independence. 43 interviews were conducted 
with selected members of various interested groups (auditors, shareholders, credit 
managers, investment analysts, fund managers, and government bodies). The results of 
this study showed that lengthy tenure was perceived by most of the groups to impair 
auditor independence except the auditors group. 
In Greece Tahinakis and Nicolaou (2004)1 examined the effects of four factors including 
audit firm on perceptions of auditor independence. Audit tenure was set in two levels 
less than three years or more than three years. The results showed that subject groups 
believed that audit tenure for more than three years was perceived to have a negative 
impact on auditor independence. Abu Bakar et al (2005)2 investigated the effects of six 
factors including audit firm tenure on perceptions of bank loan officers regarding auditor 
independence. Audit firm tenure was perceived by 90.7 per cent of the participants of 
this study to negatively effect auditor independence. Respondents believed that the 
longer the duration an auditor firm serves an audit client, the more likelihood that 
auditor independence will be impaired. In addition, auditor firm tenure was found to be 
the second most important factor that affects auditor independence. 
1- For more details of this study refer to page 58. 
2- For more details of this study refer to page 58. 
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In Barbados, Alleyne et al (2006 a)1 studied how perceptions of subject groups would 
be influenced by a set of 39 audit-related issues categorised under a number of generic 
factors including audit firm tenure. Results of this study indicated that audit firm tenure 
was perceived to undermine auditor independence. 
In contrast, some empirical research indicated that auditor independence was found not 
to be significantly affected by lengthy audit firm tenure. For example, St. Pier and 
Anderson (1984) investigated the activities, decisions and circumstances that have led to 
auditor's conflicts with clients and third parties, resulting in lawsuits against the 
auditors. 129 US legal cases tried between 1960 and 1973 were selected that were filed 
against auditors and categorised 334 alleged errors brought by the plaintiffs. Each case 
was separately analysed to indicate the factors that contributed to the filing sequences 
including the situational characteristics surrounding each case. The results showed that 
30 court cases of the 129 cases (23%) analysed involved an auditor with less than three 
years of experience with the client. Accordingly, the researchers concluded that this 
result adds credibility to the contention that risks increase with new clients and should 
be noted in discussions concerning mandatory rotation of auditors. 
Geiger and Raghunandan (2002) used a logistic regression model to examine the 
association between auditor tenure and audit reporting failures. The study analysed 
financial statements, audit reports, and auditor tenure data for 177 stressed, bankrupt 
companies in the US in the 1996-1998 time period. The results of this study indicated 
that there was a positive association between length of auditor tenure and the likelihood 
of a bankrupt company having received a prior going-concern modified audit report. 
Moreover, the researchers concluded that audit reporting failures were more likely to 
occur in the initial years of an audit engagement. In the same vein, Almalhuf (2003)2 
studied, among several issues, the effect of audit firm tenure on auditor independence. 
Participants of this study were requested to express their opinions about whether auditor 
independence would be affected if an audit firm continued to audit a particular audit 
client for a prolonged period of time. The results indicated that auditor independence 
was perceived not to be effected. 
1- For more details of this study refer to page 58. 
2- For more details of this study refer to page 57. 
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Based upon yearly regression between 1990 and 2000, Ghosh and Moon (2005) 
investigated whether capital market participants (investors, independent rating agencies, 
and financial analysts) perceived longer tenure as affecting audit quality. The results of 
this study showed that audited financial statements, and in particular reported earnings. 
were perceived as more reliable for firms with longer auditor tenure. Overall, the study 
suggested that imposing mandatory limits on the duration of the auditor-client 
relationship might impose unintended costs on capital market participants. 
The above literature showed conflicting evidence as to the effects of audit firm tenure on 
perceived auditor independence. Some theoretical arguments and empirical results 
believed that long association between audit firms and their clients may lead to the 
development of an "over-cosy relationship" that could adversely affect auditor 
independence and reduce the reliability and quality of the audit. Therefore, mandatory 
audit firm rotation was proposed as a remedy to this issue. Others believed that the costs 
of audit firm rotation outweigh the benefits and the experience and knowledge that is 
gained over time in improving quality work would be wasted with the appointment of a 
new auditor. In addition, problems with audit reporting and independence may be more 
likely to arise in the earlier years of the auditor-client relationship. Although audit firm 
rotation may be a suitable solution to sustain public confidence in the audit process in 
developed countries with adequate qualified auditors, such policy may be not justified 
for countries such as Libya where there is a relatively small auditing community capable 
to provide a high quality audit. 
4.1.3: Competition among audit firms. 
Competition among audit firms has been recognised as having an adverse impact on 
auditor independence by many interested parties. For instance, Shockley (1982) argued 
that auditor independence could be impaired if levels of competition in the audit market 
increases. Specifically, he states that: 
"As competition increases, it becomes more likely that the CPA will be replaced by an 
auditor more compliant with the client's wishes. Knowing this, the CPA's power over 
the client decreases", (Shockley, 1982: 136). 
It has been noticed that the audit environment has become more competitive than in 
earlier decades (Awadallah, 2006). In recent years, competition has 
increased due to the 
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increase in the supply of services that audit firms could provide to their clients other 
than the audit serves and to the removal of rules that prevented audit firms from 
advertising their services and directly soliciting clients for business (Beattie et al, 1999). 
These changes have increased the consequences of losing clients and the incentives for 
maintaining good auditor-client relationships (Awadallah, 2006). In order to obtain 
clients or to maintain them, auditors may respond to the client's management pressure 
and accept audit engagement at lower fees than appropriate for the work. This kind of 
practice that auditors may use to indicate their willingness to accommodate the client's 
wishes is known in the accounting literature as "low-balling". Low-balling has been 
defined by De Angelo (1981 a: 113) as: 
"Setting audit fees below total current costs on initial audit engagements. 
De Angelo (1981 a) however, argues that low-balling itself does not constitute a threat 
to auditor independence because initial fee reductions are sunk costs and are irrelevant 
for future actions or decision making. Additionally, she mentioned that low-balling is a 
competitive response to the expectation of future income. Contrary to this viewpoint 
Simon and Francis (1988) state that sunk costs do significantly affect subsequent 
decision making. They contended that since a considerable investment was made to 
obtain the new client, a motivation not to lose the client will be developed even in the 
presence of serious auditor-client disagreements. They add that this could lead to an 
additional auditor independence problem during the period of investment recovery. This 
idea was supported by Magee and Tseng (1990) when warned that low-balling as a 
response to the high level of competition in the audit market may motivate auditors to 
reduce the quality of their professional opinions in order to preserve their clients or to 
find new ones. Low-balling has been referred to by regulatory bodies as impairing 
auditor independence and reduces audit quality (Vanasco, 1996). 
Another aspect of the competitive environment which could be practiced by either audit 
firms or their audit clients is what has been known as "opinion shopping". For instance, 
many auditors could be contacted by client's management for their opinions on a 
specific issues relating to the client's financial statements. Reza (1991) suggests that 
opinion shopping could substantially affect auditor independence, the credibility, role, 
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and status of the accounting profession, and the reliability of financial statements. 
Opinion shopping has been defined by the SEC (1988) as: 
"The practice of seeking an auditor willing to support a proposed accounting 
treatment designed to help a company to achieve its reporting objectives even though 
doing so might frustrate reliable reporting" (Vanasco, 1996: 36). 
The effect of competition on perceptions of auditor independence has received 
considerable attention and was examined in several previous studies. For example, 
Lindsay (1990)1 investigated how the extent of competition among audit firms as well as 
three other factors was perceived by Canadian bank loan officers to affect the ability of 
an auditor to resist management pressure. Competition was set at two levels: aggressive 
and not aggressive. Aggressive level referred to when a number of large auditing firms 
were aggressively pursuing practice development (expansion) programmes. The results 
showed that bank loan officers perceived the nature of the competitive environment 
among audit firms as a factor that may hamper an audit firm in its attempt to take a 
strong independent stance. In New Zealand, Gul (1991)2 studied how bank loan officers 
perceived auditor's ability to resist management pressure in an audit conflict situation 
due to the effect of four factors including competition. Competition was set at two 
levels; high and low. High level of competition referred to when the immediate audit 
market is characterised by a number of large audit firms that are aggressively pursuing 
expansion programmes in terms of increasing client number, whereas, low competition 
referred to when there are few or no competing firms in the audit market. The results of 
this study showed that competitive audit firms were perceived to be more likely to 
resolve the conflict in favour of the client than less competitive audit firms. 
Beattie et al. (1999)3 examined the effects of a large set of economic and regulatory 
factors including competition on perceptions of interested parties in the UK regarding 
auditor independence. Competition was described as; high level of competition within 
the external audit market. Three audit environmental factors (audit situations) were used 
as a proxy measure of competition; audit fee discounting and low-balling, competition 
among audit firms and budget pressures imposed by audit firm on staff. The results 
1- For more details of this study refer to page 55. 
2- For more details of this study refer to page 56. 
3- For more details of this study refer to page 57. 
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showed that competition was found to be a significant threat to auditor independence. 
Hudaib (2003)1 explored and analysed how various factors (including competition) 
shaped the perceptions of auditors and financial statement users regarding auditor 
independence in Saudi Arabia. The results indicated that the majority of the respondents 
perceived high level of competition as one of the most significant threats to auditor 
independence. 
Abu Bakar et al (2005)2 investigated the impact of competition beside five other factors 
on perceptions of bank loan officers regarding auditor independence. Results of this 
study showed that 74.4% of the respondents mentioned that the level of competition in 
the audit services market influenced auditor independence. Respondents perceived that 
the higher the level of competition among audit firms the more it will impair auditor 
independence. In Egypt, Awadallah (2006)3 studied the effects of four factors including 
competition on perceptions of auditors regarding auditor's ability to resist pressure from 
his client's management on audit disputes. Competition was set at two levels; low or 
high. The results showed that high levels of competition among audit firms increased the 
risk that auditor independence may be impaired. 
Alleyne et al. (2006 a)4 examined the effects of a large set of 39 audit-relevant issues 
categorised under a number of generic factors including high levels of competition 
within the external audit market on perceptions of interested groups in Barbados with 
respect to auditor independence. Similar to Beattie et al. (1999) three audit 
environmental factors (audit situations) were used as a proxy measure of competition; 
audit fee discounting and low-balling, competition among audit firms and budget 
pressures imposed by audit firm on staff. The results of this study indicated that high 
competition was found to negatively affect auditor independence. 
Contrary to the above results, auditor independence was found not to be affected by 
competition between audit firms in a number of other previous studies. For example, 
Knapp (1985) in the US examined the effects of four factors including competition in 
the audit services market on bankers' perceptions of the auditor's ability to resist client 
I- For more details of this study refer to page 63. 
2- For more details of this study refer to page 58. 
3- For more details of this study refer to page 59. 
4- For more details of this study refer to page 58. 
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pressure. Competition was set at two levels; high and low (definition for what was 
meant by high or low levels of competition however, was not given in this study). Out of 
the 70 Bank loan officers were contacted, only 43 agreed to participate in the study 
making a response rate of 61.4%. Respondents were provided with sixteen cases, 
resulting from all possible combinations of the treatment levels of the independent 
variables and a brief narrative explanation of each case. Subjects were asked to record 
their perceived likelihood that management would obtain its preferred resolution to the 
dispute on a7 point Likert scale. Half of the cases involved a conflict issue that were 
dealt with quite explicitly by the technical standards about disclosure of a subsequent 
event, the other half of the cases involved the materiality of a financial statement 
amount, an issue that was not dealt with as explicitly by the technical standards. The 
results indicated that banker's perceptions of the auditor's ability to resist management 
pressure were not significantly influenced by the degree of the competition. 
Gul (1989)1 investigated the impact of five factors including competition on perceptions 
of auditor independence. Competition was set at two levels; high and low. High level of 
competition referred to when the immediate audit market is characterised by a number 
of large audit firms that are aggressively pursuing expansion programmes in terms of 
increasing client number, whereas, low competition referred to when there are few or no 
competing firms in the audit market. The results of this study showed that the existence 
of competition was perceived by the participants as increasing auditor independence. 
Similar result was obtained in the Libyan context when Almalhuf (2003)2 tested the 
effect of four factors including competition between audit firms on perceptions of 
auditor independence. The results showed that auditor independence was perceived not 
to be affected by the level of competition between audit firms. 
Based on the above literature, it could be seen that inconsistent results were achieved by 
previous research with regard to the effect of competition on auditor independence. 
Some research has shown that a high level of competition among audit firms was 
perceived as a potential threat to audit quality and auditor independence. This was due to 
that audit firms in order to find or to retain clients may respond to client's pressure and 
1- For more details of this study refer to page 55. 
2- For more details of this study refer to page 57. 
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accept audit engagement at lower fees than appropriate for the work (low-balling). In 
addition, this could lead clients to seek more compliant auditors who are willing to 
support their proposed accounting treatments (opinion shopping). Contrary to these 
results, other studies revealed that auditor independence was not affected by 
competition. It seems however, that this negative effect on independence was based on 
the assumptions of economic theory that perceives auditor as wealth maximiser who 
lacks ethical values. Accordingly, more research on this area would provide better 
understanding of the inherent societal values within which auditors perform their work 
and assist in explaining why some actions or behaviours of auditors might exist. 
4.1.4: Auditors' economic dependence on their audit clients. 
It has been suggested that auditors' economic dependence will be very significant and 
may impair their independence if the percentage or income that auditors receive from 
one or few clients is very high (Barbadillo et al 2006). The greater the probability of 
losing the client, the more likely the auditor will agree with management and issue an 
unprofessional audit report. For example, Flint (1988) argues that if an audit firm's 
major source of income was provided by one client, the audit firm could face serious 
financial consequences due to the loss of this client. Furthermore, Markelevich et al 
(2005) contended that large audit fees could result in the auditor becoming "reluctant" to 
make proper investigations during the audit for fear of losing highly lucrative fees. 
Similar concern is shared by Hoitash et al (2007) who argue that large fees paid to 
auditors make them economically dependent on their clients which may encourage a 
relationship whereby the auditor becomes reluctant to make appropriate inquiries during 
the audit for fear of losing highly profitable fees. 
Economic dependence as a significant threat to auditor independence has been 
recognised by auditing professional bodies worldwide. For example, the Cohen report 
(AICPA 1978) directed attention to the importance of the size of audit fees as one of the 
crucial independence related issues when mentioning that if one or a few large clients 
supply a significant portion of the total fees of an audit firm, the firm will have great 
difficulty in maintaining its independence. Similarly, the APB (2004) in its Ethical 
Standards for Auditors acknowledged the threat of economic dependence. In particular. 
it stated that an audit firm is deemed to be economically dependent on a listed or non- 
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listed audit client if the total fees for audit and all other services from that client and its 
subsidiaries which are audited by the audit firm represent 10% for listed client and 15% 
for non-listed clients of the total fees of the audit firm. In the same vein, the IFAC 
(2005) emphasised that a self-interest threat could be created due to the economic 
dependence and the concern of the possibility of losing the client when the total fees 
generated by that client represent a large proportion of a firm's total fees. 
The effect of the economic dependence (fees) on perceptions of auditor independence 
has attracted the attention of many researchers. For instance, Gul (1991)1 investigated 
the effect of the size of audit fees among other three factors on bankers' perceptions of 
auditors' ability to resist management pressure in an audit conflict situation. Fee size 
was described as "significant" or "insignificant" (the study did not specify a percentage 
for identifying what was meant by `significant' or `insignificant' fees). The results 
showed that when the fee from the audit client was a significant proportion of the 
auditor's total revenues, perceptions of the auditors' ability to withstand management 
pressure were adversely affected. 
In Libya, Mousa (1992)2 studied the impact of the percentage of audit fees compared to 
the total audit firm's income on perceptions of auditor independence. The results 
revealed that audit fees made a great portion of the total auditors' income. This result 
has led the researcher to conclude that auditor independence might be affected according 
to this situation. 
In Hong Kong, Gul and Tsui (1992) examined the effects of size of audit fees among 
other factors on bankers' perceptions of the auditor's ability to resist management 
pressure in an audit conflict situation. The experiment used a repeated-measures multi- 
factor ANOVA design with the above three experimental factors each with two 
treatment levels. The instrument which was used to collect the data was in the form of a 
short hypothetical case study describing a dispute situation between an auditor and 
management. It was followed by a questionnaire consisting of eight different scenarios. 
Each scenario contains one of the treatment levels of the three experimental factors. Size 
of audit fees was described as "significant" or "insignificant" (the study did not specify a 
1- For more details of this study refer to page 56. 
2- For more details of this study refer to page 62. 
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percentage for identifying what was meant by `significant' or `insignificant' fees). 
Respondents were asked to make a subjective judgment for each of the eight scenarios 
on a seven-point scale on the likelihood that the auditor would comply to the client's 
request in solving the "matter in dispute" for each of the eight scenarios being presented 
in the questionnaire. Out of 40 questionnaires distributed, 38 usable responses were 
received, making a response rate of 95%. The results of this study indicated that bankers 
perceived auditors are likely to resolve the conflict in favour of the management client 
when the size of audit fees was significant. 
Bartlett (1993) investigated the effects of different factors including economic 
dependence (e. g. audit fees represents 1% of total audit firm, and audit fees represents 
40% of work supervised by audit partner) on the perceptions of auditors and bank loan 
officers in the USA. Respondents were asked to indicate their perceptions of auditor 
independence in ten circumstances which were perceived to have a variety of potential 
impacts on independence on a scale from 100 (completely independent) to 0 (not 
independent at all). Out of 600 questionnaires mailed equally to the auditors and bank 
loan officers, only 243 usable responses were received which made a response rate of 
40%. The results indicated that both groups perceived considerably less independence 
when audit fees were 40% of work supervised by audit partner. 
In Malaysia, Teoh and Lim (1996) studied the impact of five factors including auditors' 
economic dependence on their clients on perceptions of public and non-public auditors 
regarding auditor independence. Economic dependence was described as "audit fees 
paid to auditor from single client > 15% of total audit fee". ANOVA analyses was used 
to analyse the generated data that had a response rate of 69% and 33 % of public firm's 
accountants and industry's accountants respectively out of 200 questionnaires that were 
mailed. The results showed that a large audit fee received from a single client was the 
most important factor leading to impairment of perceptions of auditor independence. 
In the UK, Beattie et al (1999)1 examined the effects of a large set of 45 economic and 
regulatory factors including economic dependence of auditors on their clients on 
perceptions of auditor independence. The results showed that economic dependence of 
1- For more details of this study refer to page 57. 
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auditors on their clients was perceived to represent the most serious threat to auditor 
independence. 
Geiger and Rama (2003) used a logistic regression model incorporating the proportion 
of total audit and non-audit fees among other variables to examine the association 
between the magnitude of audit and non-audit fees and auditor report modification 
decisions for financially stressed manufacturing companies in the US. From the CD- 
SEC database, the financial statements of 66 stressed companies receiving a first-time 
going-concern modified audit opinion were identified and analysed. The results of this 
study indicated that a significant positive association between the magnitude of audit 
fees and the likelihood of receiving a going-concern modified audit opinion, which 
suggests that stressed clients paying high audit fees might obtain a going-concern 
modified audit opinion from their auditors. 
Using a qualitative research methodology, Hudaib (2003)1 explored and analysed in 
Saudi Arabia how various factors including auditors' economic dependence on their 
clients shaped the perceptions of auditors and financial statement users regarding 
auditors independence. The results of this study indicated that the economic dependence 
of auditors on the audit client was perceived by the majority of respondents as one of the 
most significant threats to auditor independence. 
The effect of auditors' economic dependence on their audit clients among other factors 
on perceptions of auditor independence as held by Malaysian Bank loan officers' was 
investigated by Abu Bakar et al (2005)2. The results of this study showed that 
respondents perceived that the larger the size of audit fees paid by the audit client 
company to the audit firm (in relation to the total percentage of audit revenues), the 
more likelihood that auditor independence would be weakened. Similar result was 
achieved in Barbados when Alleyne et al (2006 a)3 examined the effects of a large set of 
39 audit-relevant issues categorised under a number of generic factors including the 
economic dependence of auditor on his audit client on perceptions of Barbadian 
interested groups with respect to auditor independence. The results indicated that the 
1- For more details of this study refer to page 63. 
2- For more details of this study refer to page 58. 
3- For more details of this study refer to page 58. 
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economic dependence of auditors on their clients was found to have a negative effect on 
perceptions of auditor independence. Respondents ranked economic dependence as a 
significant risk for auditor independence. 
Although most of the above previous literature revealed that auditor independence was 
perceived to be undermined due to the economic dependence of auditors on their audit 
clients, other research have concluded opposite results. For example, Craswell et al 
(2002) used a model which incorporated proportion of total audit fees among other 
variables in Australian to examine whether the exercise of auditor independence in the 
formulation of the audit opinion is affected by the proportion of audit fees that a client 
contributes to the total fees earned by the auditor. Publicly available data of two samples 
of Australian listed companies during 1994 (n = 1062) and 1996 (n = 1045) were 
analysed to test the association between auditor fee dependence and auditor opinion 
choice. The results showed that the auditor's propensity to issue unqualified audit 
opinion was not affected by the level of auditor fees dependence. 
Despite that some studies concluded that auditor independence was not perceived to be 
effected by the economic dependence of auditors on their audit clients, the vast majority 
of the previous research concluded the opposite. Some professional bodies in order to 
deter the economic dependence threat suggested a cut-off point of the level of the audit 
fees that might be generated from one client (e. g. 15%). This cut-off point of audit fees 
could be suitable for developed countries where audit firms have the chance to engage 
with a large number of different clients but it may not be suitable for other developing 
countries such as Libya where different economic environment exists. In addition, in 
some cultures where individuals accept ethical values and religious principles as their 
main guiding forces in their performance, such policies (cut-off point) may not be 
suitable. Thus, it would be better to understand the socio-economic environment 
inherent in the society in which auditors perform before setting any cut-off point of the 
level of the audit fees. 
4.1.5: Audit committees. 
A firm's audit committee is appointed by the Board of Directors and among its primary 
responsibilities, which are to oversee the firm's financial statements and reporting 
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process, is the recommendation of selecting the external auditors to the board, receiving. 
reviewing, and forwarding to the board the annual financial report of the external auditor 
(Alleyne et al, 2006 b). An audit committee was defined by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(SOX, 2002 henceforth) as: 
"A committee (or equivalent body) established by and amongst the board of directors 
for the purpose of overseeing the accounting and financial reporting processes of the 
issuer and audits of the financial statements of the issuer" (SOX, sec. 205). 
With regard to the audit committee's responsibilities relating to the enhancement of the 
auditor independence, the SOX Act stated that: 
"The audit committee of each issuer, in its capacity as a committee of the board of 
directors, shall be directly responsible for the appointment, compensation, and 
oversight of the work of any registered public accounting firm employed by that issuer 
(including resolution of disagreements between management and the auditor 
regarding financial reporting) for the purpose of preparing or issuing an audit report 
or related work" (SOX 2002). 
It has been argued that the existence of an audit committee would have a positive 
relationship with auditor independence. For example, many years ago, Goldman and 
Barleu (1974) suggest that if audit committees were established to deal with selection of 
audit firms, the negotiation of fees, and participating in matters relating to the auditor's 
replacement, the power of the client's management over the auditor would be limited. 
This viewpoint was shared by Green (1994: 138) when he declares that: 
"By involving the audit committee in the nomination of auditors and in the decision to 
change auditing firms, a higher degree of independence from management is 
attained ". 
In the same vein, Pomeranz (1997) stresses that auditor independence could be enhanced 
by a good link between the entire board of directors and the external auditor with the use 
of an audit committee. An audit committee opens up for the external auditor a direct 
channel of communication with the board to discuss audit progress and findings and 
helps resolve conflicts between him and client's management (Arens et al, 2003). 
Similar opinion was expressed by the Cadbury Committee (1992) when it maintained 
that the position of the auditor would be strengthened by providing a channel of 
communication and forum for issues of concern and a framework within which external 
auditors can assert their independence in the event of a dispute with management. 
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Furthermore, the Committee recommended in its 1992 Code of Best Practice that all 
listed companies establish an audit committee, composed of non-executive directors, a 
majority of whom are independent. 
Moreover, the Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO) in October 2002 issued a statement titled as: "Principles of 
auditor independence and the role of corporate governance in monitoring an auditor's 
independence". Within those principles relating to the audit committee, the following 
points emphasise the importance of audit committees: 
" The audit committee should be the key representative body with which the external 
auditor interacts. It should be established with a mandate that permits it to carry out its 
responsibilities free of any unreasonable restrains. Those responsibilities should include 
matters such as evaluating whether the audit fees charged by the auditor appear 
adequate in relation to the work required to support an audit opinion without regret to 
fees that might be paid to the auditor for other services. 
" The audit committee should on a regular and frequent basis meet with the auditor 
without management present and discuss with auditor any contentious issues that have 
arisen with management during the course of the audit and whether they have been 
resolved to the auditor's satisfaction. 
0 To monitor independence effectively, it is good practice for the audit committee to 
discuss with the auditors, at least annually, matters relating to their independence, 
including all significant threats to independence identified by the auditors and the 
safeguards implemented. To provide support for such discussions, the audit committee 
may wish to consider obtaining a written statement from the auditors: 
  Confirming that they are, and have been throughout the conduct of the audit 
engagement, independent in accordance with the terms of all relevant 
professional and regulatory requirements; and 
  Summarising all significant services provided to the entity and its affiliates, 
together with related fees, identifying separately audit services, other services 
required to be provided by the entity's auditor, such as in connection with an 
offering of securities, and other non-audit services grouped according to the 
nature of the services provided. 
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Audit committees however, are likely to be effective in enhancing auditor independence 
only in circumstances in which the members of the audit committee act in a manner 
independent of management (Gwilliam and Kilcommins, 1998). It has been argued that 
a company having an audit committee as part of its corporate governance structure and 
having an effective audit committee are, of course, two different matters (Sommer, 
1992). It is not enough that companies form audit committees. The committee must be 
composed such that the board of directors can and do rely on it to enhance their 
monitoring abilities. Therefore, many professional and regulatory bodies have 
recommended that members of audit committees should have a specific qualification 
and expertise to discharge their responsibilities. For instance, the SOX Act of 2002 
required that each member be independent and recommended that at least one member 
be an "audit committee financial expert". To be as independent, the Act states that an 
audit committee member can not accept any fees from the company other than for 
serving as a director, and can not be an affiliated person of the company or any of its 
subsidiaries. To qualify as an audit committee financial expert, an audit committee 
member must have an understanding of economic and accounting principles, 
comprehend how financial reporting choices and accounting policies can affect a 
company's financial reports, and possess an understanding of internal controls and 
procedures. 
Such requirements of audit committee's members have been shown to be important for 
dealing with the complexities of financial reporting and for reducing the occurrence of 
financial restatements. In addition, it has been argued that audit committee members 
with financial reporting and auditing knowledge are more likely to understand auditors' 
judgments and support them in auditor-management disputes than members without 
such knowledge (DeZoort and Salterio, 2001). In line with this view, Carcello and Neal 
(2003) argue that audit committees whose members are more independent, have more 
governance expertise, more financial expertise, and own less of the company's stock, 
will be likely to support the external auditor when auditor-client disagreement arises. 
Moreover, audit committees should also meet with their external auditor a number of 
times each year, both in the presence of management and independent of management in 
order to enhance and oversee the financial reporting process and to solve any disputes 
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that might occur between the external auditor and the audit client's management that 
could undermine auditor independence. 
The effect of audit committees on perceptions of auditor independence has been 
empirically investigated by many previous studies. For instance, Jackson-Heard (1987) 
examined the effects of five factors including audit committees on the auditor 
independence as perceived by financial analysts in the US. Audit committee status was 
divided between that of the client having or not having an audit committee. Participants 
were asked to respond on a ten-point scale (0 - no confidence to 10 - high confidence) 
to show their level of confidence in the independence of the auditor in thirty-two 
scenarios, each scenario represented one of the thirty-two possible combinations of 
levels of the five factors. Out of the 100 mailed questionnaires, a response rate of 23 per 
cent was obtained. The results indicated that the existence of an audit committee 
enhanced the perceptions of auditor independence. 
Similarly, Teoh and Lim (1996)1 studied how the perceptions of Malaysian public and 
non-public accountants were affected by five factors including audit committees 
regarding auditor independence. Again audit committee was described as if the client 
was having or not having an audit committee. The results showed that the existence of 
an audit committee was found to have a strong positive impact on enhancing auditor 
independence. 
Schleifer and Shockley (1990)2 investigated the perceptions of four groups (Big Eight 
audit partners, Non-Big Eight auditors, Bank loan officers, and certified financial 
analysts) about fourteen policies discussed in the Cohen Commission report (1978) as 
designed to enhance auditor independence in the US. One of the fourteen policies was 
related to the responsibilities of audit committees with regard to the appointment of 
auditors. The results indicated that the majority of the respondents agreed that this policy 
would enhance auditor independence. Only the loan officers group had a majority 
disagreeing with this policy. In the UK, Beattie et al (1999)3 examined the effects of a 
large set of factors including audit committees on auditor independence. Two proxy 
'- For more details of this study refer to page 73. 
2- For more details of this study refer to page 62. 
3- For more details of this study refer to page 57. 
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measures were used to examine the effects of the audit committee: existence or not 
existence of an audit committee. The results indicated that audit committees were 
perceived as the principal enhancement factor to auditor independence. 
Using a logistic regression model, Carcello and Neal (2003) examined the relationship 
between the likelihood that a client dismisses its auditor and audit committee 
characteristics (affiliation, stock owner ship, governance expertise, and financial 
expertise). A matched-pairs design was used to match on opinion, years, size, and 
industry companies dismissing their auditor after receiving an initial going-concern 
report with companies not dismissing their auditor after receiving a new going-concern 
report. 62 public traded companies of each group were identified from the compact 
D/SEC database that met the sample selection criteria (received a new going-concern 
report from a Big-Six audit firm over the period 1988 to 1999, and dismissed their 
auditor prior to the issuance of the client's next annual report). The results of this study 
suggested that audit committees with greater independence, greater governance 
expertise, and lower stock holdings were more effective in protecting auditors from 
dismissal after the issuance of going-concern reports. 
Abu Bakar et al (2005)1 investigated among other factors the effect of audit committees 
on perceptions of auditor independence from the perspective of commercial loan officers 
in Malaysia. The results of this study showed that 87.2 per cent of the participants 
indicated that the existence of an audit committee has some influence on auditor 
independence. In particular, the majority of the respondents agreed that the existence of 
an audit committee in the client company, the greater the auditor independence will be. 
Similar results were obtained in Barbados when Alleyne et al (2006 a)2 examined the 
effects of a large set of economic and regulatory factors including audit committees on 
selected groups' perceptions regarding auditor independence. The results showed that 
the existence of an audit committee was the most important factor perceived to enhance 
auditor independence. 
Although auditor independence was believed to be enhanced when an audit committee 
existed in the audit client company in the above literature, some other research has 
1- For more details of this study refer to page 58. 
2- For more details of this study refer to page 58. 
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different opinions. For instance, when Gul (1989)1 investigated the effects of five factors 
including audit committee on perceptions of auditor independence, the results indicated 
that audit committees had an insignificant effect on the perceptions of bankers with 
regard to auditor independence. A possible reason for this result, as Gul concluded, was 
that there was little awareness of the role and importance of audit committees amongst 
New Zealand bankers. 
It can be concluded from the above literature that auditor independence is perceived in 
the vast "majority of previous literature to be enhanced by the existence of an audit 
committee in the audit client company. This belief is due to that the power of client's 
management over the auditor could be limited when the audit committee deals with 
matters relating to the appointment, remuneration, and removal of the auditor. 
Accordingly, audit committees are recommended by many professional bodies as an 
active means of overseeing the financial reporting process. Audit committees however, 
are likely to be effective in overseeing the financial reporting process and supporting the 
auditor when disagreement with management arises only if its members act in a manner 
independent of the client's management. 
4.1.6: Status and financial condition of the audit client. 
The status and financial condition of the audit client has been recognised to have an 
impact on auditor independence. For example, Watts and Zimmerman (1986) argue that 
large audit clients due to the complexity of their operations and the increased separation 
between management and ownership, demand highly independent auditors to reduce 
agency costs. In addition, large audit clients were suggested to be less likely to receive a 
qualified audit report because of their ability to pay more audit fees than smaller clients 
that give them better bargaining power (Hudaib and Cook, 2005). Furthermore, it has 
been argued that auditors are more likely to remain independent when they audit large 
enterprises because of client's visibility and reputation protection (Gul, et al 2007). 
In addition to the status, the financial condition of the audit client was deemed to have 
an impact on auditor independence. For instance, Gul and Tsui (1992) argue that in 
auditor-client disagreement situations, auditors are more likely to resolve the conflict in 
1- For more details of this study refer to page 55. 
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favour of management when the client's financial condition is good than when it is poor 
because a client in good financial circumstances is unlikely to go bankrupt. Furthermore, 
the financial condition of the audit client may have an influence on the decision of the 
audit client regarding the retention of the current audit firm or seeking another. Francis 
and Wilson (1988) point out that audit clients who are insolvent and are experiencing 
poor financial condition are more likely to seek auditors having high independence to 
enhance the confidence of shareholders and creditors as well as to lower the risk of 
litigation. 
The possible impact of the status and financial condition of the audit client on auditor 
independence has been previously investigated by researchers in many different 
countries. For example, in the USA, Knapp (1985)1 examined the effects of four factors 
including client's financial condition on bankers' perceptions of auditor's ability to 
resist client pressure. Client financial condition was set at two levels: good and poor. 
Good financial condition was described as the firm's entire solvency and profitability 
ratios compare favourably to industry averages and the Net income has shown a modest 
but steady growth pattern over the last five years. The results of this study indicated that 
an audit client in a good financial condition was perceived as being more likely to obtain 
its preferred outcome to an audit conflict than a client in a poor financial condition. 
Similarly, Gul and Tsui (1992)2 in Hong Kong investigated the effects of three factors 
including the financial condition of the audit client on perceptions of Bankers regarding 
auditor's ability to resist management pressure in an audit conflict situation. Financial 
condition of the audit client was described as good and poor. Good financial condition 
was described as the firm's entire solvency and profitability ratios compare favourably 
to industry averages and the Net income has shown a modest but steady growth pattern 
over the last five years whereas poor financial condition is the reverse. The results 
showed that lending officers had less confidence in auditor's ability to resist 
management pressure when the financial condition of the audit client was good. 
'- For more details of this study refer to page 68. 
2- For more details of this study refer to page 71. 
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In the UK, Beatie et al (1999)1 studied the impact of size and financial condition of the 
client among other factors on perceptions of some interested parties regarding auditor 
independence. The results of this study showed that auditor independence `t as not 
perceived to be effected by the size of the audit client which was ranked near the end. 
On the other hand, ' most of the respondents perceived a client in a weak financial 
condition as one of the threatening factors to auditor independence. In another study in 
the UK, Hudaib and Cooke (2005) used a logistic regression model to examine the 
interactive effects of change in managing directors (MD) and financial distress together 
with five control variables including financial condition of the client on audit opinion 
and auditor switching. Financial condition of the client was described as "financial 
distress" or "not financial distress". Not financial distress company refers to a company 
which is solvent and is highly unlikely to fail within the next year while financial 
distress refers to a company which has a financial profile similar to financially distressed 
companies. The relevant information was extracted from the annual reports of 297 non- 
financial UK companies listed on the London Stock Exchange over a period from 1987 
to 2001. The results of this study indicated that clients that were financially distressed 
and change their MD were most likely to receive a qualified audit report compared to 
non-distressed clients regardless of a change in MD. According to this result, the 
researchers concluded that financial distress rather than change in MD is the driver for 
qualification. 
In order to provide evidence on the relationships between audit switching and five 
variables including client size, Abdul Nasser et al (2006) examined the behaviour of 
audit tenure and switching in the Malaysian audit environment for the period from 1990 
to 2000. Audit client size was divided to large and not-large. The relative data (financial 
statements and audit reports) were collected from Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
Institute Database regarding a randomly selected sample of 297 companies listed in the 
KLSE. A logistic regression model was used to test for the relationships between auditor 
switching and the other variables. The results of this study indicated that client size was 
significantly associated with auditor switching. Accordingly, the authors concluded that 
the likelihood of non-distressed large clients to switch is significantly less compared 
with distressed small clients. 
1- For more details of this study refer to page 57. 
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In Barbados, Alleyne et al (2006 a)' examined the effects of a large number of factors 
including size and financial condition of the audit client on perceptions of auditor 
independence. Similar to the results of Beatie et al (1999), size of the audit client was 
not seriously perceived to have an impact on auditor independence. In contrast, the weak 
financial condition was perceived by most of the respondents as one of the threatening 
factors to auditor independence. 
Although most of the above previous literature suggests that auditor independence is 
perceived to be affected due to the status and financial condition of the audit client, other 
researchers have concluded opposite results. For example, Gul (1989)2 examined how 
New Zealand bankers' perceptions were affected by five factors including the financial 
condition of the audit client with regard to auditor independence. Financial condition of 
the audit client was set at two levels: good and poor (the meaning of good or poor 
however, was not identified in this study). The results indicated that the effect of the 
financial condition of the audit client was found to be insignificant. The possible reason 
for this insignificant effect of the financial condition of the audit client, as Gul 
concluded, was due to the less awareness of the New Zealand bankers of the possibility 
that an auditor would have more difficulty resisting management pressure when the 
client's financial condition was strong than when the client's financial condition was 
poor. 
The conclusion that can be drown from the above is that most of previous literature 
relating to the perceived effect of the status and financial condition of the audit client on 
auditor independence show that companies which are large and in good financial 
condition are perceived to be less likely to receive a qualified auditor report because of 
their ability to pay more audit fees than smaller clients that give them a better bargaining 
position. In addition to this belief, others suggest that small audit clients usually seek 
auditors who have a high level of independence to enhance the confidence of interested 
parties of their performance. 
1- For more details of this study refer to page 58. 
2- For more details of this study refer to page 55. öJ 
4.1.7: Personal relationships. 
Personal relationships between auditors and their clients have been suggested as having 
an adverse impact on auditor independence. For instance, Flint (1988) argues that as the 
auditor-client personal relationships increase, other interested parties may question 
whether the auditors' mental attitudes, judgments or opinions might be influenced and 
independence will be compromised. The personal relationships such as family, 
friendship and employment relationships between auditors and individuals in the audit 
client who are in a position to influence the preparation of the financial statements have 
been recognised by the professional bodies worldwide as threats to auditors' objectivity 
and independence. For example, the APB (2004) in the case of family relationships 
stated that self-interest and familiarity or intimidation threats to the auditor's objectivity 
and independence might be created when a member of an audit firm has a personal 
relationship with the audit client. Similarly, the IFAC (2005) stated that threats to 
auditor independence may be created when an immediate family member of the audit 
client is a director, an officer or an employee of the audit client in a position to exert 
direct and significant authority over the preparation of financial statements. In addition, 
the IFAC (2005) warned that close relationships between auditors and members of the 
audit client other than immediate or close family members (e. g. director, an officer or an 
employee) may create threats to auditor independence. 
Another kind of personal relationship that might create a threat to auditor independence 
is the employment of an ex-auditor with an audit client. Beasley et al (2000) argue that 
audit firms might be less likely to conduct an appropriate audit after an ex-auditor joins 
the audit client's management team because the remaining members of the audit team 
may be reluctant to question a former audit colleague who is now responsible for the 
audit engagement. In addition, the ex-auditor's knowledge of the audit firm's plans and 
strategies enables him to design a misstatement that is unlikely to be discovered by his 
former audit firm. The potential threat to auditor independence that an employment 
relationship might pose has been recognised by Professional bodies and several 
provisions regarding this issue have been enacted. For example, the APB (2004) warned 
that objectivity and independence may be threatened where a director or an officer or an 
employee of the audit client who is in a position to influence the preparation of the 
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financial statements was previously an ex-auditor with the audit firm. Furthermore, the 
APB recommended that audit firms should not re-engage as auditors until a two-year 
period has elapsed since the former partner ceased to join the client. Similar assertion 
was expressed in the US when the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) stated: 
"It shall be unlawful for a registered public accounting firm to perform for an issuer 
any audit service required by this title, if a chief executive officer, controller, chief financial officer, chief accounting officer, or any person serving in an equivalent 
position for the issuer, was employed by that registered independent public accounting 
firm and participated in any capacity in the audit of that issuer during the ]-year 
period preceding the date of the initiation of the audit" (SOX, Sec 206) 
The effect of personal relationships on perceptions of auditor independence has been 
empirically investigated by many previous studies. For example, Lindsay et al (1987) 
examined the effects of fifteen auditor-client relationships including three personal 
relationships (e. g. employment and family) on perceptions of Canadian interested 
groups regarding auditor independence. The respondents were asked to indicate whether 
they perceived the audit firm to be independent in each situation (yes/no). A mailed 
questionnaire sent to a randomly selected sample of 400 auditors, 400 financial analysts 
and 400 loan officers and overall response rate of 38% was obtained. The results showed 
that the majority of the respondents in each group did not perceive the auditor 
independence to be impaired with the family relationships, but with respect to the 
employment situation, the majority of the financial and bankers group considered the 
auditor not to be independent in this situation. 
Schleifer and Shockley (1990)1 studied perceptions of four interested groups in the US 
regarding fourteen policies designed to enhance auditor independence. One of the 
fourteen policies was that audit firms should be prohibited from helping their employees 
find employment with audit clients. The results from this study showed that most of the 
respondents from the auditors group disagreed with this policy. On the other hand, the 
majority of respondents from the financial statement users group supported this 
restriction. This result suggests that users groups perceived the employment of ex- 
auditors with their clients as adversely affecting auditor independence. In Libya, Mousa 
(1992)2 found that some auditors have personal relationships with their audit clients. In 
1- For more details of this study refer to page 62. 
2- For more details of this study refer to page 62. 
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particular, 36% of the participants from the external auditors group noticed that auditing 
were performed by auditors who previously were one of the executive directors of the 
audit clients' management. This result has led the researcher to conclude that an adverse 
effect on auditor independence might be developed 
Kilcommins (1997) investigated the impact of six factors including client employment 
on perceptions of auditor independence and the reliability of financial statements held by 
interested parties in Ireland. Both mailed questionnaires and semi-structured interviews 
were used for collecting data. Participants in the mailed questionnaire were presented 
with a number of statements including employment relationship and were asked to 
indicate how often they would consider the auditor to be independent in each situation. 
Out of the 196 mailed questionnaires, 148 usable responses were received that made a 
response rate of 75.5%. The results showed that auditor independence and reliability of 
financial statements were perceived to be significantly impaired when the auditor took 
up an employment position with a former audit client. 
Hudaib (2003)1 explored and analysed how various factors including personal 
relationships shaped the perceptions of auditors and financial statement users regarding 
auditor independence in Saudi Arabia. Personal relationships in this study referred to 
blood relationships, close friendship and employment with audit client relationships. The 
results showed that most of the financial statement users group identified the above 
personal relationships as impairing auditor independence. The auditors group however, 
did not share the same viewpoint. This made the author to conclude that auditors in spite 
of their acknowledgement that these relationships could impair independence, they 
believed that they could still be objective as they were guided by their ethical 
conscience. 
It seems from the above literature that previous research has perceived personal 
relationships such as family relationships, friendship and employment relationships as a 
significant threat to auditor independence. In order to deter the threat of such 
relationships, some professional bodies, recommended policies to prevent auditors from 
auditing their clients when a member of an audit firm has personal relationships with 
1- For more details of this study refer to page 63. 
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key personnel in their audit clients. Despite the justified fear of the threat that personal 
relationships might have on auditor independence, it has to be noted before 
implementing any rules regarding this issue that in some societies such as Libya 
personal relationships are very strong and dominant and most of the economic and 
business activities are heavily dependent on these relationships. In addition, usually 
such developing countries are suffering from shortage of qualified auditors. Therefore, 
norms and ethical values of such societies in which auditors perform their work should 
be considered because auditors could still maintain their independence due to their 
religious beliefs and ethical values. 
4.1.8: Financial relationships. 
Financial relationships between auditors and their audit clients other than audit fees have 
been recognised by professional bodies as possible threat to auditor independence. These 
include shareholdings, receipt of loans and overdue audit and non-audit fees. For 
example, in the UK the APB (2004) acknowledged the threat to auditor's objectivity and 
independence due to the existence of financial relationships between auditors and their 
clients and prevented audit firms, any partner or members of the audit firm who are able 
to influence the conduct and outcome of the audit, and any immediate family member of 
such persons from holding any direct or "material" indirect financial interest in the audit 
client or in an affiliate of an audit client. Similarly, the EU Eight Directive (2005) 
emphasised that auditors should not perform an audit if there are any financial or 
business relationships between the auditor and the client because this might compromise 
the auditor independence (Soltani, 2007). Internationally, the IFAC (2005) adopted 
similar provisions to that of the APB (2004) and prohibited auditors or their immediate 
family members from developing any direct or "material" indirect financial relationship 
with the audit client. 
The rational reasoning behind this prohibition by the professional auditing bodies, as 
Moizer (1997) argues, is that beneficial shareholdings in audit clients creates an 
incentive for auditors to act in such a way as to maintain a false market value of the 
client which is against the interests of future shareholders at whose expense an existing 
shareholder (such as the auditor) could profit by selling shares at an inflated value, 
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hence an auditor shareholder has an incentive to mislead potential shareholders and 
therefore not to act in an independent way. 
The effect of financial relationships on perceptions of auditor independence has received 
considerable attention and was examined in several previous studies. For instance, 
Bartlett (1993)1 examined how perceptions of auditors and bank loan officers in the US 
were affected by a number of auditor-client relationships including financial 
relationships. The subjects of this study were asked to indicate whether they consider the 
auditor to be independent when the audit firm was a partner in a joint venture with an 
audit client. The results showed that both groups perceived that joint venture 
arrangements with audit clients severely reduced auditor independence. 
In the UK, Beattie et al (1999)2 investigated how perceptions of auditor independence 
were effected by a large set of 45 economic and regulatory factors including financial 
relationships (unpaid audit fees). The results showed that most of the respondents 
perceived unpaid audit fees as one of the most threatening factors to auditor 
independence. A similar result was obtained by Hudaib (2003) 3 when he studied how 
various factors including financial relationships shaped the perceptions of auditors and 
financial statement users regarding auditor independence in Saudi Arabia. Financial 
relationships in this study referred to receipt of loan, overdue non-audit fees, trade and 
rent relationships and shareholdings. The results showed that the above financial 
relationships were perceived by the participants as posting the most significant threat to 
auditor independence. 
In a similar study to that of Beattie et al (1999), Alleyene et al (2006 a)4 examined how 
perceptions of Barbadian interested groups were effected by a large set of 39 auditor- 
client relationships including financial relationships (unpaid audit fees) regarding 
auditor independence. The results of this study indicated that unpaid audit fees were 
perceived by most of the respondents as a threatening factor to auditor independence. 
I- For more details of this study refer to page 72. 
2- For more details of this study refer to page 57. 
3- For more details of this study refer to page 63. 
4- For more details of this study refer to page 58. 
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Nevertheless, Lindsay et al (1987)1 obtained different results when they examined the 
effects of three financial relationships among fifteen auditor-client relationships on 
perceptions of Canadian interested groups regarding auditor independence. The results 
indicated that most of the respondents perceived financial relationships as not impairing 
auditor independence, except for one situation where only the auditors group perceived 
auditor independence to be impaired. A possible explanation for this result, as the 
researchers suggested, is that auditors have a better understanding of the concept of 
independence than the other participants. 
Based on the above literature it can be seen that financial relationships such as 
shareholdings, receipt of loans and overdue audit and non-audit fees between auditors 
and their audit clients were found by most of the previous research to create a threat to 
auditor objectivity and independence. Regarding this issue, some professional bodies 
prohibited auditors or their immediate family members from developing any direct or 
(material) indirect financial relationships with their audit clients. This was because 
auditors might have incentives to act in a biased way to maintain a false market value of 
companies who they hold shares on. Despite the perceived threat that financial 
relationships might have on auditor independence, it is vital to consider and understand 
the socioeconomic structure of the particular society in which auditors conduct their 
work before implementing any rules regarding this issue that might be inappropriate. 
4.1.9: Provision of non-audit services (NAS). 
The provision of NAS by auditors to their audit clients have been the subject of the most 
heated debate among all other factors identified in the independence literature which 
might effect perceptions of auditor independence. The controversy surrounding auditors 
providing NAS to their audit clients centres around the ability of such auditors to 
evaluate objectively the client's financial statements while at the same time providing 
consulting services to the same client (Mautz and Sharaf, 1961; Shockley, 1982; Flint, 
1988; Clikeman, 1998; Canning and Gwilliam, 1999; Firth; 2002). For instance, Mautz 
and Sharaf (1961) argued that audit firms by providing NAS to their audit clients impair 
auditor independence because giving advice and decision making can not be separated 
1- For more details of this study refer to page 85. 
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and that the auditor who provides NAS cannot avoid participation in management 
decisions. In the same vein, Firth (2002) contended that provision of NAS to an audit 
client will increase auditor's economic dependence on that client. As a result, a decrease 
in auditor independence or a perception of a lack of independence will occur. In 
addition, he added that the auditor will be reluctant to adversely report on items that are 
the result of, or partly the result of, his/her consultancy advice. 
The concern about the threat that NAS could pose on auditor independence was 
acknowledged by professional bodies worldwide. For example, in the US, the Metcalf 
Committee Staff Study (1976) suggested that providing both services (auditing and 
NAS) by audit firms to their audit clients can create a conflict of interest, particularly 
when an audit firm helps to recruit a client's executives and is interested in assuring 
their success, or when it installs a management information system and subsequently 
audits the reliability and accuracy of its own work. In these situations, an audit firm 
acting as both auditor and consultant may be motivated not to report consulting 
deficiencies observed during the audit, thereby avoiding erosion of its consulting in 
general. 
Consistent with these views, the SOX Act of 2002 prohibited audit firms in the US from 
providing some NAS to their audit clients. Specifically, section (202) of the Act stated 
that it shall be unlawful for a registered public accounting firm, in charge of the audit of 
a company's financial statements, to provide to that issuer, contemporaneously with the 
audit, any NAS including: 1) Bookkeeping or other services related to the accounting 
records or financial statements of the audit client, 2) Financial information systems 
design and implementation, 3) Appraisal or valuation services, fairness opinions, or 
contribution-in-kind reports, 4) Actuarial services, 5) Internal audit outsourcing services, 
6) Management function or human resources, 7) Broker or dealer, investment adviser, or 
investment banking services, 8) Legal services and expert services unrelated to the audit, 
and 9) Any other services that the Board determines, by regulation, is impermissible. 
In the UK, the professional bodies did not prohibit audit firms from providing NAS to 
their audit clients, but they consider independence to be impaired if providing NAS to 
audit clients leads to the exercise of management functions. For example, GPES (1.202, 
Para. 4.56) stated: 
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"There is no objection to a firm providing advisory services to a company which are 
additional to the audit. Care must be taken to ensure not to perform management functions or to make management decisions. It is economic in terms of skill and effort for professional accountants in public practice to be able to provide other services to their clients since they already have a good knowledge of their business. Many 
companies (particularly smaller ones) would be adversely affected if they were denied 
the right to obtain other services from their auditors ". 
Similarly, the APB (2004) emphasised that a threat to auditor objectivity' and 
independence arises due to provision of NAS by audit firms to their audit clients and 
recommended that audit firms should not undertake any engagement to provide NAS 
where auditors would place significant reliance up on those NAS as part of the audit of 
the client's financial statements. The threat to auditor independence due to the provision 
of NAS has led some countries such as Japan, France, Belgium, Italy and Kenya to 
prohibit auditors from supplying NAS to their audit clients (Firth, 2002). The EU 
Directive (2004) required that an external auditor should be able to demonstrate that 
his/her independence has not been compromised by providing NAS to an audit client for 
which the remuneration received is disproportionate to the work performed, and 
recommended that information about NAS such as provision of financial information. 
technology, internal audit, valuation, litigation and recruitment services should at least 
be disclosed (Soltani, 2007). 
Internationally, the IFAC (2005) recognised the threat to auditor independence due to 
the provision of NAS by audit firms to their audit clients and stated that a significant 
self-interest or self-review threat will be created as auditors perform a number of 
activities such as i) Authorising, executing or consummating a transaction, or otherwise 
exercising authority on behalf of the assurance client, or having the authority to do so, ii) 
Determining which recommendation of the firm should be implemented, and iii) 
Reporting, in a management role, to those charged with governance (IFAC, Para 
290.159: 57). 
Contrary to the above arguments, another viewpoint exists in the auditing literature that 
deems auditor independence will not be impaired by auditors providing NAS to their 
audit clients. For example, Higgins (1962) argued that providing NAS by audit firms to 
their audit clients does not negate the independence of the consultant. He contended that 
if circumstances in which an individual auditor's opinions are improperly 
influenced b\ 
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NAS, the source of the problem is not the provision of NAS but rather a basic weakness 
in the auditor's ethical constitutions. A similar idea was expressed by Carey and Doherty 
(1966) when they argued that auditor independence will not be affected as long as 
auditors confined their provision of NAS to advice, and do not involve in the final 
decision-making process of their audit clients. 
These thoughts were supported by The Cohen Commission (1978) in the US when it 
concluded that provision of NAS did not compromise an auditor's ability to remain 
independent and recommended auditors to fully inform the board of directors or its audit 
committee of all of such services and their relationship to the audit services. The 
Commission however, emphasised that efficiencies may be associated with the joint 
supply of the two services. Similarly, the Council of the ICAEW (1987) maintained that: 
"The provision of some NAS by the auditor will often assist the auditor to perform the 
task effectively, by adding to his knowledge of relevant aspects of the business affairs 
and given that the objective of the independence requirements is to support the quality 
of audit services provided, a ban on the provision of other services could, therefore, be 
counter productive ". 
With regard to the Libyan context, article No 25 of Law No. 116 which governs the 
accounting and auditing practices in Libya prohibited auditors from combining their 
status as public accountants with certain activities. These include: a) ministerial 
position, b) any public post, permanent or temporary, with salary or compensation 
(unless he was permitted to do so according to the provision of this law), c) any 
commercial activities and d) all other activities which are not compatible with the 
profession (Law No. 116, article 25: 14). Accordingly, Kilani (1988) assumed that the 
auditor in Libya may render any service required by his client such as bookkeeping, 
auditing, tax services, liquidation, management services, system design and installation, 
and public sector financial management. 
In addition to the above two views, another viewpoint argues that the provision of NAS 
may strengthen the independence of auditors. For instance, Goldman and Barleu (1974) 
argue that the more NAS provided to the audit client, the greater the power and 
independence of the auditor. In particular, they state that: 
"This occurs because most consulting-type services are non-routine and 
because these 
services benefit the client firm directly. Consequently, the replacement of the 
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consulting auditor may result in a loss of valuable advice to the firm. His bargaining 
position therefore becomes stronger; he is better equipped to resist interference in the 
performance of his auditing duties and is more likely to retain his independence " 
(Goldman and Barleu, 1974: 751). 
Permitting auditors to provide NAS to their audit clients may allow them to supply 
different types of services that leave them less dependent on one or few clients (Grout et 
al, 1994). In the same vein, Arrunada (1999) argues that the provision of NAS by 
auditors to their audit clients reduces total costs, increases technical competence and 
motivates more intense competition and it does not necessarily impair auditor 
independence or the quality of NAS. Furthermore, he contended that the provision of 
such services can in fact; enhance professional judgement through increased familiarity 
that auditor will have with the client, especially in relation to areas such as intangible 
assets, and through the efficient use of experts. Defond et al (2002) contend that the 
concerns about NAS are based on the assumption that auditors are willing to sacrifice 
their independence in exchange for retaining profitable clients. They argued that this 
assumption ignores the auditor's expected costs of compromising their independence 
such as loss of reputation and litigation costs that are likely to provide strong incentives 
for auditors to maintain their independence. 
The effect of Provision of NAS on perceptions of auditor independence has received 
considerable attention and was examined in several previous studies. For example, 
Jackson-Heard (1987)1 investigated the effects of five factors including provision of 
NAS on auditor independence as perceived by financial analysts in the US. Provision of 
NAS was divided as "over 50% of audit fee" and "not over 50% of audit fee". The 
results of this study showed that the participants' confidence in the external auditor 
independence was significantly higher when NAS fees were less than or equal to 50% of 
audit fee than when NAS fees were more than 50% of audit fee. Similarly, in Canada, 
Lindsay (1990)2 examined the effects of four factors including provision of NAS on 
perceptions of bank loan officers with respect to auditor's ability to resist management 
pressure. Provision of NAS was set at two levels; provision of NAS at level of 40% of 
audit fee and NAS were not provided at all. The results of this study 
indicated that 
I- For more details of this study refer to page 78. 
2- For more details of this study refer to page 55. 93 
provision of NAS at a level of 40% of audit fee was perceived by the respondents as a 
factor that may impede an audit firm in its attempt to take a strong independent stance. 
In the UK, Beattie et al (1999) 1 investigated the effects of a number of auditor-client 
relationships including provision of NAS by auditors on auditor independence. The 
results indicated that auditor independence was perceived to be threatened by the four 
NAS situations. In another study in the UK, Hussey and Lan (200 1)2 studied how 
finance directors, perceived the three key questions posed by the Board for Chartered 
Accountants in Business (1990) regarding enhancing auditor independence. One of the 
questions related to the prohibition on firms undertaking work other than audit for their 
audit clients. The results showed that finance directors agreed that prohibition of non- 
audit work for the same audit client would enhance perceptions of auditor independence. 
Sharma and Sidhu (2001) used a logit model to investigate the effects of the joint 
provision of NAS and audit services on auditor's propensity to issue a going-concern 
opinion in the year preceding bankruptcy. The audit reports and financial statements of a 
selected sample of 49 bankrupt Australian public companies were analysed. The results 
of this study indicated that the higher proportion of NAS fees relative to total fees 
influenced the auditor's decision to issue a going-concern opinion. The authors 
concluded that auditor independence may be impaired due to the economic dependence 
of the auditor on the audit client. 
In Saudi Arabia, Hudaib (2003)3 investigated how various factors including provision of 
NAS effected perceptions of auditors and financial statement users regarding auditor 
independence. The results of this study indicated that most financial statement users 
considered NAS as impairing auditor independence but less so in terms of bookkeeping 
services. Most auditors however, perceived neither bookkeeping services nor NAS as 
impairing independence. 
Quick and Rasmussen (2005) examined the effects of provision of NAS by audit firms 
to their audit clients on perceptions of five groups in Denmark; state authorized auditors, 
managing directors, bank loan officers, private shareholders and business journalists. 
1- For more details of this study refer to page 57. 
2- For more details of this study refer to page 63. 
3- For more details of this study refer to page 63. 
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Out of the 927 mailed questionnaires, only 481 usable responses were received making a 
response rate of 52 per cent. Participants were asked to give their view of several 
statements relating to the provision of NAS. The results of this study showed that 
provision of NAS was perceived by the respondents to have a negative effect on auditor 
independence. 
Awadallah (2006)1 studied the effects of four factors including provision of NAS on 
perceptions of Egyptian auditors regarding auditor's ability to resist client's 
management pressure on audit disputes. Provision of NAS was restricted to two levels, 
provided or not provided. The results indicated that the participants perceived that audit 
firms which provide NAS to their audit clients act as if they have relatively less power in 
conflict situations than those which did not. A similar result was obtained by Alleyne et 
al, (2006 a)2 when they examined how a large set of 39 auditor-client relationships 
including provision of NAS effected perceptions of Barbadian interested groups 
regarding auditor independence. In particular, auditor independence was perceived to be 
threatened by the provision of NAS. 
Opposite to the above, some other researchers have concluded different results. For 
example, Knapp (1985)3 investigated the effects of four factors including provision of 
NAS on bankers' perceptions of auditor's ability to resist client's management pressure. 
The respondents were asked to indicate their perceptions on the likelihood that 
management would obtain its preferred resolution in a conflict situation when NAS 
provided by the audit firm at the level of 0% and 40% of audit fees. The results showed 
that the provision of a significant amount of NAS by an audit firm slightly increased the 
apparent likelihood of a conflict of being resolved in favour of the client. 
Gul (198 9)4 examined the effects of five factors including provision of NAS on 
perceptions of bankers in New Zealand regarding auditor independence. NAS was 
restricted to two levels, provided or not provided. The results of this study showed that 
the provision of NAS affected the bankers' perceptions of auditor independence but not 
in the predicted direction. Bankers had higher confidence in auditors who provide NAS. 
1- For more details of this study refer to page 59. 
2- For more details of this study refer to page 58. 
3- For more details of this study refer to page 68. 
4- For more details of this study refer to page 55. 
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Gul concluded that the increased bankers' confidence in auditor independence when 
they provide NAS could be attributed to the scenarios that NAS was provided by a 
separate department within the audit firm. 
Defond et al (2002) used a logistic regression model to investigate the association 
between NAS fees and the auditor's propensity to issue a going-concern audit opinion. 
The analysis of audit reports and financial statements of a sample of 1.158 US financial 
distressed companies indicated that no significant association between NAS fees and 
impaired auditor independence. The authors concluded that market-based incentives 
such as loss of reputation and litigation costs, dominate the benefits auditors are likely to 
receive from compromising their independence to retain clients that pay larger fees. 
Almalhuf (2003)1 among several issues tested the effect of four factors including NAS 
on perceptions of external auditors and financial statement users with respect to auditor 
independence. The results of this study showed that auditor independence was perceived 
not to be effected by the provision of NAS. 
Geiger and Rama (2003)2 used a logistic regression model incorporating the proportion 
of total audit and non-audit fees among other variables to examine the association 
between the magnitude of audit and non-audit fees and auditor report modification 
decisions for financially stressed manufacturing companies in the US. The results of this 
study indicated no significant association between NAS fees and auditor opinion, in 
addition the results reviled that no significant relationship between the ration of NAS 
fees to audit fees and reporting decisions. 
It can be seen from the above theoretical arguments and empirical results that conflicting 
evidence has been produced as to the effect of provision of NAS on perceived auditor 
independence. Some believed that provision of NAS to clients make auditors unable to 
evaluate objectively the client's financial statements because of their involvement in 
some of the clients' decision-making process that put them in a position of auditing their 
own work. As a result, many voices were raised to demand a complete or partially ban 
on provision of NAS. Others believed that provision of NAS will not impair auditor 
1- For more details of this study refer to page 57. 
2- For more details of this study refer to page 73. 
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independence as long as auditors confine their provision of NAS to advice and are not 
involve in the final decision-making process of the audit client. A third group believed 
that auditor independence will be enhanced when NAS are provided due to the increased 
familiarity that auditors will have with their clients that puts them in a unique position to 
provide such services. The above mixture of theoretical arguments and empirical results 
on the perceived effect of the provision of NAS on auditor independence could be 
attributed to the differences of the nature of the structure of the economic environments 
in which previous research has been conducted. Thus, it would be better to consider and 
understand the specific nature of the economic environment in which auditors perform 
their duties before implementing policies such as complete banning of providing NAS, 
especially in developing countries that suffer from a shortage of skilful professional 
auditors. 
4.2: Limitations of the literature review (the literature gap). 
Based on the above review of the previous literature related to the effect of the nine 
selected factors on perceptions of auditor independence, some limitations can be 
highlighted. 
Firstly, the majority of the research on perceptions of auditor independence has been 
conducted in developed and some capitalist developing countries (UK, USA, Australia, 
New Zealand, Canada, Ireland, Greece, Denmark, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, 
Barbados) where one might expect no significant differences in context, while little is 
known from developing countries such as Libya where research on this contentious issue 
is deficient. 
Secondly, most of the previous empirical studies were limited in relying entirely either 
on quantitative or qualitative data. In addition, it can be seen that a large number of 
studies used an experimental design by using repeated-measure (within-subject design or 
between-subject design) that restricts the number of factors that could be examined. 
Normally, the number of factors and levels are kept small in order to keep the 
experimental task manageable. Furthermore, repeated measure design can result 
in false 
significant differences because the subjects are over sensitised to the variables and 
hypotheses being tested and reply cooperatively (learning and demand effects). 
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Thirdly, some of the previous studies have shown conflicting results with respect to 
perceptions of auditor independence due to not giving enough consideration to some 
elements of culture that prevails in a country. For example, in some cultures individuals 
do not depend too much on regulatory rules and standards in their performance and 
accept ethical values and religious principles as their main guiding forces. In addition to 
the differences in the methodology and in results, it can be seen from (Appendix A) that 
studies differed in relation to the type of the required response (dichotomous / scaled), 
the number of examined factors, the research groups and sample size, the obtained 
response rate and whether independence in the researched factors was defined or not. 
Fourthly, the majority of the previous empirical studies have focused on identifying the 
factors that might pose a potential threats to auditor independence, while potential 
enhancement factors were not given due consideration. 
Finally, as the environment within which the audit operates is subject to continuous 
changes, interest in perceived auditor independence will continue due to new situations 
that might be seen to threaten or enhance auditor independence. Thus, assessing whether 
interested parties are maintaining their confidence in auditor independence is an ongoing 
process. 
4.3: Summary. 
Nine factors considered to be suitable for the purpose of this study were selected from a 
comprehensive literature review. These included the size of the audit firm, tenure of the 
audit firm, competition among audit firms, auditors' economic dependence on their audit 
clients, audit committees, status and financial condition of the audit client, personal and 
financial relationships and provision of NAS. This section aims to summaries the 
theoretical and empirical arguments relating to the above selected factors as follows: 
The size of an audit firm: Large audit firms were perceived to be more independent 
than smaller audit firms. This is due to several reasons such as that large audit firms 
usually are not dependent on one or few clients for their income, they perform 
in a 
professional manner, they do not develop close relationships with their clients, and their 
numerous experienced and qualified staff that allows them to provide 
high audit qualit\ . 
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Audit firm tenure: Some believed that a long association between audit firms and their 
clients may lead to the development of an "over-cosy relationship" that could adversely 
affect auditor independence and reduce the reliability and quality of the audit. Others 
believed that the costs of audit firm rotation outweigh the benefits and the experience 
and knowledge that is gained over time in improving quality work would be wasted with 
the appointment of a new auditor. In addition, problems with audit reporting and 
independence may be more likely to arise in the earlier years of the auditor-client 
relationship. 
Competition between audit firms: Auditor independence was perceived to be 
adversely effected due to the high level of competition between audit firms. Contrary to 
this viewpoint, other empirical results indicated that auditor independence was perceived 
not to be affected. Furthermore, a few empirical results showed that independence was 
perceived to be enhanced by competition. 
Auditors' economic dependence on their audit clients: Auditor independence was 
considered to be impaired if auditors were economically dependent upon clients for their 
income. Large audit and non-audit fees paid to auditors make them economically 
dependent on their clients that may lead to a relationship whereby the auditor becomes 
reluctant to make appropriate inquiries during the audit for fear of losing highly 
profitable fees. 
Audit committees: Auditor independence was perceived to be enhanced by the 
existence of an audit committee in the audit client company. The power of a client's 
management over the auditor could be limited when the audit committee deals with 
matters relating to the appointment, remuneration, and removal of the auditor. Audit 
committees, however, are likely to be effective only if its members act in a manner 
independent of the client's management. 
Status and financial condition of the audit client: Some believed that companies 
which are large and in good financial conditions are less likely to receive a qualified 
auditor report because of their ability to pay more audit fees than smaller clients that 
gives them a better bargaining position. Others suggested that small and poor audit 
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clients usually seek auditors who have a high level of independence to enhance the 
confidence of interested parties of their performance. 
Personal relationships: Personal relationships such as family, friendship and 
employment relationships were perceived as a significant threat to auditor independence. 
In order to deter this threat, some professional bodies recommended policies that prevent 
auditors from auditing their clients when a member of an audit firm has personal 
relationships with audit clients. 
Financial relationships: financial relationships such as shareholdings, receipt of 
interest free loans and overdue audit and non-audit fees were perceived as significant 
threat to auditor objectivity and independence because such relationships might provide 
auditors with incentives to act in a biased way to maintain a false market value of 
companies where they have financial interests. 
Provision of non-audit services (NAS): Some believed that provision of NAS makes 
auditors unable to evaluate objectively the client's financial statements because of their 
involvement in the clients' decision-making process puts them in a position of auditing 
their own work. Additionally auditors' economic dependence on their audit clients will 
increase which might decrease auditor independence or a perception of a lack of 
independence. Others believed that provision of NAS will not impair auditor 
independence as long as auditors are not involved in the final decision-making process. 
On contrast, a third group believed that auditor independence will be enhanced when 
NAS were provided due to the increased familiarity that auditors will have with their 
clients that puts them in a unique position to provide such services. 
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5.0: Introduction. 
The previous chapter covered the relevant prior research that relates to the perceptions of 
auditor independence. This chapter aims to describe the research methodology. It is 
organised into three main sections. The first section presents and identifies the two 
dominant paradigms that have shaped social science research (Positivism and 
Phenomenological paradigms). An overview of the quantitative, qualitative and mixed 
research methodologies is also outlined in this section. The second section deals with the 
methods of collecting primary data (questionnaire and interview). Finally, a brief 
summary of the contents of the chapter is provided in the third section. 
5.1: Research paradigms. 
The concept of paradigms of social science has been heavily discussed in the literature 
(Creswell, 1994; Remenyi et al, 1998; Collis and Hussey, 2003). According to Chua 
(1986) and Gummesson (1991) the term paradigm was introduced for the first time by 
Thomas Kuhn in the early 1960s. The meaning of paradigm has been defined by 
Johnson et al (2007: 129) as: 
"A set of beliefs, values, and assumptions that a community of researchers has in 
common regarding the nature and conduct of research ". 
According to Collis and Hussey (2003) a paradigm refers to the progress of scientific 
practice based on people's philosophies and assumptions about the world and the nature 
of knowledge, more specifically, about how research should be undertaken. Paradigms 
provide a framework comprising an accepted set of theories, methods and ways of 
defining data. Remenyi et al (1998: 32) states that: 
'A paradigm or theory is no more than conventional wisdom of the subject, thus 
empirical research should be fundamentally rooted in theory and it is impossible to 
conduct such research in a meaningful way without the researcher taking a specific 
theoretical standpoint". 
Collis and Hussey (2003) and Remenyi et al (1998) identified two main research 
philosophies or paradigms to describe the researchers' 
beliefs about the world that «- ill 
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be reflected in their way of designing the research, and how data would be collected and 
analysed. These paradigms are: Positivist and Phenomenological. Collis and Hussey 
(2003) suggest that it is best to regard these paradigms as the two extremes of a 
continuum. As one moves along the continuum, the features and assumptions of one 
paradigm are gradually relaxed and replaced by those of the other paradigm. 
The key idea with positivism is that the social world exists through objective measures, 
instead of being inferred subjectively through sensation or intuition (Milliken, 2001). On 
the other hand, phenomenologists consider the world is socially constructed and 
subjective, therefore, people place different meanings based on their experiences. Table 
(5.1) shows the different assumptions of the two main paradigms as suggested by 
Creswell (1994). He refers to the positivistic paradigm as quantitative and the 
phenomenological paradigm as qualitative'. 
a) Ontological: According to this assumption, the world must be considered as objective 
and external to the researcher, or socially constructed and only understood by examining 
the perceptions of the human actors. 
Table (5.1): The assumptions of the two main paradigms. 
Assumption Question positivistic phenomenological 
Ontological What 
is the nature of Reality is objective and singular, Reality is subjective and multiple 
reality? a apart from the researcher as seen by participants in a study 
What is the 
Epistemological relationship of the 
Researcher is independent from Researcher interacts with that 
researcher to that that being researched being researched 
researched? 
Axiological 
What is the rule of 
the values? 
Value-free and unbiased Value-laden and biased 
What is the language 
Formal based on set definitions Informal; evolving decisions; 
Rhetorical 
of the research? 
impersonal voice use of accepted personal voice; use of accepted 
quantitative words qualitative words. 
Deductive process cause and 
Inductive process; mutual 
effect; static design-categories 
simultaneous shaping of factors 
What is the process 
isolated before study; context-free 
. emerging design-categories 
identified during research process; 
Methodological 
of the research? 
generalisations leading to context-bound; patterns, theories 
prediction, explanation and developed for understanding; 
understanding accurate and reliable accurate and reliable through through validity and reliability verification 
Source: adapted from Creswell (1994. p. 5) 
I- Collis and Hussey (2003) outlined that some authors prefer to use different terms to refer to the two main paradigms which 
have arisen as a result of their wishing to denote a different approach. For 
instance, terms such as Quantitative. Objectivist, 
Scientific, Experimentalist and Traditionalist are used by some authors to refer to the Positivistic - paradigm. While, 
terms such as Qualitative, Subjective, Humanistic and Interpretivist are used to refer to the 
Phenomenological 
paradigm. 
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b) Epistemological: The epistemology assumption is concerned with the stud% of 
knowledge and what is accepted as being valid knowledge. An examination of the 
relationship between the researcher and that which is being researched is involved in this 
assumption. According to this assumption, positivists believe that only phenomena 
which are observable and measurable can be validly regarded as knowledge. They try to 
maintain an independent and objective stance. Contrary to this viewpoint, 
phenomenologists try to minimise the distance between the researcher and that which is 
being researched. 
c) Axiological: This kind of assumption is considered with values. Positivists according 
to this assumption believe that science and the process of research is value-free. Thus, 
they consider that they are detached from what they are studying and regard the 
phenomena which are the focus of their research as objective. Positivists are interested 
in the interrelationship of the objects they are studying and believe that these objects 
were present before they took an interest in them. In addition, positivists believe that 
their research activities will not have any effect on the researched objects and they will 
still be present after the study has been done. These assumptions are common in natural 
sciences research but are less convincing in the social sciences that are concerned with 
the activities and behaviour of people (Collis and Hussey, 2003). Opposite to this 
viewpoint, phenomenologist considers that researchers have values, even if they have 
not been made explicit. These values help to determine what are recognised as facts and 
the interpretations that are drawn from them. Phenomenologists believe that the 
researcher is involved with that which is being researched. 
d) Rhetorical: The rhetorical assumption is concerned with the language of the research. 
Positivists usually write their research in a formal style using the passive voice in order 
to convey the impression that the research is objective. On the other hand, in a 
phenomenological research the position is less clear. Phenomenologists prefer a writing 
stile that fully reflects the closeness of the research and demonstrates the researcher's 
involvement. 
e) Methodological: This assumption is concerned with the process of the research. 
Methodology refers to the overall approach to the research, from the theoretical 
underpinning to the collection and analysis of data. While, methods refer to the 
different 
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means by which data could be collected and analysed with. Positivists according to this 
assumption are concerned with ensuring that any concepts used can be described in such 
a measurable way. In addition they use large samples and reduce the phenomena under 
examination to its simplest parts. Also they focus on what they regard as being objective 
facts and formulate and analyse hypotheses in order to deduct any associations or 
casualty. Contrary to this, phenomenologists investigate small samples, possibly over a 
period of time. They use a number of different research methods to obtain different 
perceptions of the phenomena under investigation. Phenomenologists in their analysis 
will be seeking to understand what is happening in a situation and looking for patterns 
which may be repeated in other similar situations. 
It can be seen from what has been mentioned above that the positivistic and the 
phenomenological paradigms are two extremes and very few would undertake research 
within their pure forms. Adopting a particular paradigm determined partly on the nature 
of the investigated research problem and could be influenced by several issues such as 
time and funding resources. Collis and Hussey (2003) suggest that it should be 
remembered that there is no wrong or right paradigm. In addition, Remenyi et al (1998) 
suggests that a compromise sometimes has to be made between what would be ideal and 
what is practical. 
5.1.1: Quantitative methodology. 
A quantitative methodology is based on the positivist perspective of the world in which 
all phenomena can be analysed scientifically and explained through appropriate 
scientific analysis and has been the dominant tradition within the research community. 
According to this ideology of thought as Sarantakos (1998) argues, reality is 
independent of human consciousness, is objective, rests on order, is governed by strict 
natural and unchangeable laws and can be examined. In other words, reality can be 
defined by all members of the society in the same way because they all share the same 
meaning. In his descriptions of quantitative methodology, Sarantakos (1998) mentioned 
some of the standards that constitute the theoretical principles of the quantitative 
approach as follows: 
" Perceives reality as a sum of measured or measurable attributes and 
its main 
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purpose is to quantify and measure social events. 
" Gives more consideration to the methods used of collecting and analysing of 
data. 
" Attempts to neutralise the researchers or to reduce or eliminate as much as 
possible their influence on the researched phenomena. 
" Endeavours to achieve objectivity which is considered as one of the most 
important properties of social research. 
Similarly, Robson (2002) argues that quantitative research attempts to neutralise the 
researcher or to reduce or eliminate his/her influence on the investigated phenomena as 
far as possible. According to Collis and Hussey (2003) the quantitative approach 
searches for the facts or causes of social phenomena, with little regard to the subjective 
state of the individual. Therefore, logical reasoning is applied to the research so that 
precision, objectivity and rigour replace hunches, experience and intuition as the means 
of investigating research problems. The quantitative approach depends on using research 
methods that provide a standardised framework in order to limit the collected data to a 
certain predetermined response or analysis categories (Patton, 1990). 
It has been argued that the main advantages of the quantitative approaches are that they 
can provide wide coverage of the range of situations; they can be fast and economical 
especially in cases where statistics are aggregated from large samples (Easterby-Smith et 
al, 2006). In the same context, Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004, p. 19) mentioned a 
number of advantages that relate to the quantitative research approach. These include the 
following: 
" Testing and validating already constructed theories about how (and to a lesser 
degree, why) phenomena occur. 
0 Testing hypotheses that are constructed before the data are collected. This can 
generalize research findings when the data are based on random samples of 
sufficient size. 
9 Can generalize a research finding when it has been replicated on many different 
populations and subpopulations. 
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" Useful for obtaining data that allow quantitative predictions to be made. 
" The researcher may construct a situation that eliminates the confounding 
influence of many variables, allowing one to more credibly assess cause-and- 
effect relationships. 
" Data collection using some quantitative methods is relatively quick. 
" Provides precise, quantitative, numerical data. 
" Data analysis is relatively less time consuming. 
" It is useful for studying large numbers of people. 
On the other hand, the quantitative approach has some drawbacks. For instance, 
Sarantakos (1998) states that some critiques have been expressed by many researchers 
regarding the quantitative approach such as respondents according to this approach are 
turned into "units" or "objectives" and are treated as such. As a result, researchers are 
removed from the research process, lose contact with the respondents and become 
alienated from the world they are supposed to study. Similar weaknesses of the 
quantitative research approach were outlined by Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004: 19). 
These drawbacks include the following points: 
0 The researcher's categories and theories that are used may not reflect local 
constituencies' understandings. 
" The researcher may miss out on phenomena occurring because of the focus on 
theory or hypothesis testing rather than on theory or hypothesis generation, i. e. 
confirmation bias. 
" Knowledge produced may be too abstract and general for direct application to 
specific local situations, contexts, and individuals 
5.1.2: Qualitative methodology. 
The qualitative methodology developed as a result of the criticisms of the quantitative 
methodology (Collis and Hussey, 2003). Contrary to the quantitative approach that 
considers the researchers to adopt a position outside the investigated phenomena, 
qualitative approach considers that researchers to take the role of actors and see the 
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world from their standpoint. Thus, the researcher according to the qualitative approach 
can become an insider and could view the subject of the research as a participant in the 
setting. Rudestam and Newton (2001) state that the qualitative approach is likely to be 
inductive rather deductive. Additionally, they mentioned that qualitative research 
provides large quantities of data which represent words and ideas rather than numbers 
and statistics. In the same vein, Higson and Blake (1993) contended that qualitative 
research generally seeks to understand an event or action by using people's own words. 
The qualitative approach as Collis and Hussey (2003) see it, stresses the subjective 
aspects of human actions by concentrating on the meaning, rather than the measurement 
of the social phenomena. According to this ideology, social reality is dependent on the 
mind and there is no reality independent of the mind, thus, it can not be claimed that 
what is being researched is unaffected by the process of research. Lamnek (1988) cited 
in Sarantakos (1998) described some of the basic principles of the qualitative 
methodology as follows: 
9 It is not predetermined or prestructured by hypotheses and procedures that might 
limit its focus, scope or operation. 
" It is embedded in a process of communication between the researcher and the 
respondent. There is no intention to establish independence of the researcher 
from the respondents or the data. 
0 Considers reality as it is created and is explained in interaction. 
" Set to explain clearly and accurately how respondents will be approached. 
" Qualitative research methods are flexible in many ways. 
It has been argued that the qualitative methodology and its associated methods have 
some strength in their ability to look at how change develop over time, to understand 
people's meanings, to adjust to new issues and ideas as they provide a way of gathering 
data which is seen as natural rather than artificial. Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004: 20) 
commenting on the strength of the qualitative research approach mentioned the 
following points: 
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" Data are based on the participants' own categories of meaning , collected in 
naturalistic settings and lend themselves to exploring how and why phenomena 
occur 
" Useful for studying a limited number of cases in depth. 
" Useful for describing complex phenomena. 
" Can describe, in rich detail, phenomena as they are situated and embedded in 
local contexts. 
" The researcher identifies contextual and setting factors as they relate to the 
phenomenon of interest. 
" Responsive to changes that occur during the conduct of a study and may shift the 
focus of their studies as a result. 
On the other hand, qualitative research have some weaknesses such as that the process 
of collecting data can be a consumer of a great deal of time and resources and the 
difficulty of analysing and interpreting collected data besides the problem of low 
credibility (Easterby-Smith et al, 2006). In this vein, Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004: 
20) contend that qualitative research has several weaknesses such as follows: 
" Knowledge produced may not apply to other people or other settings. 
" It is difficult to make quantitative predictions. 
9 It may have lower credibility. 
" It generally takes more time to collect and analyse data when compared to 
quantitative research. 
" The results are more easily influenced by the researcher's personal biases and 
idiosyncrasies. 
5.1.3: Mixed research methodology. 
As a result of the long-standing paradigm debate between researchers of both 
quantitative and qualitative methodologies, a third approach has emerged as a natural 
complement to these two traditional approaches (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998; Johnson 
and Onwuegbuzie, 2004). This new rapidly growing approach of research 
is known in 
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the methodological literature as the mixed methods research (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 
1998; Creswell, 2003; Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Saunders et al, 2007). Mixed 
methods research is an approach of knowledge that tries to consider several viewpoints, 
perspectives, positions that always include the standpoints of the quantitative and the 
qualitative research. Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998: 19) define those studies that use 
different approaches as: 
"Studies that are products of the pragmatist paradigm and that combine the 
qualitative and quantitative approaches within different phases of the research 
process". 
Likewise, Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004: 17) define this approach as: 
"The class of research where the researcher mixes or combines quantitative and 
qualitative research techniques, methods, approaches, concepts or language into a 
single study ". 
They argued that mixed methods research is an attempt to legitimise the use of multiple 
approaches in answering research questions, rather than restricting or constraining the 
researcher's choices. In addition, they stated that many research questions and 
combinations of questions are best and most fully answered through mixed research 
solutions. Based on their analysis of different definitions to what is meant by the term 
mixed methods research, Johnson et al (2007: 123) come up with what they called a 
general definition. They state that mixed methods research is: 
"The type of research in which a researcher or team of researchers combines elements of 
qualitative and quantitative research approaches (e. g., use of qualitative and quantitative 
viewpoints, data collection, analysis, inference techniques) for the broad purposes of 
breadth and depth of understanding and corroboration ". 
It has been argued that the concept of mixed methods research evolved from the pioneer 
work of Campbell and Fiske (1959) that used more than one quantitative method to 
measure psychological traits (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998; Creswell, 2003). They 
introduced the idea by which more than one method is used as part of a validation 
process which ensures that the explained variance is a result of the underlying 
phenomenon or trait and not of the method (e. g., quantitative or qualitative). The use of 
more than one research approach, method and technique in a single study is known as 
triangulation (Collis and Hussey, 2003). By using different methods to collect data from 
several sources and by several means, a broader and fuller picture of the phenomenon or 
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unit of analysis under study could be achieved (Bonoma, 1985). Several definitions have 
been given to the triangulation method (mixed methods research approach). For 
example, Denzin (1978: 291) defines triangulation as: 
"The combination of methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon ". 
Denzin also makes a distinction between two types of triangulations: within-methods 
triangulation and between-methods triangulation. Denzin outlined that the former refers 
to the use of either multiple quantitative or multiple qualitative approaches whereas the 
later involves the use of both quantitative and qualitative approaches. Denzin (1978) 
argued that the use of more than one method by a number of researchers studying the 
same phenomenon should lead to greater validity and reliability than a single 
methodological approach. In the same vein, Morse (1991) identifies two kinds of 
triangulations of research: simultaneous and sequential triangulation. According to 
Morse, simultaneous triangulation represents the simultaneous use of qualitative and 
quantitative approaches in which there is limited interaction between the two sources of 
data during the data collection stage, but at the interpretation stage, the findings 
complement one another. On the other hand, sequential triangulation is used when the 
findings of one research are necessary for planning the next method. 
Similar to Morse (1991), Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) suggest that mixed methods 
research design can be developed from two main types: mixed-model (mixing 
qualitative and quantitative approaches within or across the stages of the research 
process) and mixed method (the inclusion of a quantitative phase and a qualitative phase 
in an overall research study). In the same context, Easterby-Smith et al (2006) describe 
four kinds of triangulation methods that could be used within social and managerial 
research. These triangulations include data, investigator, theory and methodological 
triangulation. Methodological triangulation, as they suggest, involves the use of both 
quantitative and qualitative methods and data to study the same phenomena within the 
same study or in different complementary studies. 
In the same vein, Creswell (2003) identifies six research strategies that could be selected 
in conducting a mixed methods research. These were: sequential explanatory strategy, 
sequential exploratory strategy, sequential transformative strategy, concurrent 
triangulation strategy, concurrent nested strategy and concurrent transformative strategy. 
The most familiar of the six major mixed strategies, as Creswell (2003) suggests, is the 
concurrent triangulation strategy. This model generally uses separate quantitative and 
qualitative methods as a means to offset the weaknesses inherent within one method 
with the strengths of the other method. In this case the quantitative and qualitative data 
collection is conducted in one phase of the research study. The priority would be equal 
between the two methods, but in practical application the priority may be given to either 
the quantitative or the qualitative approach. The key goal of this model is to confirm, 
cross-validate or corroborate findings within a single study. This mixed methods model 
is advantageous because it is familiar to most researchers and can result in well- 
validated and substantiated findings. Furthermore, the concurrent data collection results 
in a shorter data collection time period as compared to the other sequential approaches. 
In describing the mixed methods research, Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) considere 
that they are similar to conducting a quantitative mini-study and qualitative mini-study 
in one overall research study. They argued that to consider a study as a mixed-method 
design, its findings must be mixed or integrated at some point. In other words, a 
qualitative phase might be conducted to inform a quantitative phase, sequentially, or if 
the quantitative and qualitative phases are undertaken concurrently the findings must, at 
a minimum, be integrated during the interpretation of the findings. Also they 
recommended that in order to mix research in an effective manner, the researchers have 
to consider all of the related characteristics of quantitative and qualitative research 
methodologies. They contended that this will enable the researchers to understand the 
strengths and weaknesses of both approaches and this will put them in a position to mix 
or combine strategies. 
According to several authors (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998; Morse, 1991; 
Creswell, 2003; Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Johnson et al, 2007; Saunders et al 
2007) the main purpose of this approach (mixed research approaches) is not to replace 
either of the quantitative nor the qualitative approaches but rather to draw from the 
strengths and minimise the weaknesses of both in single research studies and across 
studies. For example, Johnson et al, (2007) identify several reasons for conducting this 
kind of research. These include: 
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" Enhance description of the investigated phenomena and provide a fuller picture 
and deeper understanding. 
" Validate and explicate findings from another approach and produce more 
comprehensive, internally consistent, and valid findings. 
" Provide more elaborate understanding and greater confidence in conclusions. 
" Handle threats to validity and gain a fuller and deeper understanding. 
" Provide richer/more meaningful/more useful answers to research questions. 
In their advocacy of using the new third methodological paradigm of research (mixed 
research approach), Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004: 21) illustrated some of the 
strengths and weaknesses of mixed methods research, which should be considered to aid 
in the decision of whether or not to use this type of research approach for a given study. 
These were outlined as follows: 
Strengths. 
" Words, pictures, and narrative can be used to add meaning to numbers. 
" Can answer a broader and more complete range of research questions because 
the researcher is not confined to a single method or approach. 
"A researcher can use the strengths of a second method to overcome the 
weaknesses in a first method by using both in a research study. 
" Can provide stronger evidence for a conclusion through convergence and 
corroboration of findings. 
" Can add insights and understanding that might be missed when only a single 
method is used. 
0 Can be used to increase the generalisability of the results. 
Weaknesses 
" Can be difficult for a single researcher to carry out both qualitative and 
quantitative research, especially if two or more approaches are expected to be 
used concurrently. 
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" Researcher has to learn about multiple methods and approaches and understand 
how to mix them appropriately. 
" More expensive and time consuming. 
5.2: Data collection methods. 
There are two main sources that data can be collected from; primary and secondary. 
Primary data refers to information collected by the researcher on the variables of interest 
for the specific purpose of the research. For example, focus groups, case studies, 
interviews, observations and questionnaires. Secondary sources refer to information that 
already exists. These might include books, journals, theses, company records and 
government and professional bodies' publications. According to Sekaran (2003) 
questionnaires, interviews and observations are the three main data collection methods 
in survey research. It has been argued that there is no single best way of collecting data; 
the method chosen depends on the nature of the posed research questions and the 
specific questions needed to be asked. In similar previous studies to this one, interviews 
and questionnaires were the most used methods of collecting data. Questionnaires and 
interviews as methods of collecting data are discussed in detail as follows: 
5.2.1: Questionnaires. 
A questionnaire is a method of collecting data in which selected groups of people are 
required to complete a written set of questions to find out about their attitudes, feelings 
and knowledge regarding particular issues. Questionnaires can be used in both 
quantitative and qualitative research methodologies. Collis and Hussey (2003: 173) 
define questionnaire as: 
'A questionnaire is a list of carefully structured questions, chosen after considerable 
testing, with a view to eliciting reliable responses from a chosen sample ". 
Similarly, Sekaran (2003: 236) defines the questionnaire as: 
'A reformulated written set of questions to which respondents record their answers, 
usually within rather closely defined alternative ". 
Questionnaires are an important and efficient tool for collecting primary data when the 
researcher knows exactly what information is required and how to measure the variables 
of interest (Oppenheim, 1992). Questionnaires can be distributed by two main methods. 
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Personal distribution or mailed distribution. Personal distribution questionnaire can be 
used when the sample is situated in one location such as a place of work. The main 
advantages of this method are: 
" All completed responses can be collected within a short period of time. 
" Any doubts that the respondents might have on any question could be clarified. 
" The opportunity for the researcher to introduce the research topic and to motivate 
the respondents to offer frank answers. 
" Good response rates can be ensured. 
" Less expensive and consumes less time than interviewing and it does not need as 
much skill to administer the questionnaire as to conduct interviews. 
These advantages of the personal distribution questionnaires, however are dependent on 
both time and geographical location, and limit the scope and extent to which this method 
of distribution can be used (Walliman, 2001: Sekaran, 2003: Collis and Hussey, 2003). 
On the other hand, mail questionnaires are used when targeting a large sample. 
Envelopes containing the questionnaire, covering letter and prepaid reply envelope are 
usually posted to the participants of the targeted sample who can complete them at their 
convenience, in their homes, and at their own pace. The main advantage of mail 
questionnaires is that a wide geographical area can be covered in the survey. The 
response rates of mail questionnaires however, are typically very low. In addition, 
doubts that participants might have about some issues cannot be clarified. 
In order to overcome some of the main disadvantages of using questionnaires as a data 
collecting method, many authors came up with different suggestion such as taking great 
care when designing the questionnaire and its contents and sending follow-up 
questionnaires to non-respondents to motivate them to participate in the study. 
Furthermore, many issues related to the procedures of designing questionnaires were 
addressed. These include; a) asking relevant and accurate questions: b) wording of the 
questions: c) type of questions, d) sequencing of the questions, and e) piloting the 
questionnaire. 
Relevancy and accuracy: There are two basic criteria that need to be taken into account 
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when selecting the right questions to be included in the questionnaire survey. These are 
relevance and accuracy of the questions. Relevancy refers to the extent to which they 
address the research questions, and thus, should be included in the questionnaire. 
Questions accuracy refers to the reliability and validity that collected information should 
have (Zikmund, 1991). 
Wording: Clarity of presentation of the questionnaire, especially, the wording and the 
extent to which the questionnaire is clear and unambiguous, can motivate and help the 
participants. Also, the design and layout of the questionnaires are of great importance for 
the achievement of a high response rate. In this vein, Berdie et al (1986) state that the 
appearance of the questionnaire usually determines whether it is read or discarded 
because once the respondent makes the effort to read it, he/she has made some 
psychological commitment to complete it. 
Type of questions: A questionnaire survey could include two types of questions: 
Closed-ended or open-ended questions (Sekaran, 2003). Open-ended questions allow 
respondents to give their own answers in their own words in any way they choose. 
According to Collis and Hussey (2003) open-ended questions offer the advantages that 
the respondents are able to give their opinions as precisely as possible in their own 
words. Open-ended questions however, can be difficult to analyse. Open-ended 
questions are mostly used in studies that are using a qualitative methodology, especially 
in the exploratory stages of the research (Remenyi et al, 1998). Open-ended questions 
could be used in quantitative methodology research when the researcher seeks specific 
comments on topics that might not have been covered fully or adequately (Sekaran, 
2003). On the other hand, closed-ended questions require respondents to make a choice 
among a set of alternatives given by the researcher such as multiple choice questions. 
Closed-ended questions are convenient for collecting primary data and are usually easy 
to analyse. They also offer the opportunity for the respondents to answer in an easy way 
and will reduce the likelihood of giving ambiguous answers (Moor, 2000). This type of 
questions is usually used in quantitative research. The main disadvantage of closed- 
ended questions as Remenyi et al (1998) argue is that they may introduce bias by forcing 
the respondent to choose from given alternatives or by making the respondent select 
alternatives that might not have otherwise come to mind. 
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Sequence: The order or sequence of the questions in the questionnaire is an important 
issue that has to be taken into account when designing the questionnaire. Sekaran (2003) 
outlined that questions should be sequenced so that the respondent is led from questions 
of a general nature to more specific ones and from relatively easy questions to those that 
are more difficult. This process facilitates the easy and smooth progress of the 
respondent through the items in the questionnaire. The simplicity of the questions may 
be seen by the respondents as a motivating factor that could encourage them to take a 
part in the study and complete the questionnaire. 
Piloting: Once questionnaires are distributed, the researcher cannot have them back for 
adjustment and amendments. Thus it is very important that questionnaires have to be 
piloted to ensure that the questions are understood by the respondents (i. e. there is no 
ambiguity in the questions) and that there are no problems with the wording or 
measurement (Sekaran, 2003). Regarding this issue, Collis and Hussey (2003) 
recommende that questionnaires have to be piloted on people who are similar to the 
targeted sample, and therefore expected to have knowledge about the subject of the 
research interest in order to anticipate any problems of comprehension or other sources 
of confusion. In addition, piloted questionnaires give useful indications of the estimated 
time needed to complete them. 
5.2.2: Interviews. 
Interviews are another method of collecting primary data. An interview is a purposeful 
conversation in which one person asks questions, i. e. the interviewer, and another 
answers them, i. e. the respondent, (James and Frey, 1995). According to Collis and 
Hussey (2003) interviews are associated with both positivist and phenomenological 
methodologies and their main purpose is to find out what the selected participants in a 
particular research do, think or feel. Interviews could be conducted face-to-face or over 
the telephone with individuals or group of individuals at the same time. They could be 
highly formalised and structured, using standardised questions for each respondent, or 
they may be informal and unstructured conversations. In between, there are compromise 
positions. One of the typologies that are commonly used is related to the 
level of 
formality and structure, whereby interviews could be classified as one of structured. 
semi-structured or unstructured (Saunders et al, 2007). 
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Structured or standardised interviews: This kind of interviews is similar to 
administered questionnaires in which the researcher has a list of predetermined questions 
to be asked of the respondents (Sekaran 2003). In this kind of interviews, every single 
question will be asked of everybody in the same manner and then the answers are 
recorded or noted on a standardised schedule, usually with pre-coded answers. The 
primary aim of this sort of interviews as Easterby-Smith et al (2006) state is to gain 
quantitative results from a carefully targeted sample. 
Semi-structured interviews: This class of interviews is non-standardised. In semi- 
structured interviews, although, participants to be interviewed and questions to be asked, 
are determined beforehand, the order and the wording of the questions can be changed 
and modified based upon the respondent's perceptions of what seems most appropriate. 
Additional questions however, may be needed to explore the research question(s) and 
objective(s) given the nature of events within particular organisations (Saunders et al, 
2007). In this type of interview, the researcher attempts to fix and control the 
circumstances of the interview in order to collect data in a constant manner as far as 
possible (Moor, 2000). Semi-structured interviews are best used when the researcher 
seeks to obtain both structured information and information about beliefs and attitudes. 
Semi-structured interviews can be used as sole method or in combination with other 
methods (Robson, 2002). 
Unstructured interviews: This type of interview is informal and is generally utilised to 
explore in depth a general area in which the researcher is interested. Therefore, this sort 
of interview is referred to as an in-depth interview as there is no predetermined list of 
questions to be dealt with through in this situation. A clear idea however, about the 
aspects that the researcher meant to explore should be fully understood (Oppenheim, 
1997). In unstructured interviews, only broad open-ended questions would be asked and 
the interviewee would be given the opportunity to talk freely about events, behaviour 
and beliefs with regard to the topic area (Burns, 2000). 
In general, interviews as methods of collecting data enjoy several advantages such as; 
they give an added degree of confidence to the replies, the opportunity that allows the 
researcher to identify non-verbal clues which are present in the inflection of the voice. 
facial expressions or the clothes that the interviewee is wearing, and allows the 
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researcher to ask more complex questions and follow-up questions (Easterby-Smith et 
al, 2006; Collis and Hussey, 2003). 
Nevertheless, using interviews as a data collecting method is not without limitations. 
Interviews are likely to consume more time and resources than other methods of 
collecting data such as mailed questionnaires. Collis and Hussey (2003) notice that 
several problems associated with conducting interviews could affect most of the 
outcome of the interviews. These include, problems with recording the questions and 
answers, controlling the range of topics and, later, analysing the collected data. 
Furthermore, Collis and Hussey (2003) state that events which have taken place before 
the interview such as promotion or an increase in salary may affect the respondent's 
state of mind. 
In an attempt to overcome most of the disadvantages that questionnaires and interviews 
might have especially in designing their included questions, Collis and Hussey (2003), 
as shown in table (5.2), suggested several rules that should be followed. 
Table (5.2): General rules for designing questions. 
No The Rule 
1 Explain the purpose of interview or questionnaire to all participants 
2 Keep your questions as simple as possible 
3 Do not use jargon or specialist language 
4 Phrase each question so that only one meaning is possible 
5 Avoid vague, descriptive words such as `large' and `small' 
6 Avoid asking negative questions as these are easy to misinterpret 
7 Only ask one question at a time 
8 Include relevant questions only (do not be tempted to include every question you can think of) 
9 Include questions which serve as cross-checks on the answer to other questions 
10 Avoid questions which require the participant to perform calculations 
11 Avoid leading or value-laden questions which imply what the required answer might be 
12 Avoid offensive questions or insensitive questions which could cause embarrassment 
13 Avoid questions which are nothing more than a memory test 
14 
Keep your interview schedule or questionnaire as short as possible, but include all the questions 
required to cover your purposes 
Source: Collis and Hussy (2003. p. 178) 
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5.3: Summary: 
This chapter has discussed the research methodology in general. Following the review of 
the two main paradigms the Positivist and the Phenomenological paradigms, description 
of the three dominant research approaches, i. e. the quantitative approach, the qualitative 
approach and the mixed research approach, were provided. This discussion included 
illustrating the meaning and purpose, and strengths and weaknesses of each approach. In 
addition, questionnaires and interviews as the main methods of collecting primary data 
were outlined in the second section of this chapter. Based on the research objectives and 
research questions, the next chapter will outline the chosen research methodology and 
the justification for this choice. 
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Chapter six: 
The chosen methodology and design 
of the research 
Chapter six: 
The chosen methodology and design of the research. 
6.0: Introduction. 
This chapter is devoted to discuss the methodology and the design that the current study 
has adopted in order to achieve its objectives and answer the research questions. It is 
divided into five sections. The first section deals with the aims and the questions of the 
research. The second section covers the chosen methodology. This included the design 
and the content of the questionnaire, interview development and procedures, population 
and sampling of the research and methods of data analysis. The third section provides 
the results of the reliability analysis. The fourth section outlines some of the problems 
that had been faced during the empirical work of this study. The final section provides a 
brief summary of the content of this chapter. 
6.1: The objectives of the study and the research questions. 
The main aim of the current study is to provide additional empirical evidence relating to 
the perceptions of auditor independence by investigating and exploring the effects of 
audit firm size, audit firm tenure, competition, auditors' economic dependence on 
clients, audit committees, status and financial condition of the audit client, financial and 
personal relationships and provision of (NAS) on perceptions of auditor independence 
held by members of EA, IFA, TBA and BLO. In addition, the study sought to explore 
the attitudes of the respondents about the accounting and auditing profession and its 
related legal, education, economic and social environments in the Libyan context. To 
achieve these two broad aims, a number of objectives were formulated. 
1. To explore the relevant literature to auditor independence in order to understand 
the nature and development of auditor independence and the factors that might 
affect it. 
2. To examine the effect of the above nine selected factors on the perceptions of 
auditor independence held by the four targeted groups in the Libyan context. 
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3. To investigate the differences of the subject groups' perception of auditor 
independence with respect to the effect of the above nine selected factors. 
4. To measure the participants' attitudes about the auditing and accounting 
profession and its related environment in the Libyan context 
5. To assess the reasons for such perceptions being held by the participants from the 
four targeted groups with regard to both the effect of the nine selected factors on 
auditor independence and to their attitudes about the auditing and accounting 
profession. 
In order to fill in the gaps in the previous literature and to accomplish the objectives of 
the current study, the following questions were structured. 
1. How do audit firm size, audit firm tenure, competition, auditors' economic 
dependence on clients, audit committees, status and financial condition of the 
audit client, financial and personal relationships and provision of (NAS) affect 
perception of auditor independence held by EA, IFA, TBA and BLO? 
2. Do perceptions of auditor independence differ between EA, IFA, TBA and BLO 
with respect to the effect of audit firm size, audit firm tenure, competition, 
auditors' economic dependence on clients, audit committees, status and financial 
condition of the audit client, financial and personal relationships and provision of 
NAS)? 
3. How do participants from the EA, IFA, TBA and BLO perceive the auditing and 
accounting profession and its related legal, professional, social, and education 
environments in the Libyan context? 
4. Do participants' attitudes from the targeted populations (EA, IFA, TBA and 
BLO) differ about the accounting and auditing profession and its related 
environments in the Libyan context? 
5. Why are such perceptions of the effects of audit firm size; audit firm tenure, 
competition, auditors' economic dependence on clients, audit committees, status 
and financial condition of the audit client, financial and personal relationships 
and provision of (NAS) held by EA, IFA, TBA and BLO? 
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6.2: The chosen research methodology 
The term methodology refers to the overall approach of the research process (Collis and 
Hussey, 2003). As outlined in the previous chapter, it has been argued in the social 
sciences that there are two main methodologies that can be adopted in conducting 
research: The qualitative approach and the quantitative approach. The qualitative 
approach allows great depth in the analysis of collected data, but is more subjective. On 
the other hand, the quantitative approach provides precision and accuracy in the 
statistically generated data, but the raw data on which the statistical analysis are based is 
open to subjectivity bias in the same way as in the qualitative produced data. Therefore, 
a major trade-off between qualitative and quantitative approaches is a trade-off between 
breadth and depth of the research (Patton, 1990). Breadth is facilitated by the 
quantitative approach, in that it allows measuring the reactions of a large number of 
subjects but at a cost to depth. The qualitative approach generates a wealth of detailed 
information from a small number of subjects and often produces additional knowledge. 
Choosing a particular research methodology depends on which approach will help to 
achieve the objectives of the study and answer the concerns of the research. A number of 
approaches that might be applied to examine the effect of factors on perceptions of 
auditor independence were utilised by previous studies. Both qualitative and quantitative 
approaches have been used to evaluate the perceived independence of auditors. These 
include questionnaire surveys, structured, semi-structured and unstructured interviews, 
and empirical experiments. Nevertheless, as previously mentioned, each method has its 
advantages and disadvantages. Studies that use only one method are more vulnerable to 
mistakes linked to that particular method than studies that use multiple methods where 
different types of data provide cross-data validity checks (Robson, 2002). Walsh (2001) 
argues that by using more than one method researchers can explore various aspects of 
the same topic by looking at it from different sides or angles. 
With regard to business and management research, Saunders et al (2007) argue that it is 
often a mixture of positivist and phenomenologist approaches. In addition, they 
recommended that it is quite beneficial for research to combine qualitative and 
quantitative approaches. The use of different research approaches, methods and 
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techniques in the same study is known as triangulation (Hussey and Hussey, 1997). 
Triangulation is defined by Saunders et al (2003: 99) as: 
"The use of different data collection methods within one study in order to ensure that 
the data are telling you what you think they are telling you. For example, semi- 
structured group interviews may be a valuable way of triangulating data collected by 
other means such as a questionnaire ". 
Therefore, to overcome the weaknesses of using either one of the methods alone and to 
obtain the most useful results, combinations of quantitative and qualitative approaches 
were used in this study (mixed research methodology). Self-administered questionnaires 
and semi-structured interviews were the main methods of collecting data. These two 
instruments assisted in clarifying the perceptions of the four targeted groups (EA, IFA, 
TBA and BLO) with respect to their perceptions of auditor independence and attitudes 
about the accounting and auditing profession in the Libyan context. The main 
advantages of questionnaires, as discussed in chapter five, are that they offer a cheap 
method of collecting data, avoidance of bias, ability to reach respondents who live at 
widely dispersed addresses or abroad, anonymity and respondents can take their own 
time to fill in the questionnaire and consider their responses. On the other hand, 
interviews often have a higher response rate, offer the opportunity to correct 
misunderstandings and to carry out observations and ratings while controlling for 
incompleteness and for answering in a sequence and interviewers can often succeed with 
respondents who have reading or language difficulties. 
For the purpose of designing the questionnaire and the interview a focus group was 
conducted with nine Libyan PhD accounting students at LJMU who have a significant 
knowledge of accounting and auditing practices in the Libyan economic environment 
(some of these students used to be either partners or auditors in accounting and auditing 
firms in Libya). A focus group provides a guide to the matters that need to be 
concentrated on and the most pertinent questions to be asked in any subsequent 
questionnaires or interviews (Collis and Hussey, 2003). According to May (2001), a 
focus group is a valuable tool of investigation, which allows the researchers to explore 
group norms, dynamics and experience around issues and topics which they wish to 
investigate. The two research methods of collecting data; self-administered 
questionnaires and semi-structured interviews are discussed in detail as follows. 
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6.2.1: Design and contents of the questionnaire. 
Questionnaires are the most commonly used method of data collection in social sciences 
(Sarantakos, 1998; Sekaran, 2003). The aim of using questionnaires in the current study 
is to collect data that would help in investigating both the effect of the nine selected 
factors on perceptions of auditor independence and to the attitudes about the accounting 
and auditing profession as held by the participants from the four targeted groups in the 
Libyan context. In previous similar studies, questionnaires were used as the main 
method of collecting data by many researchers (see, Alleyne et al, 2006; Awadallah, 
2006; Abu Bakar et al, 2005; Quick and Rasmussen, 2005; Beattie et al, 1999). This 
section is devoted to reporting on the procedures and the steps undertaken in developing 
and conducting the questionnaires. 
6.2.1.1: Sources of the included questions. 
The questions included in the questionnaire were derived from two main sources of 
information. Firstly, the majority of the questions were derived as a result of the 
extensive review of the existing accounting and auditing literature. The studies of both 
of Beattie, et al (1999) and Alleyne et al (2006) however, were one of the main guidance 
that assisted in the construction process of the questions. Secondly, the focus group that 
was held with some of the Libyan PhD accounting students at LJMU was another 
valuable source of information that helped identifying the most important factors that 
might effect perceptions of auditor independence in Libya. 
6.2.1.2: Length and wording of the questionnaire. 
One of the important considerations that the researcher has to deal with is the length of 
the questionnaires. Therefore, it was necessary to construct a questionnaire of reasonable 
length. For the purposes of this study the length of the questionnaire was seven pages 
including the cover page (See Appendix B). Another issue that has to be fully considered 
is the wording of the questionnaire. The wording and tone of the questions is important 
in developing the questionnaire because the information and its quality largely depend 
upon these factors. Thus, the subsequent points of factors that are emphasised in the 
literature (Oppenheim, 1992; Ghauri et al., 1995; Hussey and Hussey, 1997; Kumar, 
1999; Ticehurst and Veal, 2000; Sakaran, 2003; Collis and Hussey, 2003) were 
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considered to help in preventing the most evident problems related to questionnaire 
wording. These points were advised to be adopted in order to: 
1. Prevent jargon and technical terms as much as possible. 
2. Make questions as short as possible since the shorter the question the less 
confusing and ambiguous it would be. 
3. Avoid double-barrelled questions which ask more than one thing at a time and 
which can also be seen as confusing and ambiguous. 
4. Avoid phrasing questions in such a way that they may lead the respondent to 
give the responses that the researcher would like to, or may come across as 
wanting to be elicited. 
5. On some issues, respondents may have not any opinion or do not know. 
Therefore, respondents were offered the options of answering `Neither' and 
'Neutral'. 
6.2.1.3: Type of questions. 
For ease of use and to save respondents time in completing the questionnaires, as well as 
achieving uniformity among respondents' answers, closed or fixed alternative forms of 
questions were adopted in this study. According to Collis and Hussey (2003) closed 
form questions are convenient for collecting data in a questionnaire survey and are 
usually easy to answer and analyse, since the range of potential answers is limited. This 
viewpoint was shared by Easterby-Smith et al (2006) who mentioned that the strength of 
closed questions is that they are quick to complete and analyse. In addition, some 
definitions of the concepts that were used in the questionnaire such as independence, 
competition, audit committee, non-audit services, low balling, audit firm tenure and 
audit firm size were provided to the respondents in order to clarify any misunderstanding 
regarding the meaning of such concepts. 
6.2.1.4: Scaling of the questions. 
There are four different types of scales; nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio (Sekaran, 
2003). For the purposes of the current study, two kinds of scales were used; the nominal 
scale and ordinal scale. With nominal scales, the researcher can assign subjects to certain 
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categories or groups such as gender, age, occupation or experience. Ordinal scales are 
used when respondents are asked for responses in the form of rank. In the first part of 
the questionnaire, the nominal scale was used to collect data on the background I information about the participants. They were asked to tick a particular classification or 
characteristic such as gender, age, level of education and other data that were deemed to 
be relevant for the purpose of this study. In the second and third part of the 
questionnaire, a five-point Likert scale was used to measure the respondents' 
perceptions and attitudes regarding the identified auditor-client relationships and the 
accounting and auditing profession related issues. Collis and Hussey (2003) mentione 
that the Likert scale is one of the most frequently used types of scales. The Likert scale 
according to them turns the questions into a statement and asks the participants to 
indicate their level of agreement with the statement. In the second part of the 
questionnaire, the Likert scale was designed to measure the extent to which the 
participants believe that each statement might undermine or enhance auditor 
independence. The scale of perception ranged from seriously undermines independence 
to strongly enhance independence. Another five point scale is used in the third part to 
measure attitudes of the respondents regarding different issues related to the accounting 
and auditing profession. The scale of measuring participants' attitudes ranged from 
(strongly disagree) to (strongly agree). 
6.2.1.5: Content of the questionnaire. 
The questionnaire was divided into four main sections (see Appendix B) and each 
section included several questions or statements as described below. 
Section one: Participants in this section were asked to provide some information about 
their background by answering some personal questions using nominal scales. This 
information included the following: 
" Gender: Respondents were asked to indicate whether they were male or female. 
" Age: Respondents were asked to indicate the age group to which they belong. 
Four age groups were provided and ranged from (29 years or less) to (50 years or 
over). 
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" Occupation: Participants were requested to indicate their occupation. Occupation 
was classified as: external auditors, auditors from the Institute of Financial 
Auditing, auditors from the Taxation Board and bank loan officers. 
" Level of education: Respondents were asked to indicate their highest level of 
education. This included First University Degree, Masters' degree, PhD and 
other levels of education. 
0 Subject of study: Respondents were requested to indicate their subject of study's 
specialisation. This was classified as: Accounting, Administration, Economic and 
others. 
0 Working experience: Participants were requested to indicate the working 
experience group to which they belong. Four working experience groups were 
provided and ranged from (less than 5 years) to (15 years or over). 
Section two: This section was constructed in the form of different statements followed 
by a five-point Likert scale and designed to measure participants' perceptions regarding 
the effect of the nine selected factors on auditor independence. 31 auditor-client 
situations were included in this section describing different relationships that might 
occur between auditors and their audit clients. Respondents were asked to express their 
opinion of the perceived effect of these statements on the auditor independence by 
selecting one of the five point Likert scale that ranged from (seriously undermines 
independence) to (seriously enhances independence). This section was organised to 
include nine main headings in such a way that describes the auditor-client relationships 
that could be addressed with respect to the selected factors as follows: 
" Size of the audit firm: Four different statements describing the size of the audit 
firm were included under this heading (statement No. 2-1 to 2-4). These include 
being a sole practitioner, small, medium and large audit firm. 
" Audit firm tenure: To investigate the perceived effect of audit firm tenure on 
auditor independence, four auditor-client relationships were set under this 
heading (statement No. 2-5 to 2-9). These include, where an audit firm has been 
auditing the client for less than 2 years, 2 to less than 5 years, 5 to less than 10 
years, and 10 years and over. 
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Competition among audit firms: Under this heading, four auditor-client 
relationships were set to measure the participants' perceived effect of 
competition between audit firms on auditor independence (statement No. 2-10 to 
2-14). These include, when there is a high level of competition, little 
competition, audit fee discounting and low-balling and budget pressures imposed 
by an audit firm on staff. 
Auditors' economic dependence on their audit clients: The perceived effect of an 
auditors' economic dependence on their audit clients on auditor independence 
was sought to be examined in three auditor-client relationships (statement No. 2- 
15 to 2-17). These include, when an audit firm' s profitability depends on the 
retention of a specific audit client, greater than 10% of total firm's audit fees 
revenues are from one client, and when an audit firm's desire is not to lose status 
by losing a key client. 
Audit committee: An attempt to measure views on auditor independence with 
respect to the effect of an audit committee in two different situations (statement 
No. 2-18 & 2-19). These include existence of an audit committee and the lake of 
an audit committee in the audit client's company. 
Status and financial condition of the audit client: Four auditor-client relationships 
were set to measure the participants' view of the effect of the status and financial 
condition of the audit client on auditor independence (statement No. 2-20 to 2- 
22). These include, when the audit client is in the state sector, is in the private 
sector, is in a strong financial condition and is in a weak financial condition. 
Personal relationships: Participants' perception of auditor independence was 
measured with respect to the effect of personal relationships between auditors 
and their audit clients in three different situations (statement No. 2-23 to 2-25). 
These include, when an audit client's financial director was previously employed 
by the audit firm, one of the audit client's executive directors is a close friend of 
one of the audit team, and when one of the audit client's executive directors is a 
brother of one of the audit team. 
Financial relationships: In order to examine the perceived effect of the financial 
relationships between auditors and their audit clients on auditor independence, 
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three auditor-client relationships were set (statement No. 2-26 to 2-28). These 
include, unpaid audit and non-audit fees from the previous years, a partner or a 
member of the audit staff of an audit firm owns material shares in the audit 
client, and an auditor in an audit firm has received an interest free loan from an 
audit client. 
" Provision of non-audit services (NAS): Participants' perception of auditor 
independence was sought to be measured with respect to the effect of the 
provision of NAS by audit firms to their audit clients in four different situations 
(statement No. 2-29 to 2-31). These include, when the audit firm does not 
provide any kind of NAS to its audit clients or when the fees from non-audit 
services are 25% to 49 %, 50 % to 99 % and 100 % or more of the audit fees. 
Section three: This section of the questionnaire attempted to measure the attitudes of 
the participants on the auditing and accounting profession and its related environments 
in the Libyan context. Respondents in this section were asked to indicate their agreement 
or disagreement with eight different statements that describe several aspects and issues 
pertinent to the legal, profession, social, and education systems in Libya by using a five 
point scale ranged from (strongly disagree) to (strongly agree). 
" Statement No. 3-1: This statement is concerned with measuring if the Libyan 
rules and regulations include any comprehensive provisions that could enhance 
and maintain auditor independence. 
" Statement No. 3-2: The aim of this statement is to test whether the Libyan audit 
firms adhere to the independence requirements when performing their auditing 
tasks. 
0 Statement No. 3-3: This statement was devoted to investigate whether the Libyan 
Accounting and Auditing Association (LAAA) is playing an important role in 
maintaining auditor independence. 
" Statement No. 3-4: This statement is set to test whether the (LAAA) is properly 
doing its duty in developing the profession of accounting and auditing. 
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" Statement No. 3-5: This statement is concerned with measuring whether the 
accounting and auditing profession is efficiently fulfilling its role in meeting the 
demands of its clients. 
" Statement No. 3-6: The sufficiency of the Libyan accounting and auditing 
curriculum to train auditors is sought to be investigated in this statement. 
" Statement No. 3-7: This statement is set to test whether the accounting and 
auditing profession, in general, and auditors in particular are enjoying reasonable 
respect and status in Libyan society. 
" Statement No. 3-8: Finally, this statement is intended to investigate the 
participants' opinions about the importance of the auditor independence in 
effectively and correctly completing the audit process of the audit clients' 
financial statements. 
Section four: In this section, the opportunity was given to the respondents to comment 
on the subject of the study and on the questionnaire, i. e. wording, layout, ambiguity and 
length. In addition, the respondents were asked to mention and to comment on any 
issues they think are important and related to the subject of the study which had not been 
mentioned in the questionnaire. Furthermore, participants were offered a copy of the 
results of the study, when ready, if they wanted one. 
6.2.1.6: Piloting the questionnaire. 
The final step in the design process of the questionnaire and the most important one is 
the piloting stage. Borg and Gall (1989) mention that the main advantage that might be 
gained by piloting the questionnaire, is the feedback from the participants in the pilot 
study with respect to the subject investigated that might be used in improving the main 
study. Therefore, a few steps in this context were taken to check the questionnaire 
phrases, clarity, length, layout together with the relevance of the questions. The piloting 
process of the questionnaire was done through two stages. 
The first stage of the pilot study. 
This was conducted in the UK at Liverpool John Moores University and consisted of the 
following steps: 
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Firstly, the researcher played the role of the respondent and answered his own questions. 
Secondly, Libyan and other PhD accounting students at LJMU were given copies of the 
questionnaire and asked for their comments. Thirdly, other copies were given to the 
supervisory team for their comment and advice. Based on the feedback from these 
individuals, several modifications were made to the wording of some questions, some 
less relevant questions were deleted, and some of the questions were clarified. 
Because most of the previous studies on perceptions of external auditor independence 
were in the English language (see Appendix A), the questionnaire was originally written 
in English and then translated into Arabic. The translation process needed some 
additional care in order to prevent and avoid any mistranslation of the words and 
expressions and concepts that were used in the construction of the questions. Regarding 
this issue, a number of steps were considered to construct the Arabic version. These 
include the following points: 
1. The questionnaire was firstly translated by the researcher and then discussed in 
detail, either while being translated or during the pilot study with postgraduate 
colleagues and those involved in the pilot study whose native language is Arabic; 
2. The Arabic copy along with its English version was given to an expert translator 
for comments and amendments if necessary. 
After considering all the necessary procedures that might ensure an appropriate 
translation, the researcher was satisfied with the accuracy of the Arabic translated 
version (see Appendix D). 
The second stage of the pilot study. 
This was conducted in Libya during the period from the first of July 2007 to the end of 
August 2007. The Arabic version of the questionnaires was personally distributed to the 
main four targeted groups. These included 20 members of external auditors, 13 members 
of Taxation Board auditors, 12 members of bank loan officers and 17 auditors from the 
Institute of Financial Auditing (for more details, see section 6.2.3). Out of the 62 
personally distributed questionnaires, 50 usable questionnaires were received making an 
overall response rate of 80%. 
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In addition to completing all of the questions included in the questionnaire, the 
participants in the pilot study were asked to provide their comments and suggestions 
regarding the questionnaire's clarity, answering options, layout and length. In general. 
the main concluded points were as follows: 
1. There were no complaints about the length of the questionnaire and the clarity 
and layout of the questions, and the use of the 5 point Likert scale. 
2. The average time the participants took to complete the questionnaire was 25 
minutes. 
3. Most of the participants were interested in the study and acknowledged its 
importance. 
The collected data from the pilot study were analysed using SPSS computer program in 
order to answer the research questions. The main statistical techniques that were used for 
this purpose were the descriptive statistics (standard deviation, mean, percentage) and 
parametric test technique, i. e. the one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA), (for more 
details, see section 6.2.4). The main findings of this pilot study were successfully used 
in the transfer report process from the MPhil stage to the PhD stage. 
6.2.2: Interview development and procedures. 
The second stage of the empirical work seeks to gain more in-depth understanding of the 
perceptions of the selected factors on auditor independence in addition to the attitudes 
about the accounting and auditing profession held by the subject groups in the Libyan 
context. Therefore, it was decided to conduct some interviews with different members of 
the targeted groups (EA, IFA, TBA and BLO). In some similar previous studies, 
interviews were chosen as methods of collecting data (Hudaib, 2003; Kilcommins, 1997) 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, there are three types of interviews that can be 
used to collect data in research; structured, semi-structured and unstructured interviews. 
In this study, semi-structured interviews were conducted with some selected members of 
the targeted groups. It has been argued that a semi-structured interview is generally used 
in social research since its objective is to obtain explanation and gain more 
understanding of particular research phenomena. Semi-structured interviews were 
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chosen for the current study because they allow space for discussion and encourage 
participants to raise and elaborate on important related issues. In addition, a semi- 
structured interview was described by Cohen and Manion (1980) to be friendlier and less 
intimidating. 
In semi-structured interviews, the researcher can change and modify the questions or 
the wording of them according to the respondents' perceptions of what seems most 
appropriate. Also, other questions could be asked to explore the research questions and 
objectives (Saunders et al, 2007). Another advantage of using semi-structured interviews 
is that since members of the targeted groups differ in many aspects (e. g. accounting 
background, level of education, age, experience etc), and using formal structured 
interviews will necessarily generate the difficulty of a lack of shared knowledge towards 
the same set of questions. 
In order to collect the necessary data for the current study, an interview guide was 
prepared (see Appendix Q. The interview guide lists the questions and issues that need 
to be discussed during the interview process with the participants of the targeted 
populations. Intended questions were based on research questions and similar to those 
used in the self administered questionnaire with the aim to clarify and seek further 
opinions on related issues. Patton (2002) indicates that the interview guide can be 
developed in more or less detail, depending on the extent to which the interviewer is 
able to specify important issues in advance and on how important it is to put questions in 
the same order to all respondents. 
The questions of the interview guide were initially prepared in English and then 
translated into Arabic. Similar procedures to those used in preparing of the questions of 
the questionnaire were followed in the preparation and designing of the questions of the 
interview guide. These include wording and relevance and clarity of the questions. 
Based on the feedback from the supervisory team and the PhD accounting students at 
LJMU, several amendments were made to a number of questions. In order to ascertain 
the validity and reliability and to ensure the appropriateness and relevance of the 
interview's questions, the Arabic version of the interview guide (see Appendix E) was 
piloted in Libya by interviewing a number of individuals 
from the targeted groups with 
whom the actual study was to be conducted. The pilot study of the 
interview was 
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conducted in the period from the first of July 2007 to the end of August 2007. This pilot 
testing stage of the interview was conducted in the same manner as it would be 
performed in the actual study. Seven semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
randomly selected members of the targeted groups. 
Each interview on average lasted between 45 minutes to 2 hours, and most of the 
interviewees agreed to have the interview recorded except for one interviewee, where 
efforts were made to write down the points covered in the interview. At the beginning of 
each interview and before embarking on the collection of data, the researcher first 
introduced himself and thanked the respondent for agreeing to take part in the interview, 
then, the purpose of the interview and the objectives of the study were briefly outlined 
and the importance of the interviewee's opinions was stressed. In addition, all 
interviewees were guaranteed confidentiality at the outset of the fieldwork and promised 
that they would not be individually identified in the study. The main purpose of offering 
anonymity was to obtain open and unguarded responses to the questions that were asked 
during the interview. Furthermore, each interviewee was given the opportunity to 
receive a brief report of the study when ready. 
All the interviews were conducted at the participants' place of work and, as far as 
possible, in the same manner. This was to ensure that the same questions were asked and 
that each interviewee would understand the questions in the same way. Moreover, 
supplementary questions were asked, especially, when initial responses needed to be 
further elaborated or new issues emerged during the interview. All the recorded tapes 
were transcribed and combined with the notes taken and were organised in such a way as 
to simplify the analysis process. 
Overall, most of the interviewees expressed their interest in the study and believed that 
most of the questions were relevant and covered most of the issues related to the subject 
of the research. The collected data from the interview pilot study were analysed using 
content analysis technique in order to answer the research questions. (For more details, 
see section 6.2.4). Similar to the findings of the questionnaire pilot study, the main 
findings of the interview pilot study were successfully used in the transfer report process 
from the MPhil stage to the PhD stage. 
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6.2.3: The Population and Sampling of the Research. 
Choosing the research participants is one of the most important issues that determine the 
quality of the produced data. Therefore, it is highly recommended by Denscombe (2001) 
that researchers have to choose the right population to participate in research studies. 
According to Sekaran (2003: 265) population refers to: 
"The entire group of people, events or things of interest that the researcher wishes to investigate " 
6.2.3.1: The identified population. 
The populations identified for this study comprised of four Libyan groups; EA, IFA, 
TBA and BLO. The main reason for choosing these particular groups were based on 
previous research that has identified them as the most relevant groups on the issue of 
auditor independence (see Appendix A). Thus, these groups' perceptions of auditor 
independence are worthy of study. In addition, these four groups include professionally 
qualified and trained individuals who are capable of making informed judgements about 
the subject of this study. The justification for targeting these groups is as follows. 
External auditors, who are members of the Libyan Accountants and Auditors 
Association (LAAA), are legally allowed to practise accounting and auditing. As the 
main objective of the current study is to examine the effect of certain factors on 
perceptions of auditor independence, it was very important to see how external auditors 
perceive themselves with respect to each of the selected factors. The LAAA has, 
approximately, 1500 members who are external auditors. According to the LAAA 
officials, the approximate number of external auditors who practise auditing during the 
period of conducting this study is about 1,000. This is due to different reasons such as 
retirement, death, stopping practising accounting and auditing and some of them being 
outside Libya for several reasons. 
Auditors from the Institute of Financial Auditing, who are members of the Institute 
of Financial Auditing (IFA), are employed by the government to audit the financial 
statements of its corporations. Because of the huge work that these auditors have to 
accomplish before the end of every financial year, the IFA contracts with external 
auditors to audit some of the financial statements of the State owned companies. 
Thus, it 
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is very important to know how auditors from this Institute perceive the independence of 
the external auditors. The number of auditors who work for the IFA according to its 
registers is about 400. 
Taxation Board auditors, are legally allowed to review the audited financial statements 
of companies to determine the exact amount of tax that should be collected. They rely on 
the audit report to aid them in estimating income tax as part of the governments' source 
of revenues. These auditors are interested in external auditor's independence and prefer 
external auditors to avoid circumstances where their independence might be impaired. It 
is important, therefore to find out how this group of financial statement users perceive 
auditor independence. According to the registers of the Taxation Board, it has about 250. 
Bank loan officers, are chosen because they were regarded as relatively sophisticated 
financial statement users who would understand the importance of independent audit 
action (Knapp, 1985). They also represent the lenders' or creditors' point of view, as one 
of the major users of financial statements. Bank loan officers depend heavily on the 
audit report that conveys the financial condition and performance of the company when 
making lending decisions. Therefore, it is very important to know how this group of 
financial statement users perceive the auditor independence with regard to the effect of 
each selected factor. Sixteen Libyan state and private banks operating in Libya under the 
supervision of the Central Bank of Libya were used to select the sample of the bank loan 
officers of this studyl. 
6.2.3.2: The sampling process. 
Having defined the populations intended for this study, a number of subjects2 have to be 
selected which can be seen as representative of that population. This process is known as 
sampling. Sekaran (2003: 266) defines sampling as: 
"The process of selecting a sufficient number of elements from the population, so that 
a study of the sample and an understanding of its properties or characteristics would 
make it possible for us to generalise such properties or characteristics to the 
population elements ". 
1- Headquarters of these banks and its main branches in the largest cities in Libya were chosen to select the 
subjects that made the sample of the bank loan officers of this study 
2-A subject is a single member of the sample, whereas an element 
is a single member of the population. 
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The main reasons for using samples rather than collecting data from entire populations 
are that it is less prohibitive in terms of time, cost and other resources especially when a 
large number of elements are involved and sometimes in different geographical areas. 
Although there are different types of sampling techniques, it is important to select the 
right sample. Relating to this issue (Collis and Hussey, 2003) recommend that a 
representative or good sample is one in which the results obtained for the sample taken 
to be true for the whole population. In addition, they stated that a good sample must be: 
" Chosen at random (every member of the population must have a chance of being 
chosen). 
" Large enough to satisfy the needs of the investigation being undertaken. 
" Unbiased. 
According to Sekaran (2003) there are two major kinds of sampling designs: Probability 
sampling where every element in the population has a known and equal chance of being 
selected as a subject, and non-probability sampling where elements do not have a known 
or predetermined chance of being selected as a subject. For the purposes of this study, 
probability sampling was employed to select subjects from the targeted groups. By using 
a simple random sampling method, each person in the targeted population has an equal 
probability of being chosen for the sample and the selection of one particular element 
has no effect on the selection of the others. In addition, in this method of sampling, non- 
replacement sampling is used in order to avoid the possibility of choosing a particular 
element more than once. The rationale for using this kind of technique is to: a) offer the 
most generalisability or the most representative sample; and b) to minimise bias and 
enable the estimates of sampling errors to be made (Sekaran, 2003). Because most of the 
economic, financial and commercial activities in Libya are conducted and performed in 
the major cities such as Tripoli (the capital city of Libya), Benghazi, Ez-Zawia and 
Gharian (Khorwatt, 2006; Mahmud, 1997), the sampling process of selecting subjects 
from the four targeted groups was confined to these main cities. This was due to the 
following issues: 
" More than 90 per cent of the audit firms are located in these cities. 
" Most of the economic and business activities are held in these cities. 
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" The headquarters and their main branches of the commercial and state banks, the 
Institute of Financial Auditing and the Taxation Board are located in these cities. 
Regarding sample size, Saunders et al (2007) state that a sample size of 30 or more will 
usually result in a sampling distribution for the mean that is very close to a normal 
distribution. In addition, they outlined that samples of larger absolute size are more 
likely to be representative of the population from which they are drawn than smaller 
samples and, in particular, the mean calculated for the sample is more likely to equal the 
mean for the population. On the contrary, Cohen and Manion (1980) consider that there 
is no exact number or percentage that can be universally prescribed to be adopted in all 
studies. Some authors however, suggested that there are considerations to be borne in 
mind when deciding the size of the selected sample such as the kind of statistical 
analysis that is planned, the expected variability within the samples and the results, 
based on experience, the traditions in the particular research area regarding appropriate 
sample size, the size of the entire population and time and cost (Sekaran, 2003; Collis 
and Hussey 2003; Remeryi et al, 1998; Easterby-Smith, 2006; Saunders et al, 2007). 
After considering the above notes about selecting the right size of the sample to whom 
the questionnaires would be distributed, the sample sizes of each targeted population in 
the current study were as follows; 300 subjects from the EA group, 200 subjects from 
the IFA group, 125 subjects from the TBA group and 100 subjects from the BLO group. 
6.2.4: Questionnaire distribution and collection. 
Because the survey was confined to some specific locations (the main cities in Libya), 
personally distributed and collected questionnaires method was adopted in the current 
research. The main advantages of this method as Sekaran (2003) mentions are: 
" The researcher or a member of the research team can collect all the completed 
responses within a short period of time. 
" Any doubts that the respondents might have on any question could be clarified 
on the spot. 
" The researcher is afforded the opportunity to introduce the research topic and 
motivate the respondents to offer frank answers. 
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" Administering questionnaires to a large number of individuals, is less expensive 
and consumes less time than interviewing. 
" It does not require as much skill to administer the questionnaire as to conduct 
interviews. 
The distribution and collection process of the questionnaires were conducted with the 
assistance of the Institution of Financial Auditing and its branches, the state and private 
banks and their branches, the Taxation Board and its branches, the LAAA and its 
branches and accounting and audit firms. The distribution and collection process was 
conducted in Libya over a period of three months from first of July to the end of 
September 2008 and planned as follows: 
The handing over visits: The questionnaires with the attached covering letters were 
personally delivered to the coordinatorsl or directly to the selected subjects from the four 
targeted groups. 
The follow-up visits: Several follow-up visits were made to assisting participants of this 
study in completing the questionnaires, firstly, they serve as a friendly reminder and to 
ask the participants to complete the questionnaires as soon as possible secondly, they 
allowed for the collection of completed questionnaires and for the expression of 
appreciation to the coordinators and respondents. 
The collecting visits: Other visits were made in order to collect completed 
questionnaires from coordinators and thank them and to ask them to inform non- 
respondents that ten days later would be the final days for collecting the completed 
questionnaire; 
The final visit. A final visit was made to collect the remaining completed 
questionnaires. 
Based on the above procedures, 410 usable questionnaires out of the 725 personally 
distributed questionnaires were collected making a response rate of 56.55%. 
I- Managers of personal departments of the four targeted organisations (the Institution of Financial Auditing and 
its 
branches, the state and private banks and their branches, the Taxation Board and its branches and the 
LAAA and its branches) 
were chosen to be the coordinators for distributing and collecting questionnaires. 
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A summary of the number of the distributed and collected questionnaires for each group 
of the targeted population is illustrated in table (6.1). From the researcher's point of 
view, the response rate was reasonably good compared to other surveys (see Appendix 
A for more details). In addition, a great deal of interest was expressed in the research. 
Approximately 80% of the respondents requested a summary of the results. 
Table (6.1): Summary of the number of the distributed and collected questionnaires for 
each group. 
Description EA IFA TBA BLO Total 
Distributed 
questionnaires 
300 200 125 100 725 
Usable collected 
questionnaires 
148 103 85 74 410 
Percentage 49% 51% 70% 74% 56.55% 
EA= External auditors; IFA= Auditors from the Institute of Financial Auditing; TBA= Auditors from the 
Taxation Board and BLO= Bank Loan Officers. 
6.2.5: The semi-structured interviews of this study. 
The personally distributed questionnaires would provide a great deal of quantitative 
data, but as previously indicated there are considerable benefits to be gained from 
mixing quantitative and qualitative information. Therefore, the second stage in the 
current study of collecting data was through conducting some semi-structured interviews 
with selected members of the targeted populations. As mentioned earlier, semi- 
structured interviews can be the best tool in cases where the researcher needs to collect 
both structured information and information about attitudes or beliefs of the participants 
(Moore, 2000). 
The interview process was designed to enhance and supplement the information gained 
from the second and third sections of the questionnaire. 20 semi-structured interviews 
were conducted with randomly selected members of the four targeted groups. This 
included 6 members of the EA group, 6 members of the IFA group, 4 members of the 
TBA group and 4 members of the BLO group. The semi-structured interviews were 
conducted in Libya over a period of three months from first of July to the end of 
September 2008. Table (6.2) shows the breakdown of the participants from each group. 
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Similar procedures and steps to those used in the pilot stage of the interview guide were 
followed when conducting the final semi-structured interviews. For more details see 
section (6.2.2). 
Table (6.2): Samples selected from each group for semi-structured interviews. 
Int. No Population 
_group 
Position Working 
experience 
Date 
1 EA Senior auditor _ 9 years 02/07/2008 2 
3 
EA 
EA 
Partner 
Partner 
25 years 
24 years 
07/07/2008 
16/09/2008 
4 EA Senior auditor 8 years 14/08/2008 5 EA Partner 9 years 20/08/2008 6 EA Partner 17 years 08/09/2008 
7 IFA Manager of the companies auditing department 12 years 23/09/2008 
8 IFA Manager of the companies auditing department 21 years 28/07/2008 
9 IFA Manager of the companies auditing department 13 years 06/08/2008 
10 IFA Manager of the companies auditing department 8 years 10/09/2008 
11 IFA Manager of the companies auditing department 18 years 13/07/2008 
12 IFA Manager of the companies auditing department 22 years 17/07/2008 
13 TBA Manager of the companies taxation department 10 years 05/08/2008 
14 TBA Manager of the companies taxation department 14 years 20/08/2008 
15 TBA Manager of the companies taxation department 13 years 02/09/2008 
16 TBA Manager of the companies taxation department 21 years 15/07/2008 
17 BLO Manager of the credit department 15 years 28/07/2008 
18 BLO Manager of the credit department 27 years 14/08/2008 
19 BLO Manager of the credit department 24 Years 15/09/2008 
20 BLO Manager of the credit department 25 Years 28/09/2008 
Total F 20 Semi-structured interviews 
EA= External auditors; IFAA= Auditors from the Institute of Financial Auditing; TBA= Auditors from the 
Taxation Board and BLO= Bank Loan Officers. 
6.2.6: Methods of data analysis. 
In general, there are many statistical techniques and methods of analysing quantitative 
and qualitative data. For the purposes of achieving the objectives and answering the 
questions of the current research, several techniques were adopted. These include 
Cronbach's Alpha, Descriptive statistics technique, parametric test technique, i. e. the 
one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA), multiple comparisons test (Duncan test) and 
content analysis technique. 
Cronbach's Alpha Coefficient: in order to find out whether the internal consistency of 
the selected scales for the current study is reliable, Cronbach's Alpha Coefficient was 
used. Pallant (2007) states that Cronbach's Alpha Coefficient is one of the most 
commonly used indicators of internal consistency. 
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Descriptive techniques: With regard to the use of the descriptive techniques, Pallant 
(2007) states that descriptive statistics (e. g. mean, median, standard deviation, etc) hav e 
different uses such as to describe the characteristics of the participants of the study, to 
check the variables for any violation of the assumptions underlying the statistical 
techniques that will be used to address the research questions, and to address any 
specific research questions. Therefore, descriptive statistics were used in this study to 
describe the characteristics of the participants of the study and to assist in answering the 
questions of the research. 
Parametric technique: A parametric test is a statistical technique measuring the 
distribution (e. g. mean and variance) of the population from which the research sample 
is drawn. Parametric statistics are more powerful than non-parametric statistics because 
they have more stringent assumptions in order to characterise the population parameter 
(Bryman and Cramer, 2002). As the second and third part of the questionnaire aimed to 
examine the effect of the selected factors on the perceptions of auditor independence and 
the attitudes about the accounting and auditing profession held by the four targeted 
groups, the parametric technique was applied in this research. The one way (ANOVA) 
was used in order to answer research question number two and four. More specifically, it 
was employed to examine whether the mean scores of the four groups according to their 
occupations significantly differ from each other with regard to their perceptions of 
auditor independence and to measure the differences of their attitudes regarding several 
issues related to the accounting and auditing profession environments. One-way analysis 
of variance (ANOVA) is used when there are two or more groups whose mean scores on 
a continuous variable needed to be compared (Sakaran, 2003). According to Pallant 
(2007) there are some key assumptions that need to be met if the decision was to use one 
of the parametric techniques such as one-way ANOVA. These assumptions, which the 
current study is compatible with include: 
" The dependent variable is measured by using a continuous scale such as a five- 
point Likert scale 
" The use of a randomly selected sample from the targeted population. 
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" The independence of the observations that make up the collected data. Each 
observation or measurement must not be influenced by any other observation or 
measurement. 
" The population which samples are selected from must be normally distributed'. 
Multiple comparisons test: Although the one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) test 
may indicate that there are differences among the respondents' opinions, it does not 
show exactly which of the groups differ if there were any significant differences (p value 
< 0.05). Accordingly, an additional multiple comparisons test is needed to be conducted 
in order to obtain more insights into which groups differ from which. There are a 
number of different post-hoc tests that can be used, and these vary in terms of their 
nature and strictness. One of the most commonly used post-hoc tests that was used in the 
current study is the Duncan test. 
Content analysis technique: For the purpose of answering research question number 
five that aims to gain more insight to the perceptions of auditor independence held by 
the subject groups and their attitudes about the accounting and auditing profession, a 
content analysis technique was used to analyse data that were collected from the semi- 
structured interviews with some members of the targeted population groups. Content 
analysis is a research tool that researchers use to determine the presence of certain words 
or concepts within a particular analysed material such as books, essays, interviews, 
discussions or any similar materials that they may use to quantify and analyse to make 
inferences about the messages within these materials. In particular, this technique was 
chosen to be used rather than NVIVO technique because the size of the chosen samples 
of each group was respectively small and the collected qualitative data was manageable 
to be analyses by the content analyses technique. 
Collis and Hussey (2003) describe content analysis as a formal approach to qualitative 
data analysis that is usually associated with a positivistic approach where analysed 
material is classified into different coding units which are normally preconstructed by 
the researcher. Content analysis was defined by Patton (1990, p. 38) as: 
1- Pallant (2007) believed that most of the parametric techniques are reasonably robust or tolerant of violations of 
this assumption. With large size of samples (e. g. 30 +), the violation of this assumption should not cause any 
major problems. 
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"The process of identifying, coding and categorising the primary patterns in the data ". 
In the current study, the collected qualitative data was analysed based on the cross- 
interview approach suggested by Patton (1990). The first step in this process involved 
joining together answers from the transcripts of the interviews held by topic per the 
interview guide and allowing the guide to act as a descriptive framework for the 
analysis. As answers were grouped by topic, they were analysed using the content 
analysis which included identifying, coding and categorising the primary patterns in the 
collected data. 
6.3: Reliability analysis. 
One of the first important steps that the researcher has to do in order to gain a good 
quality control of conducting research relying on primary sources of data such as a 
questionnaire is the reliability analysis. Reliability analysis allows studying the 
properties of measurement scales and the items that make them up. According to Collis 
and Hussey (2003) reliability is concerned with the results of the research. Sakaran 
(2003: 203) states that: 
"The reliability of a measure indicates the extent to which it is without bias (error free) 
and hence ensures consistent measurement across time and across the various items in 
the instrument ". 
In other words, reliability refers to the likelihood to produce the same results if the 
research is replicated by another researcher following the same procedures. The 
reliability analysis procedures calculate a number of commonly used measures of scale 
reliability and also provide information about the relationships between individual items 
in the scale. By using reliability analysis, items that might create problems could be 
identified and excluded. In this study, Cronbach's Alpha was used due to its relevance to 
analyse questionnaires based on five-point Likert scale and measures the internal 
consistency of the questionnaire based on the average inter-item correlation of the items. 
Table (6.4) below provides the reliability analysis result of the items that were included 
in the questionnaire. As can be seen the Cronbach's Alpha Coefficient is 0.724. Sekaran 
(2003) mentioned that the closer the reliability coefficient gets to 1.0 the better. In 
addition, he stated that those reliabilities less than 0.60 are considered to be poor while 
those in the range of 0.70 are acceptable. In the same vein, Pallant (2007) states that the 
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ideal Cronbach's Alpha Coefficient of a scale should be above 0.7. Thus, the internal 
consistency reliability of the measures used in the current study can be considered to be 
acceptable. 
Table (6.3): Reliability analysis 
Cronbach's Alpha Number of items 
0.724 45 
6.4: Data collection problems. 
During the process of collecting both quantitative and qualitative data, the researcher 
had faced some problems that might be worth mentioning. Firstly, the list of the 
external auditors' names, addresses and phone numbers that was issued by the LAAA 
was not accurate. This was due to that a number of auditors changed their addresses and 
their phone numbers without notifying the LAAA. Therefore, the researcher had to make 
extended efforts to find their new addresses which resulted in wasting a lot of time. 
Secondly, collecting personally the distributed questionnaires needed a lot of follow-up 
visits. This was due to different reasons such as the absence of some of the participants, 
there were no specific working time especially for the external auditors group and the 
existence of some of the participants in other places and cities conducting their tasks. 
Thirdly, a lot of travel had to be undertaken in order to contact the participants of the 
study due to the long distances that separates the locations of the targeted cities. 
Despite these problems every effort was made to contact most of the subjects of the 
samples from the four targeted population. In addition, most of the participants of the 
study were cooperative and helpful and there were no complaints from them about the 
current study regarding its length or the clarity in the questions of the questionnaire and 
the interview. 
6.5: Summary. 
This chapter has outlined the chosen research methodology and the justification behind 
that. To provide research evidence on perceptions of external auditor independence and 
attitudes about the accounting and auditing profession in the Libyan context, this 
research employs both quantitative and qualitative methods (mixed methods research) to 
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enrich the research findings and to gain advantage from data triangulation. Personally 
distributed and collected questionnaires used in this research to measure perceptions of 
participants from the four targeted groups with regard to the effect of the nine selected 
factors on auditor independence and their attitudes about the accounting and auditing 
profession in the Libyan context. 300 external auditors, 200 auditors from the Institute 
of Financial Auditing, 125 Taxation's Board auditors and 100 bank loan officers were 
randomly selected to participate in this study. To gain more in-depth understanding of 
perceptions and attitudes that held by the subject groups in the Libyan context with 
regard to the subject of this study and to confirm and clarify the findings derived from 
the questionnaire survey, 20 semi-structured interviews were conducted with randomly 
selected subjects of the targeted populations. In order to produce the findings from the 
quantitative and qualitative data, the use of suitable analysis techniques was adopted. 
This included a number of techniques such as Cronbach's Alpha Coefficient, descriptive 
statistics, parametric tests (the one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA), multiple 
comparisons test (Duncan test) and content analysis technique. 
The following two chapters present the findings based on questionnaire survey and 
semi-structured interviews conducted with the selected samples of the targeted 
population. 
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Chapter seven: 
Findings of the questionnaire 
Chapter seven: 
Findings of the questionnaire 
7.0: Introduction. 
This chapter is intended to present the results of the quantitative data which were 
collected by the questionnaires. It examines and discusses the participants' perceptions 
relating to the effect of the nine selected factors, identified in chapter four, on auditor 
independence and their attitudes about several issues relating to the accounting and 
auditing profession in Libya. In order to achieve the aim of this chapter, it is divided into 
four main sections. The first section presents a description and analysis of the 
background information of the participants (part one of the questionnaire). The second 
section provides the results of the descriptive and analytical analysis of the collected 
data that relates to the perceptions of the participants regarding the impact of the 
selected factors on auditor independence (part two of the questionnaire). The third 
section details the analysis of the participants' attitudes about the auditing and 
accounting profession and its related environment in the Libyan context (part three of 
the questionnaire). Finally, a summary of the main results is provided in the fourth 
section. 
7.1: Analysis of part one of the questionnaires. 
The first part of the questionnaire is concerned with some general information about the 
participants of the study such as gender, age, level of education, subject of study and 
experience. This information was sought to ascertain some of the attributes and 
characteristics of the participants. Pallant (2007) recommended that in studies involving 
human subjects, it is useful to collect information such as the number of participants in 
the sample, the number and percentage of males and females in the sample, the range 
and mean of ages, education level and any other relevant background information. The 
following analysis outlines the background information of the participants of the current 
study as follows: 
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7.1.1: Gender. 
Table (7.1) shows that almost all (98.78%) of the aggregate participants (n = 405) were 
male and only small minority (1.22 %) were female (n = 5). None of the participants 
from the TBA or the BLO were females. This indicates that in developing countries like 
Libya, males still occupy a very high proportion of the professional jobs, like accounting 
and auditing. 
Table (7.1): Participants' gender. 
EA IFA TBA BLO Total 
Description 
No % No % No % No % No % 
Male 145 98.0 101 98.1 85 100 74 100 405 98.78 
Gender Female 3 2.0 2 1.9 0 0 0 0 5 1.22 
Total 148 100 103 100 85 100 74 100 410 100 
EA = External auditors, IFA =Auditors from the Institute of Financial Auditing, TBA = Taxation Board 
auditors and BLO = Bank loan officers 
7.1.2: Age. 
As can be seen in table (7.2) the age of the participants ranged from under 30 to over 
50 years old. The highest number of participants among the four groups except for the 
BLO was recorded on the 30 to 39 years age category (n = 184). More specifically, 
63.1%, 48.2% and 37.8% of the IFA, the TBA and the EA were aged 30 to 39 years 
while 45.9% of the BLO aged 40 to 49 years. In general, it can be seen that the vast 
majority (83.9%) of the aggregate participants were aged 30 years and over (n = 344). 
Table (7.2): Participants' age. 
EA IFA TBA BLO Total 
Description 
No o /o No /o % No % /o No /o o1 1 No /o % 
Under 30 years 24 16.2 10 9.7 32 37.6 0 0 66 16.10 
30 to 39 years 56 37.8 65 63.1 41 48.2 22 29.7 184 44.88 
Age 40 to 49 years 28 18.9 22 21.4 4 4.7 34 45.9 88 21.46 
50 ears and over 40 27.0 6 5.8 8 9.4 18 24.3 72 
17.56 
Total 148 100 103 100 85 100 
- 
74 E: J 100 : 410 I 100 
EA = External auditors, IFA =Auditors from the Institute of Financial Auditing, 
TBA = Taxation Board auditors and 
BLO = Bank loan officers 
7.1.3: Level of education. 
Table (7.3) shows the education level of the participants. The majority (82.44%) of the 
participants held a first university degree (n = 338) and approximately 
15% of them held 
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a masters degree (n = 61) while only small minority (2.68%) held a PhD (n = 11). In 
addition, the table shows that none of the participants held any level of education other 
than a first university degree, masters degree or PhD. All participants (100%) held a 
high level of education qualifications which suggests that they are well educated 
individuals who can understand and consider the importance of the subject of the 
research. 
Table (7.3): Participants' level of education. 
Description 
EA IFA TBA BLO Total 
No % No % No % No % No 
First university 
degree 104 70.3 89 86.4 79 92.9 66 89.2 338 82.44 
Education Master degree 33 22.3 14 13.6 6 7.1 8 10.8 61 14.88 
level PhD 11 7.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 2.68 
others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 
ý 
148 
1 
100 103 100 
_ 
85 100 74 100 410 100 
_1 EA = External auditors, IFA =Auditors from the Institute of Financial Auditing, TBA = Taxation Board auditors and BLO 
= Bank loan officers 
7.1.4: Subject of study. 
Table (7.4) indicates that nearly all (97.32%) of the participant subject of study was in 
accounting (n = 399). Only a small minority (2.44%) of them however, were specialising 
in management and just 1 participant's specialised in economics. This demonstrates that 
the subject of study for most of the participants from the four targeted groups was in 
accounting which suggests that they have the required knowledge to understand the 
importance of the subject of the research. 
Table (7.4): Participants' subject of study. 
EA IFA TBA BLO Total 
Description 
Accounting 
No 
148 
o /o 
100 
No 
103 
0 /o 
100 
No 
82 
0 /o 
96.5 
No 
66 
% /o 
89.2 
No 
399 
0 /o 
97.32 
Management 0 0 0 0 3 9.5 7 9.5 10 2.44 
Subject of Economic 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1.4 1 0.24 
study others 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
Total 148 100 103 100 85 100 74 
-TO-1 
1 
410 100 
EA =External auditors, IFA =Auditors from the Institute of Financial 
Auditing, TBA = Taxation Board auditors and BLO 
= Bank loan officers 
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7.1.5: Years of working experience. 
It can be seen from table (7.5) that nearly one third (30%) of the aggregate participants 
had 10 to 14 years working experience (n = 123). The highest percentages of working 
experience for the EA and the TBA groups were recorded on the 5 to 9 years category 
while approximately 40% of the IFA and less than half (45.9%) of the BLO counted for 
10 to 14 years of working experience. In general, it can be seen that 79.76% of the 
aggregate participants, had more than 5 years of working experience (n = 327). This 
result demonstrates that more than three quarters of the participants held reasonable 
length of working experience. 
Table (7.5): Participants' years of working experience. 
Descri ti 
EA IFA TBA BLO Total 
p on No % No % No % No % No % 
Under 5 years 28 18.9 20 19.4 28 32.9 7 9.5 83 20.24 
5 to 9 ears 40 27.0 17 16.5 33 38.8 19 25.7 109 26.59 
Working 10 to 14 ears 32 21.6 41 39.8 16 18.8 34 45.9 123 30.00 
experience 15 years and 
over 
48 32.4 25 24.3 8 9.4 14 18.9 95 23.17 
Total 148 100 103 100 85 100 74 100 410 100 
EA = External auditors, IFA =Auditors from the Institute of Financial Auditing, TBA = Taxation Board auditors and BLO = 
Bank loan officers 
Overall, it can be seen from tables (7.1 - 7.5) above that the vast majority of 
participants in the current study were aged 30 years and over, possessed high levels of 
education, specialised in accounting and well experienced to understand the subject of 
the study and to participate in it in a responsible manner. Therefore, participants' 
responses from the four groups appeared to be authoritative. 
7.2: Analysis of part two of the questionnaire. 
This section presents the results of the analysis of part two of the questionnaire which 
sought information about the perceptions of the EA, IFA, TBA and the BLO regarding 
the effect of audit firm size, audit firm tenure, competition, auditors' economic 
dependence on their audit clients, audit committees, status and financial condition of the 
audit client, financial relationships, personal relationships and provision of 
(NAS) on 
auditor independence. The main objective of this part of the questionnaire 
is to collect 
data that will help in answering research questions one and two: 
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Q l- How do participants from the EA, IFA, TBA and BLO perceive the effect of 
audit firm size, audit firm tenure, competition, auditors' economic dependence on 
clients, audit committees, status and financial condition of the audit client, financial 
and personal relationships and provision of (NAS) on auditor independence? 
Q2- Do perceptions of auditor independence significantly differ between participants 
from the EA, IFA, TBA and BLO with respect to the effect of audit firm size, audit 
firm tenure, competition, auditor's economic dependence on clients, audit 
committees, status and financial condition of the audit client, financial and personal 
relationships and provision of (NAS)? 
Respondents were asked to indicate on a five-point Likert scale their perceptions of the 
influence that the above factors might have on auditor independence. The Likert scale 
was designed to measure the extent to which the participants' perceptions that each 
statement related to the above factors will undermine or enhance auditor independence. 
The scale of perception ranged from seriously undermines independence to strongly 
enhances independence. It was decided for the textual summaries to aggregate "seriously 
undermines independence" and "slightly undermines independence" responses and 
"seriously enhances independence" and "slightly enhances independence" responses. 
The means and tests for significant differences between respondents' responses that 
reported in each table are calculated on the full 5-point distribution of responses. In 
order to present the results of the analysis of part two of the questionnaire, this section is 
divided into nine parts including 31 statements which describe several auditor-client 
relationships. Each part was intended to present the results of the participants' 
perceptions regarding the effect of each one of the nine factors that were selected for the 
purposes of the current study on auditor independence as follows: 
7.2.1: Audit firm size and perceptions of auditor independence. 
The perceived effect of audit firm size on auditor independence was examined in four 
auditor-client relationships. These include when an audit is performed by a sole 
practitioner (statement 2-1), a small audit firm (statement 2-2), a medium audit 
firm 
(statement 2-3) and a large audit firm (statement 2-4). The sample groups were asked to 
indicate whether auditor independence might be undermined or enhanced according to 
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each one of the above four auditor-client relationships. The participants' responses to 
these statements are presented in tables (7.6,7.7 and 7.8). 
The bold figures, as can be seen in tables (7.6 and 7.7), show the highest response 
frequencies and percentage for each statement by the four groups and their aggregate 
responses. For example, responses to statement (2-1) showed that more than half 
(52.4%) of the participants believed auditor independence is undermined when an audit 
is performed by a sole practitioner (n = 215). The highest percentages of response 
regarding this statement was the TBA (67.1%) followed by the EA (50%), BLO (47.3%) 
and the IFA (45.6%). On the other hand, only small minority (4.9%) of the aggregate 
participants believed auditor independence is enhanced in this situation (n = 20). As can 
be seen from table (7.8), all measured means of the four groups' responses were below 
3 and the lowest was the TBA (2.27). The average calculated mean was 2.44. 
The second statement (statement 2-2) sought to examine participants' perceptions of 
auditor independence when an audit is performed by a small audit firm. It can be seen 
from tables (7.6 and 7.7) that nearly 20% of the aggregate responses believed auditor 
independence is undermined in this situation (n = 81). In contrast, only 13.4% of the 
participants believed that auditor independence is enhanced. A large proportion of the 
aggregate responses (66.8%) perceived auditor independence is neither undermined nor 
enhanced (n = 274). Table (7.8) shows that the calculated response means of the EA, 
IFA, and TBA were all below 3 while it was 3 for the BLO. The average mean for the 
whole responses was 2.95. 
In contrast to the previous statements, the third statement (statement 2-3) was perceived 
by participants from the four groups to enhance auditor independence. As can be seen in 
tables (7.6 and 7.7) that more than half (55.4%) of the participants believed auditor 
independence is enhanced when an audit is performed by a medium sized audit firm 
(n = 227). The highest percentages of responses was the TBA (62.3%) followed 
by the 
BLO (58.1%). Nevertheless, only 4.8% of the participants perceived auditor 
independence is undermined (n = 20). This result was supported by the calculated means 
of the participants' responses when all of them reported above 3 as seen 
in table (7.8). 
The highest mean was the TBA (3.67) while the average mean was 3.53. 
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Similarly, tables (7.6 and 7.7) show that the vast majority (80%) of the participants 
from the four groups thought auditor independence is enhanced when an audit is 
performed by a large audit firm (n = 328). This was perceived most by the TBA (85.9%) 
followed by the BLO (83.8%). Again, a small minority (4%) of the participants had an 
opposite view and believed that auditor independence is undermined in this situation 
(n = 16). The calculated means of the participants' responses, as shown in table (7.8). 
were all above 4 except for the BLO which was 3.97 and the highest was the IFA (4.10) 
while 4.06 was the aggregated mean. 
According to the above results it can be suggested that auditor independence is 
perceived to be undermined when an audit is performed by a sole practitioner and by a 
small audit firm. This perception was expressed by the participants from the four groups 
except for the BLO who perceived auditor independence is neither undermined nor 
enhanced in the second statement (statement 2-2). On the other hand, all participants 
believed auditor independence is enhanced when an audit is performed by a medium 
sized audit firm or by a large audit firm. 
With respect to the differences of perceptions of auditor independence among the 
participants from the four groups regarding the above four statements, the results from 
the one way ANOVA test revealed that there were no statistically significant differences 
as the P values for the four statements were . 575, . 
897, . 
053 and . 766 respectively 
(see 
table 7.8). These results suggest that participants from the four targeted groups achieved 
general consensus on these four auditor-client relationships. 
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7.2.2: Audit firm tenure and perceptions of auditor independence. 
The effect of audit firm tenure on auditor independence is investigated in four auditor- 
client relationships. These include when an audit firm has been auditing the client for 
less than 2 years (statement 2-5), for 2 to 4 years (statement 2-6), for 5 to less than 10 
years (statement 2-7) and for 10 years and over (statement 2-8). The participants were 
requested to indicate whether auditor independence might be undermined or enhanced 
with regard to each one of the above relationships. The participants' responses are 
presented in tables (7.9,7.10 and 7.11). 
The bold figures in tables (7.9 and 7.10) with regard to statement 2-5, indicate that more 
than half (56.3%) of the IFA (n = 58) and less than half (48.7%) of the BLO (n = 36) 
perceived auditor independence is enhanced when an audit firm has been auditing the 
client for less than 2 years, whereas the overwhelming majority (70.9%) of the EA and 
more than half (50.6%) of the TBA perceived auditor independence as neither enhanced 
nor undermined. In aggregate, the bold figures show that more than half (54.9%) of the 
participants agreed with the opinion of the EA and the TBA groups. Only small minority 
(2.1%) of the aggregate responses believed that auditor independence is undermined in 
this situation (n = 9). As can be seen in table (7.11), all calculated means were above 3 
and the highest was the IFA (3.72) while the aggregate mean was 3.56. 
Response frequencies and percentages in tables (7.9 and 7.10) with respect to the 
perceived effect on auditor independence when an audit firm has been auditing the client 
for 2 to 4 years(statement 2-6), show that approximately one third (32%) of the 
aggregate responses believed auditor independence is undermined (n=131). The highest 
percentages was the TBA (38.8%) followed by the IFA (34%). Just 13.9% of the 
participants' aggregate responses, however, revealed that this situation was perceived as 
an enhancement factor to auditor independence (n = 57). Regarding the calculated 
response means for the four groups, table (7.11) indicate that all means were 
less than 3 
and the lowest was the EA (2.75). The average calculated mean was 2.78. 
Statement (2-7) aimed to measure participants' perception of auditor independence when 
an audit firm has been auditing the client for 5 to less than 
10 years. Tables (7.9 and 7. 
10) show that a large proportion (69.5%) of the participants thought auditor 
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independence is undermined in this situation (n = 285). The group believed this most 
was the TBA (76.5%) followed by the IFA (68.9%). Contrary to this result, only 17.5% 
of the entire participants believed that auditor independence is enhanced (n = 72). With 
regard to the calculated means, it can be seen from table (7.11) that all groups' means 
were below 3 and the aggregated mean was 2.30. 
Tables (7.9 and 7.10) show that the overwhelming majority (70.5%) of the aggregate 
responses of the participants perceived auditor independence is undermined when an 
audit firm has been auditing the client for 10 years and over (n = 289). The highest 
proportion was the TBA (76.5%) followed by the BLO (71.7%). On the other hand, only 
20% of the participants believed that auditor independence is enhanced (n = 86) in this 
situation. It can be seen from table (7.11) that all scored means were less than 3 and the 
least was the TBA (1.98) while the average mean was 2.14. 
As illustrated in the above discussion, it can be assumed that auditor independence is 
believed to be undermined when an audit firm has been auditing the client for 2 to 4 
years, 5 to less than 10 years and for 10 years and over. In contrast, auditor 
independence was perceived to be enhanced when an audit firm has been auditing the 
client for less than 2 years. 
With respect to the differences of perceptions of auditor independence among the four 
groups regarding the effect of the above four statements, the results from the one way 
ANOVA test revealed that there were no statistically significant differences for 
statements 2-6,2-7 and 2-8 as the P values for these statements were . 794, . 
263 and . 534 
respectively. Only statement 2-5 produced significant differences as the P value was 
. 030 which 
is less than . 
05. In order to obtain more insights into which groups differ 
from which, a post-hoc comparison using the Duncan test was conducted. The results of 
this test indicated that the mean score of the EA (3.43) rates significantly different from 
the mean score of the BLO (3.60). In addition, the mean score of the IFA (3.72) 
differed 
significantly from that of the TBA (3.52). Based on these results, 
it can be suggested, 
except for statement 2-5, that there was a common consensus among the responses of 
participants from the four targeted groups on the other three auditor-client relationships 
(statements 2-6,2-7, and 2-8). It can be seen from table (7.11) that statement 2-5 
produced 3 significant differences. 
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7.2.3: Competition and perceptions of auditor independence. 
To examine the impact of competition among audit firms on perceptions of auditor 
independence, four auditor-client relationships were included in part two of the 
questionnaire. These were: when there is a high level of competition among audit firms 
(statement 2-9), when there is little competition among audit firms (statement 2-10). 
when audit firms use audit fee discounting and low-balling to get or to keep audit clients 
(statement 2-11) and when budget pressures are imposed by an audit firm on its staff 
(i. e. need to spend less than adequate time to do a proper audit) (statement 2-12). The 
participants were asked to indicate whether auditor independence might be undermined 
or enhanced with respect to each one of the above relationships. The participants' 
responses to these four statements are illustrated in tables (7.12,7.13 and 7.14). 
When there is a high level of competition among audit firms, the majority (90.7%) of 
participants, as shown in tables (7.12 and 7.13), perceived auditor independence to be 
undermined (n = 372). This result was believed most by almost the entire participants 
from the IFA (97.1%) followed by the TBA (95.3%) and the BLO (90.5%). Contrary to 
this result, a small minority (4.4%) of the aggregate responses believed auditor 
independence is enhanced (n = 18). The calculated means for the responses of the four 
groups as indicated in table (7.14) were all below 3 and the least was for the TBA (1.94) 
while the average calculated mean was 1.63. 
As can be seen from tables (7.12 and 7.13), more than one quarter (27.1 %) of the 
aggregate responses of the participants perceived auditor independence to be enhanced 
when there is little competition among audit firms (n = 111). The highest proportion of 
this result was the BLO (39.2%) followed by the TBA (37.7%). The majority (59%) of 
the participants, however, believed auditor independence was neither enhanced nor 
undermined (n = 242) while just 13.9% viewed this situation as a threatening 
factor to 
auditor independence. In contrast to the previous statement, table (7.14) 
illustrates that 
all calculated means were above 3 and the highest was the TBA 
(3.37). The aggregate 
mean was 3.18. 
Tables (7.12 and 7.13) indicate that when audit firms use audit fees 
discounting and 
low-balling to get or to keep audit clients, nearly three quarters (70.5%) of the aggregate 
16 3 
participants believed that auditor independence is undermined (n = 289). This belief was 
expressed most by the BLO (89.2%) followed by the IFA (83.5%). the TBA (71.7%) 
and the EA (51.3%). On the other hand, only a small minority (2.7%) of the EA 
perceived auditor independence to be enhanced in this situation. With regard to the 
calculated means of responses from the four groups, table (7.14) revealed that all were 
below 3 with the lowest being the IFA (1.90) while the average mean was 2.08. 
When budget pressures are imposed by an audit firm on its staff (i. e. inadequate time to 
do a proper audit) (statement (2.12), a large proportion (60.8%) of the participants, as 
shown in tables (7.12 and 7.13), thought auditor independence is undermined (n = 
249). The participants from the TBA reported the highest percentages (74.2%) among 
the other groups followed by the BLO (71.6%). A significant proportion (39.2%) of all 
participants believed that auditor independence was neither undermined nor enhanced. 
Notably, none of the participants perceived this situation as an enhancing factor to 
auditor independence. The calculated means, as shown in table (7.14), were all below 3 
and the lowest was the TBA (1.83) while the average mean was 2.17. 
On the light of the above results, it can be suggested that auditor independence is 
perceived to be undermined in three of the four relationships. These were: when there is 
a high level of competition among audit firms, when audit firms use audit fee 
discounting and low-balling to get or to keep audit clients and when budget pressures are 
imposed by an audit firm on its staff. In contrast, auditor independence was perceived to 
be enhanced when there is little competition among audit firms. 
Regarding the differences of perceptions of auditor independence among the our groups 
with respect to the above four statements, the results from the one way ANOVA test, as 
shown in table (7.14), revealed that there were statistically significant 
differences 
between responses of the participants as the P values were . 001, . 
007, . 
000, . 000 
for 
statements 2-9,2-10,2-11 and 2-12 respectively. In order to obtain more 
insights into 
which groups differ from which, a post-hoc comparison using a 
Duncan test was 
performed. The results from this test with respect to each statement are 
illustrated as 
follows: 
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Statement 2-9: The mean scores of the EA (1.86) rate significantly different from those 
of the IFA (1.53), the TBA (1.49) and the BLO (1.5). In all these cases the mean score of 
the EA is higher than the mean scores of the other three groups. 
Statement 2-10: The mean responses of the EA (3.21) rate significantly differently from 
the TBA (3.37). In addition, the mean responses of the TBA (3.37) rate significantly 
differently from those of the IFA (3.01) and the BLO (3.12). In these two cases the mean 
score of the TBA was higher than the other two. 
Statement 2-11: The mean score of the EA (2.35) differ significantly from those of the 
IFA (1.90), the TBA (1.94) and the BLO (1.95). The mean score of the EA in these 
cases is higher than the other three. 
Statement 2-12: The mean responses of the EA (2.48) rate significantly different from 
those of the IFA (2.09), the TBA (1.83) and the BLO (2.06). The mean score of the EA 
in these cases scored higher than the other three groups. Moreover, the mean responses 
of the TBA (1.83) rate significantly differently from those of the IFA (2.09) and the 
BLO (2.06). In these two cases the mean score of the TBA was lower than the other two. 
From these results, it can be seen that there was no consensus among the responses of 
participants from the four groups on the above four relationships that sought to examine 
the effect of competition among audit firms on auditor independence (statements 2-9,2- 
10,2-11 and 2-12). As shown in table (7.14), the participants' responses to these four 
statements in aggregate, produced 14 significant differences between two or more 
groups at the . 
05 level. 
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7.2.4: Auditors' economic dependence and perceptions of auditor independence. 
This part shows the subject groups' perceptions of the effect of auditors' economic 
dependence on their audit clients on auditor independence in three different situations. 
These are: when an audit firm's profitability depends on the retention of a specific audit 
client (statement 2-13); when more than 10% of total firm's audit fees revenues were 
from one client (statement 2-14) and when an audit firm's desire is not to lose status by 
losing a key client (statement 2-15). The responses to these statements are detailed in 
tables (7.15,7.16 and 7.17). 
The bold figures in tables (7.15 and 7.16) indicate that the majority (87.8%) of the 
aggregate responses of the participants believed auditor independence is undermined 
when an audit firm's profitability depends on the retention of a specific audit client 
(n = 360). This opinion was expressed most by the entire BLO (100%) followed by the 
majority (93.2%) of the IFA. Notably, none of the participants perceived auditor 
independence to be enhanced. As can be seen from table (7.17) all means were below 3 
and the weakest was the BLO (1.43) while the average mean was 1.7. 
When more than 10% of total firm's audit fees revenues were from one client, a large 
proportion (60%) of the aggregate respondents, as revealed in tables (7.15 and 7.16), 
thought auditor independence is undermined (n = 246). Again, none of the participants 
perceived this situation as an enhancing factor to auditor independence. Less than 3 were 
all of the calculated means and the average mean was 2.29, as shown in table (7.17). 
Statement (2.15) investigated participants' perception of auditor independence when an 
audit firm desires not to lose status by losing a key client. The bold figures in tables 
(7.15 and 7.16) indicate that nearly all of the TBA (90.6%), the vast majority (81.1%) 
of the BLO, approximately 80% of the IFA and 70.2% of the EA perceived auditor 
independence is undermined in this situation. In aggregate, the bold figure shows that 
more than three-quarter (78.8%) of the participants shared this 
belief. As with the 
previous two statements, none of the participants perceived this situation as an 
enhancing factor to auditor independence. Once again, as can 
be seen in table (7.17), 
none of the calculated means were above 3 and the 
lowest was the IFA (1.69) while the 
aggregate mean was 1.84. 
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Based on the above results, it seems that participants from the four groups thought 
auditor independence is undermined in the three situations that were set to investigate 
the impact of auditors' economic dependence on their audit clients on auditor 
independence. 
With regard to the different perceptions of auditor independence between the four 
groups relating to the above three statements, the results from the one way ANOVA test, 
as shown in table (7.17), revealed that the responses of the four groups significantly 
differed as the P values were . 000, . 
000 and . 002 for statements 2-13,2-14 and 2-15 
respectively. In order to obtain more insight into which groups differ from which, a 
post-hoc comparison using a Duncan test was utilised. The results from this test with 
respect to each statement are provided as follows: 
Statement 2-13: the mean score of the EA (1.94) rate significantly differently from 
those of the IFA (1.52) and the BLO (1.43). In these two cases the mean score of the EA 
was higher than the other two. In addition, the mean score of the TBA (1.77) rate 
significantly different from those of the IFA (1.52) and the BLO (1.43). In these two 
cases the mean score of the TBA was higher than the other two 
Statement 2-14: The mean responses of the EA group (2.51) were significantly 
differently from those of the IFA (2.05) and the BLO (2.02). Moreover, the mean score 
of the TBA (2.43) rate significantly differently from those of the IFA (2.05) and the 
BLO (2.02). In these two cases the mean score of the TBA was higher than the other 
two. 
Statement 2-15: the mean score for the EA (2.02) was significantly differently from 
those of the IFA (1.69), the TBA (1.76) and the BLO (1.77). In these three cases the 
mean score of the EA scored higher than the other three. 
According to the results above, it can be argued that there was no consensus among the 
responses of participants from the four sample groups regarding the above three auditor- 
client relationships that sought to investigate the influence of auditors' economic 
dependence on his audit client on auditor independence (statements 
2-13,2-14, and 2- 
15). As can bee seen in table (7.17), 11 significant differences are observed 
between 
two or more groups at the . 
05 level with respect to participants' responses for the three 
statements. 
169 
a) 
U 
a) 
41 
41 
a) U 
a) 
'C 
Q) 
N 
U 
O 
O 
U 
N 
cn 
O 
O 
bA 
a) s., 
O 
4° 
a) 
O 
a) 
U 
a) 
N 
N 
O 
a) 
a) 
H 
i-ý 
t 
N 
a) 
cri 
111 
U 
z Ln 00 
C 
VI 
Ejý 
UO M"M 
a) pia U 
- 
L tli 
yU 
t- 
-. 
fnT 
w 
L G) 
M (ý1 Oll [- 00 
UN 
O 
-0 Ca 
0N 
ýN 
CO Ez MN ("ý y 
OTy 
V1 `/ 
ýI `ý W lý , __, 
Lý 
O- 
V1 
"0 D ýO ýO N 
G1 N 00 
- U O C (U Qý yn cn 
OCb >' Ö 
" Q. O X 
.ýN .OL W 
W (ý 
L 
49 
Cn 
Ü II G 
r- W O'° kA 
as 
" YYyO 
O v vý z 
s= Cl) 
cn 
v II 
ýý t: z 
O cz 
_ 
rýI CU 
03 `2 
nom/r. 
=1 -4 0 
R3 
0 
0) N fl¢ cG C 
r s r- Ö -a t r- C ý QQ 
p 
i 
A 0 
r 
0 
- 
Lr 
CC b t= 01 
cl 
X 0-`. 4) ö 
I. I. I W 
vý E., 
Q cC 
NNN II1 
r 
N 
U 
U 
U 
U 
N 
'U 
U 
O 
O 
U 
N 
c 
O 
. r. ^C3 
C13 
O 
03 
bA 
U 
bA 
4-ý 
bA 
E-" 
i-ý 
r-. 
r-, 
Lt 
H 
:J 
J 
O 
00 
J 
> 
JU 
y 
-0x z_y 
,, 
MT 
LLI 
V1 
NU 
U 
E" z N Ir N V. ý_ ^ C 
pyJ 
U 
'O I- \ C-V 
nU 
o TU 
VD pQ C) 
rn 
Q 00 N NC 
w ~ z o NN -73 C Ü 
C 
ö N oc ýc Ü 'D V; CU 
cl, 
cn 
pCO 
ý v1 
fl 
;, 
o .. y. S 
_ 
U UO 
ý 
Q 
ö NVr Cl c aac 
f. 
i CTp p 
00 N OU to -O 
°ý 
; 
i U II Ea 
BLZ] ° -C n 
ý 
Cl) 
ö on C) 
ý =Y !ý U (U . 
cn OzUy c ") 
C 
aý. ýIr C Y E .a ca 1 , 
wC 
OY 
8 
NI 
ýý~1 
ýOY 
E 
iO Ui 
N =U rý3 
4) 
O 
= tom, Qp rn C- ;z 'a - ý+ 
% 
O V; oi) 
CL ()ji 
E, -0 C 
C 
<NJn 
_D 
CA I 
" 
r. 4. i U 
rC . 
ý ` ý II ` _ - II 
ý 
11I 
NN. N 
` ; __, 
,ý 
[ý 
U 
G) 
U 
, r. 
O 
U 
G) 
O 
Cd 
O 
bA 
r 
U 
O 
r 
O 
C3 
U 
O 
z 
03 
6 
0 
r- 
I- 
Cý3 E"" U 
019-vul 
O'IH-dI 
Vul-3I 
0,19-va 
A 
. L-Va 
VdI-V 1 
d e 
O anion d ö ö 
N 
ö 
d v ! 
PIS N O 
m 
PIS 
00 p "a 
O 
ö 
M N 
N 
PIS 
C) 
aye r- (1) ýD 
Q 
PIS 
M M O 
oa 
d Ho> °' 
2I^j ö : ý- C) 
°n 
a 
PIS 
, r, ° 
kn v 
v t+ o 
`t aö ý OJAT , o ýn 
ö 
" 
En " 
r.., 1.. 
A= = r_ O Op-C 
w 
1 OO .ý 
QýO 
LT. 
ý Cd 
pO 
U 
vý 
^O v i vi C Ö 
-. 4z N 
_ 
O 
-ýöö3 ti) 
cö E? ý, 
dý 
d. J it 
dý W 
.Cý ; "Q 
i 
7.2.5: Audit committees and perceptions of auditor independence. 
This section illustrates the perceptions of the effect of an audit committee on auditor 
independence held by the participants in two situations. These were when an audit 
committee is composed of competent non-executive directors existed in the audit client 
company (statement 2-16) and when there was no committee in the audit client 
(statement 2-17). The participants were requested to indicate whether these two 
statements would undermine or enhance auditor independence. The responses to these 
two statements are provided in tables (7.18,7.19 and 7.20). 
It can be seen from tables (7.18 and 7.19) that approximately (90%) of the aggregate 
participants perceived auditor independence to be enhanced when an audit committee is 
present in the audit client's company (n = 368). Looking more closely, almost the entire 
(96%) participants of the EA and the vast majority (91.9%) of the BLO believed that 
auditor independence is enhanced in this situation. Both the IFA and the TBA showed 
similar views when 89.3% and 77.6% of their respondents agreed with the opinion of the 
other two groups. All calculated means were above 4 and the highest was the EA (4.21) 
while the average mean was 4.17. 
On the other hand, the bold figures in tables (7.18 and 7.19) show that more than two 
third (66.8%) of the participants expressed their belief that auditor independence is 
perceived to be undermined when an audit committee did not exist in the audit client 
(n = 274). The highest percentage of this perception among the four groups was the BLO 
(79.7%) followed by the TBA (68.3%) while only (64.1%) of the IFA and (61.5%) of 
the EA shared the same belief. Notably, none of them perceived auditor independence to 
be enhanced in this situation. All calculated means, as can be seen in table (7.20), were 
under 3 and the lowest was the BLO (1.95) while the average mean was 2.17. 
Accordingly, it appears that auditor independence is perceived to be enhanced when an 
audit committee existed in the client company. On the other 
hand, when an audit 
committee is not present in the audit client, auditor independence was perceived to 
be 
undermined. 
Regarding the different perceptions of auditor independence among the 
four groups 
when an audit committee existed or did not in the audit client, 
the results from the one 
172 
way ANOVA test revealed that there were no statistically significant differences for the 
first statement (statement 2-16) as the P value was . 595 but for the second statement the 
p value was . 
001 which indicates significant differences between the responses of the 
four groups regarding this statement. In order to obtain more insight into which groups 
differ from which, a post-hoc comparison using a Duncan test was performed. The 
results from this test revealed that the mean score of the EA (2.30) was significantly 
different from those of the TBA (2.04) and the BLO (1.95). In addition, the mean score 
of the IFA (2.25) significantly differed from those of the TBA (2.04) and the BLO 
(1.95). 
In the light of the above results, it can be suggested that there was a consensus among 
the responses of participants from the sample groups with regard to the first statement 
(statement 2-16) while there were no consensus between them with respect to the 
second statement (statement 2-17). Four significance differences were produced among 
responses of the sample groups regarding this statement (see table 7.20). 
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7.2.6: The status and financial condition of the audit client and perceptions of 
auditor independence. 
This section demonstrates the perceptions of the participants on the influence on auditor 
independence of the financial condition and status of the audit client in four different 
situations. These include when the audit client is in the state sector (statement 2-18), in 
the private sector (statement 2-19), in a strong financial condition (statement 2-20) and 
in a weak financial condition (statement 2-21). Participants were asked to express their 
perception of the influence of these four situations on auditor independence. The results 
of the responses to these issues are presented in tables (7.21,7.22 and 7.23). 
When the audit client is in the state sector, the majority (63.4%) of the aggregate 
responses, as shown in tables (7.21 and 7.22), perceived auditor independence to be 
enhanced (n = 260). This was perceived most by the BLO (77.1 %) followed by the EA 
(62.1%). In contrast, only a small minority (6.3%) of the aggregate participants believed 
auditor independence is undermined in this situation. All of the calculated means for the 
responses of the four groups were above 3 as illustrated in table (7.23) and the average 
mean was 3.67. 
From tables (7.21 and 7.22), it can be seen that more than half (58.5%) of the 
participants perceived auditor independence to be undermined when the audit client is in 
the private sector (n = 240). More specifically, this view was held by more than three 
quarters (78.4%) and almost two third (62.4%) of the BLO and the TBA respectively. 
whereas, more than half (51.4%) of the EA and 55.3% of the IFA reached the same 
opinion. On the other hand, just 14% of the aggregate responses believed auditor 
independence is enhanced in this situation. None of the calculated means of the four 
groups' responses, as shown in table (7.23), exceeded 3 and the average mean was 
2.42. 
Concerning the issue of whether auditor independence would be undermined or 
enhanced when the audit client is in a strong financial condition, tables 
(7.21 and 7.22) 
revealed that 43.4% of the participants perceived auditor 
independence to be 
undermined (n = 178). This belief was observed most 
by the TBA (60%) followed by 
the EA and the BLO (59.5%), and the IFA (59.2%). Auditor 
independence, however, 
was perceived neither undermined nor enhanced 
by nearly half (49%) of the aggregate 
176 
responses (n = 201). The four calculated means for the responses were all below 3 and 
the lowest was the BLO (2.41) while the average mean was 2.60. 
Statement (2-21) sought to investigate the participants' perceived auditor independence 
when the audit client is in a weak financial condition. Tables (7.21 and 7.22) state that 
although 56% of the aggregate respondents believed that auditor independence neither 
undermined nor enhanced (n = 230), approximately 40% of them perceived 
independence is enhanced in this situation (n = 163). On the other hand, only small 
minority (4.2%) of the entire participants believed auditor independence is undermined. 
Similar to those of the first statement, as shown in table (7.23), all calculated means 
were above 3 and the highest was the IFA (3.55) while the average mean was 3.39. 
It appears from the previous results that when the audit client is in the state sector or in a 
weak financial condition, auditor independence was perceived to be enhanced. Whereas, 
when the audit client is in the private sector or in a strong financial condition, auditor 
independence was perceived to be undermined. 
With respect to the different perceptions of auditor independence between participants 
from the four groups regarding the above four auditor-client relationships, the results 
from the one way ANOVA test, as illustrated in table (7.23), revealed that except for 
the first statement (statement 2-18) where the p value was . 065, all other three 
statements produced significant differences among the responses of the four groups. The 
calculated p values for statement 2-19,2-20 and 2-21 were . 000, . 
000 and . 018 
respectively. In order to obtain more insight into which groups differ from which, a post- 
hoc comparison using a Duncan test was conducted. The results from this test are 
provided as follows: 
Statement 2-19: the mean score of the BLO (2.06) rate significantly differently 
from 
those of the EA (2.48), the IFA (2.44) and the TBA (2.61). In all these cases the score 
mean of the BLO was less than those of the other three groups. 
Statement 2-20: the mean responses of the EA (2.78) significantly 
differed from those 
of the TBA (2.44) and the BLO (2.41). In these two cases the mean score of 
the EA was 
higher than the TBA and the BLO. 
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Statement 2-21: with regard to this statement, the only significant difference in the 
mean score of the responses of the four groups was between the EA (3.27) and the IFA 
(3.55). 
Accordingly, it can be suggested that except for the first statement (statement 2-18), 
there was no consensus among the participants from the four sample groups with respect 
to the other three auditor-client relationships that investigated the effect of the financial 
condition and status of the audit client on auditor independence (statements 2-19,2-20, 
and 2-21). As can be seen in table (7.23), 6 significant differences were produced 
among two or more groups at the . 
05 level with respect to participants' responses to 
these statements. 
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7.2.7: Personal relationships and perceptions of auditor independence. 
This part illustrates the participants' perceptions on the impact of personal relationships 
between auditors and their audit clients on auditor independence in three situations. 
These are: when an audit client's financial director was previously employed by the 
audit firm (statement 2-22); when one of the audit client's executive directors is a close 
friend of one of the audit team (statement 2-23) and when one of the audit client's 
executive directors is a brother of one of the audit team (statement 2-24). Respondents to 
these statements were asked to express their perception of the influence of these three 
situations on auditor independence. The results of the responses are provided in tables 
(7.24,7.25 and 7.26). 
When an audit client's financial director was previously employed by the audit firm, 
tables (7.24 and 7.25) indicate that the majority (68.6%) of the entire participants 
believed auditor independence is undermined (n = 281). The highest proportion with this 
belief were the TBA and the IFA who counted 85.9% and 73.8% respectively while only 
64.8% of the BLO and 56.8% of the EA shared the same view. As can be seen from 
table (7.26), the calculated means for the responses were all below 3 and the lowest was 
the TBA (1.74) whereas the average mean was 2.13. 
As shown in tables (7.24 and 7.25), when one of the audit client's executive directors is 
a close friend of one of the audit team, the vast majority (90.8%) of the aggregate 
responses perceived auditor independence to be undermined (n = 372). Going into more 
detail, this result was perceived by all (100%) of the TBA, nearly all (97.1 %) of the IFA, 
95.9% of the BLO and more than three quarters (78.4%) of the EA. In contrast, none of 
the participants believed this situation was an enhancing factor to auditor independence. 
Again, all calculated means of responses to this statement, as revealed in table (7.26), 
were below 3 and the lowest was the TBA (1.60) while the average mean was 
1.90. 
The bold figures in tables (7.24 and 7.25) show that almost all (98.3%) of the 
participants from the four groups perceived auditor 
independence is undermined when 
one of the audit client's executive directors 
is a brother of one of the audit team 
(n = 403). Similar to the previous statement, none of the participants perceived auditor 
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independence is enhanced in this situation. Once again, all of the calculated means were 
below 3 and the least mean was the BLO (1.24) while the average mean was 1.35. 
Accordingly, the results showed that auditor independence was perceived bý the 
participants from the sample groups to be undermined when an audit client's financial 
director was previously employed by the audit firm, when one of the audit client's 
executive directors is a close friend of one of the audit team and when one of the audit 
client's executive directors is a brother of one of the audit team. 
Regarding the different perceptions of auditor independence among the respondents 
from the four groups with respect to the above three statements, the results from the one 
way ANOVA test revealed that the three statement produced statistically significant 
differences as the P values were . 
000, 
. 000 and . 
001 for statement 2-22,2-23 and 2-24 
respectively. To obtain more insight into which groups differ from which, a post-hoc 
comparison using a Duncan test was performed. The results from this test for each 
statement are provided as follows: 
Statement 2-22: The mean responses of the EA (2.40) significantly differed from those 
of the IFA (2.07), the TBA (1.74) and the BLO (2.10). In these three cases the mean 
score of the EA was higher than those of the other three. In addition, the mean score of 
the TBA (1.74) was significantly different from those of the IFA (2.07) and the BLO 
(2.10). In these two cases the mean score of the TBA was lower than those of the IFA 
and the BLO. 
Statement 2-23: The mean score of the EA (2) rate significantly different from those of 
the IFA (1.66), the TBA (1.60) and the BLO (1.79). In all these cases the mean score of 
the EA was more than the other three. Furthermore, the response mean of the 
BLO 
(1.79) significantly differed from the IFA (1.66) and the TBA 
(1.60). The mean score of 
the BLO, in these two cases, was higher than those of the IFA and the TBA. 
Statement 2-24: With respect to this statement, only two cases of significant 
differences 
in the mean scores were produced. The mean responses of the 
EA (1.48) significantly 
differed from those of the IFA (1.29) and the TBA (1.28). In these two cases the mean 
score of the EA was higher than those of the other two. 
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According to the above results, it seems that there was no consensus among the 
responses of participants from the four sample groups with respect to the three auditor- 
client relationships that sought to investigate the effect of the personal relationships 
between auditors and their audit clients on auditor independence. As can be seen from 
table (7.26), 13 significant differences were observed between two or more groups at the 
. 05 level with respect to responses to these statements. 
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7.2.8: Financial relationships and perceptions of auditor independence. 
The impact of financial relationships between auditors and their audit clients on auditor 
independence are examined in three auditor-client relationships. These are when an audit 
firm has unpaid audit and non-audit fees from the previous years (statement 2-25), w hen 
a partner or a member of the audit staff of an audit firm owns material shares in the audit 
client (statement 2-26) and when an auditor in an audit firm has received an interest free 
loan from an audit client (statement 2-27). Participants were asked to indicate whether 
each one of these situations might undermine or enhance auditor independence. 
Responses related to these statements are presented in tables (7.27,7.28 and 7.29): 
It can be seen from tables (7.27 and 7.28) that less than half (43.1 %) of the aggregate 
participants believed that auditor independence is undermined when an audit firm has 
unpaid audit and non-audit fees from the previous years (n = 177). This viewpoint was 
perceived most by the IFA (62%) followed by the EA (48%) and the TBA (47%) while 
just 20% of the BLO shared the same opinion. On the other hand, only 2% of the entire 
participants viewed this situation as an enhancement factor to auditor independence 
(n = 8). Over half (54.9%) of the aggregate participants, however, thought this situation 
neither undermined nor enhanced auditor independence (n = 225). All calculated means, 
as shown in table (7.29), were below 3 and the lowest was the IFA (2.13) whereas the 
average mean was 2.46. 
When a partner or a member of the audit staff of an audit firm owns material shares in 
the audit client, most (97%) of the aggregate responses, as illustrated in tables (7.27 and 
7.28), perceived this situation as a threatening factor to auditor independence (n = 398). 
In contrast, none of them perceived auditor independence to be enhanced. Table (7.29) 
revealed that none of the calculated means reached 3 and the least was the BLO 
(1.28) 
while the average mean was 1.40. 
Concerning the perceptions of auditor independence held by the participants when an 
auditor in an audit firm has received an interest free 
loan from an audit client, tables 
(7.27 and 7.28) show that more than three quarters (78%) of the aggregate participants' 
responses believed auditor independence is undermined 
(n = 320). More specifically, 
this opinion was held by the overwhelming majority 
(97.1) of the IFA and the TBA 
(90.6), but at 64.8% and 63.5% of the EA and the BLO respectively. 
Similar to the 
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previous statement, none of the participants perceived auditor independence is enhanced 
in this situation. Once again, as provided in table (7.29), all calculated means were 
below 3 and the average mean was 1.70. 
It appears form the above results that auditor independence is perceived to be 
undermined in the above three auditor-client relationships. 
With respect to the differences in perception of auditor independence between 
respondents from the four groups relating to the above three situations, as can be seen in 
table (7.29), the results from the one way ANOVA test revealed that responses to 
statements 2-25 and 2-27 had produced significant differences as the P values was . 000 
for both of them whereas there was no statistically significant differences for statement 
2-26 as the P value was . 058 which is greater than 0.05. In order to obtain more insight 
into which groups differ from which relating to the responses of statements 2-25 and 2- 
27, a post-hoc comparisons using Duncan test was performed. The results from this test 
are provided as follows: 
Statement 2-25: The mean score of the EA (2.70) significantly differed from those of 
the IFA (2.13) and the TBA (2.30). In these two cases the mean score of the EA was 
higher than for the other two. In addition, the response mean of the BLO (2.63) was 
significantly different from those of the IFA (2.13) and the TBA (2.30). The mean score 
of the BLO in these two cases was higher than those of the other two. 
Statement 2-27: Four significant differences in the mean scores of the responses were 
produced in this statement. The mean responses of the EA (1.89) significantly differed 
from those of the IFA (1.38) and the TBA (1.51). In these two cases the mean score of 
the EA was higher than those of the other two. Moreover, the response mean of the BLO 
(1.97) scored significantly differently from the IFA (1.38) and the TBA (1.51). In these 
two cases the mean score of the IFA and the TBA were less than the BLO. 
Based on the above results, it seems that except for the second statement (statement 2- 
26), there was no consensus among the responses of participants relating to the other 
two statements which sought to examine the impact of the 
financial relationships. As can 
be seen in table (7.29), in aggregate, eight significant 
differences are observed bemeen 
two or more groups at the . 
05 level with respect to participants' responses for statements 
2-25 and 2-27. 
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7.2.9: Provision of (NAS) and perceptions of auditor independence. 
This section shows the results of analyses of the participants' perceptions of the 
influence of the provision of NAS by auditors to their audit clients on auditor 
independence in four situations. These include when an audit firm does not provide any 
kind of NAS (statement 2-28), when an audit firm's fees from NAS are 25% to 49 % of 
audit fees (statement 2-29), when an audit firm's fees from NAS are 50% to 99% of 
audit fees (statement 2-3 1) and when an audit firm's fees from NAS are 100% or more 
of audit fees (statement 2-31). Respondents to these statements were required to provide 
their opinion on how they perceived the effect of these relationships on auditor 
independence. The participant's responses are presented in tables (7.30,7.31 and 7.32). 
The bold figures in tables (7.30 and 7.31) indicate that the overwhelming majority 
(71.4%) of the aggregate respondents believed auditor independence is enhanced when 
an audit firm does not provide any kind of NAS to its audit clients (n = 293). The 
highest figure among the participants from the four groups was the EA (78.3%) followed 
by the TBA (76.4%) and the BLO (75.7%) while just over half (54.4%) of the IFA 
agreed with this view. Notably, none of the participants perceived auditor independence 
to be undermined in this situation. With regard to the calculated mean scores, table 
(7.32) show that all means were above 4 except for the IFA which was 3.70 and the 
average was 4.06. 
On the issue of whether auditor independence might be undermined or enhanced when 
an audit firm's fees from NAS are 25% to 49% of audit fees, the bold figures in tables 
(7.30 and 7.31) illustrate that the majority (61%) of the aggregate participants thought 
that this situation neither undermined nor enhanced auditor independence (n = 250) 
while more than one third (34.2%) of them perceived this auditor-client relationship as a 
threat to auditor independence (n = 140). On the other hand, only a small minority 
(4.8%) of the participants perceived it as an enhancing factor to auditor 
independence. 
Contrary to the previous statement, all measured means were below 
3 and the lowest 
was the IFA (2.50) while the average mean was 2.63. 
When participants were asked to indicate the impact on auditor 
independence when an 
audit firm's fees from NAS are 50% to 99% of audit 
fees, the vast majority (86.3 0ö) of 
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the aggregate responses, as can be seen in tables (7.30 and 7.31), believed that auditor 
independence is undermined (n = 354). The highest percentage of participants was the 
TBA (95.3) followed by the IFA (92.3%). All calculated means were less than 3 and the 
lowest was the TBA (1.77) while the aggregate measured mean was 1.86. 
Finally, statement (2-3 1) sought to examine the participants' perceptions of auditor 
independence when an audit firm's fees from NAS are 100% or more of audit fees. 
Similar to the previous statement, it can be seen from tables (7.30 and 7.31) that the 
majority (91.2%) of the participants perceived auditor independence is undermined (n = 
374). Going into more detail, 100%, 94.6%, 92.2% and 83.8% of the participants from 
the TBA, BLO, IFA and EA respectively held this view. Once again, only 1% of the 
participants believed this situation might enhance auditor independence. All calculated 
means were below 3 and the lowest was the IFA (1.37) while the average mean was 
1.36. 
Considering the results above, it can be argued that auditor independence was perceived 
to be undermined in three out of the four auditor-client relationships that sought to 
examine the effect of provision of NAS on auditor independence (statements 2-28.2-30 
and 2-31). Only the first statement (statement 2-28), was perceived to enhance auditor 
independence. 
Relating to the differences of perceptions of auditor independence among participants 
from the four groups with regard to the above four statements, as shown in table (7.32), 
the results from the one way ANOVA test revealed that except for statement 2-30 where 
the p value was . 
374 which is greater than 0.05, there were statistically significant 
differences for the other three statements. The calculated P values for statements 2-28, 
2-29 and 2-31 were . 
000, . 
019 and . 
009 respectively. To gain more insight into which 
groups differ from which, a post-hoc comparison using a Duncan test was conducted. 
The results determined from this test are provided as follows: 
Statement 2-28: The mean score of the EA (4.24) was significantly 
different from the 
IFA (3.70). In addition, the response mean of the IFA (3.70) significantly 
differed from 
those of the TBA (4.09) and the BLO (4.17). In these two cases 
the mean score of the 
IFA is less than the other two. 
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Statement 2-29: The mean responses of the EA (2.72) significantly differed from that of 
the IFA (2.50). Ferthermore, the mean responses of the IFA (2.50) rate significantl\ 
different from the BLO (2.74). 
Statement 2-31: The mean score of the EA (1.45) rate significantly differently from the 
TBA (1.90). Moreover, the mean response of the TBA (1.14) significantly differed from 
those of the IFA (1.37) and the BLO (1.41). The mean score of the TBA group in these 
cases is lower than the other two. 
Based on the above results, it can be assumed except for statement 2-30, that there was 
no consensus among the responses of the participants from the four groups on the 
perceptions of auditor independence with regard to statements 2-28,2-29 and 2-31. It 
can be seen in table (7.32) that eight significant differences were produced between two 
or more groups at the . 05 
level with respect to participants' responses for statements 2- 
28,2-29 and 2-31. 
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To obtain more insight into which relationships were perceived most to undermine or 
enhance auditor independence, tables (7.33 and 7.34) set out to indicate the rank: and 
the mean response score for each of the 31 relationships. Table (7.33) includes those 
situations which respondents thought undermined auditor independence (i. e.. mean is 
less than 3), while table (7.34) includes those situations which respondents thought 
enhanced auditor independence (i. e., mean is more than 3). Auditor-client relationships 
are listed in rank order for the EA as illustrated in tables (7.33 and 7.34). 
With respect to those auditor-client relationships identified as undermining auditor 
independence as can be see in table (7.33), with the exception of statement 2-27 that 
described a financial relationship (ranked 9th by the BLO), the four groups identify the 
same first five situations (although in a different order) as the most important 
undermining auditor independence. These include when a partner or staff of an audit 
firm owns material shares in the audit client, fees from non-audit services are 100% or 
more of audit fees, one of the audit client's executive directors is a brother of one of the 
audit team, there is a high level of competition among audit firms and when an auditor 
in an audit firm has received an interest free loan from an audit client. Notably, two out 
of the first five most undermining auditor independence situations were related to 
financial relationships (statements 2-26 and 2-27) whereas the other three related to the 
provision of NAS (statement 2-31), personal relationships (statement 2-24) and 
competition (statement 2-9). 
Although different rankings were given to the other situations, it can be seen from table 
(7.33) that on several occasions the sample groups almost shared the same opinion with 
respect to the ranking order. For instance, being a sole practitioner (statement 2-1) was 
ranked 15th by all groups except for the IFA who ranked it 17th. Furthermore, statement 
2-29 (fees from non-audit services are 25% to 49 % of audit fees) was ranked 
18th by the 
EA, IFA and the TBA while it was ranked 17th by the BLO. In addition, statement 
2-15 
(when an audit firm's desire is not to lose status by losing a 
key client) was ranked 7`h by 
both the IFA and TBA while it was ranked 6th by the BLO and 
8th by the EA. 
In the end of the ranking order, as can be seen 
from table (7.33), four auditor-client 
relationships were ranked by the sample groups as the 
least threatening situations to 
auditor independence (albeit in a different order) except 
for statement 2-20 which was 
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ranked 14th by the BLO. These include when fees from non-audit services are 25% to 49 
% compared to the audit fees (statement 2-29), when the audit firm has been auditing the 
client for 2 to 4 years (statement 2-6), when the audit client is in a strong financial 
condition (statement 2-20) and being a small firm (less than 3 partners or up to S 
auditors) (statement 2-2). 
In table (7.34), among relationships identified as enhancing auditor independence, 
participants from the four sample groups shared the same belief regarding the 
importance of the enhancement influence to four statements except for statement 2-18 
which was ranked 6t' by the TBA and 5thby the IFA. These relationships are: when the 
audit firm does not provide any kind of non-audit services to its audit clients (statement 
2-28), existence of an audit committee composed of competent non-executive directors 
(statement 2-16), being a big audit firm (statement 2-4) and when the audit client is in 
the state sector (statement 2-18). As can be seen in table (7.34), these four situations 
were related to provision of NAS (statement 2-28), existence of an audit committee 
(statement 2-16), audit firm size (statement 2-4) and financial condition and status of the 
audit client (statement 2-18). Different ranking orders were given to the rest of the 
enhancement factors, as seen in table (7.34), but on many occasions they were nearly in 
the same ranking order. For example, when the audit client is in the state sector 
(statement 2-18), both the EA and the BLO ranked it as the 4th enhancement factor to 
auditor independence whereas it was ranked 5th and 6th by the IFA and the TBA 
respectively. In addition, statement 2-5 (the audit firm has been auditing the client for 
less than 2 years) was ranked 5t' by both the TBA and the BLO while it was ranked 3ed 
and 6th by the IFA and the EA respectively. At the end of table (7.34), it can be seen 
that three auditor-client relationships were ranked as the least enhancing factors to 
auditor independence. These were: when the audit client is in a weak financial condition 
(statement 2-21), when there is little competition among audit firms (statement 2-10) 
and when there are unpaid audit and non-audit fees from the previous years (statement 
2-25) (this situation was perceived only by the TBA group as the 9th enhancement 
auditor-client relationship to auditor independence). 
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7.3: Analysis of part three of the questionnaire. 
This section reports on the results of part three of the questionnaire (see Appendix B) 
which sought information about the perceptions and attitudes of participants from the 
EA, IFA, TBA and BLO on the auditing and accounting profession and its related 
environments in the Libyan context. 
The key objective of part three of the questionnaire is to collect data that will help in 
answering research questions three and four. Specifically, to collect data to answer the 
following question: 
Q3. How do participants from the EA, IFA, TBA and BLO perceive the auditing 
and accounting profession and its related legal, professional, social, and education 
environments in the Libyan context? 
Q4- Do perceptions and attitudes of participants from the EA, IFA, TBA and BLO 
significantly differ about the accounting and auditing profession and its related legal, 
professional, social, and education environments in the Libyan context? 
Respondents in this section were asked to indicate their agreement or disagreement with 
eight different statements that address several aspects and issues pertinent to the legal, 
professional, social, and education systems in Libya relating to the accounting and 
auditing profession by using a five point Likert scale ranging from (strongly disagree) to 
(strongly agree). To measure the response frequencies and percentages, and the 
differences in perceptions between participants from the four groups it was decided for 
the textual summaries to aggregate "strongly disagree" and "slightly disagree" responses 
and "strongly agree" and "slightly agree" responses. The means and tests for significant 
differences between respondents' responses that reported in each table are calculated on 
the full 5-point distribution of responses. Responses related to the above issues are 
presented in tables (7.35,7.36 and 7.37) and the bold figures 
in these tables show the 
highest response frequencies and percentage for each statement 
by the four groups and 
their aggregate responses. 
The bold figures in tables (7.35 and 7.36) illustrate that the aggregate top response 
frequencies and percentages for the first six statements were either strong 
disagreement 
or disagreement with the statements whereas 
for the last two statements the highest 
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response frequencies and percentages were either neutral (statement 3-7. 'The 
accounting and auditing profession in general and auditors in particular are enjoying a 
reasonable respect and statues in the Libyan society") or strongly agree or agree 
(statement 2-8. "Auditor's independence is very important in effectively and correctly 
completing the audit process of the audit clients' financial statements"). 
Looking in more detail, it can be seen from tables (7.35 and 7.36) that nearly half 
(46.4%) of the aggregate responses disagreed that rules and regulations in the Libyan 
laws include comprehensive provisions that enhance and maintain auditor independence 
(statement 3-1) (n =190) while only 28.5% of them agreed with this statement (n = 117). 
This opinion was reached by all of the sample groups except for the IFA who were not 
decided. As can be seen from table (7.37), all calculated mean responses were below 3 
and the lowest was the BLO (2.38) while the average mean was 2.71. This result 
suggests that Libyan laws are seen by the sample groups, except for the IFA as not 
including comprehensive provisions that enhance and maintain auditor independence. 
When participants were asked whether audit firms in Libya efficiently adhere to 
independence requirements (statement 3-2), as seen in tables (7.35 and 7.36), 
approximately 48% of the aggregate responses disagreed with this situation (n = 195) 
while only 29.7% of them agreed (n = 122). Surprisingly, the highest proportion was the 
EA (54%) followed by the IFA (45.6%) and the TBA (43.5%). All measured means 
were less than 3 and the least was the EA (2.54) except for the BLO group who scored 
(3.02). According to this result, it can be assumed that the sample groups believed that 
audit firms in Libya do not efficiently adhere to independence requirements except for 
the BLO group who held an opposite opinion. 
Tables (7.35 and 7.36) show that more than half (53.2%) of the participants from the 
four groups disagreed that the LAAA plays an important role in developing the 
accounting and auditing profession (n = 218) (statement 3-3). This 
disagreement was 
shared by all sample groups although in different response percentages. 
Less than 3 were 
all calculated means and the lowest was the EA (2.24) while the aggregate mean was 
2.51. This result suggest a general agreement among the participants 
from the four 
sample groups that the LAAA is not playing an 
important role in developing the 
accounting and auditing profession. 
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Similar to the previous statement, tables (7.35 and 7.36) revealed that the majority 
(62.7 %) of the aggregate responses disagreed that the LAAA is playing an important 
role in maintaining auditor independence (n = 257) (statement 3-4). The highest 
frequencies and percentages of responses regarding this issue was the EA (n = 108. 
73%). None of the calculated means reached 3 and the highest was the BLO (2.65) while 
the average mean was (2.33). It appears on the light of this result that the LAAA is 
perceived by the four sample groups as not plying an important role in maintaining 
auditor independence. 
Approximately (45%) of the participants from the four sample groups, as shown in 
tables (7.35 and 7.36), disagreed that the accounting and auditing profession is 
efficiently fulfilling its role in meeting the demands of its clients (n = 182) (statement 
3-5). This belief was expressed most by the EA (48.6%) followed by 46% and 43.5% of 
the BLO and the TBA respectively whereas the largest percentage of responses of the 
IFA (46.6%) 'were undecided. On the other hand, nearly one quarter (24.9%) of the 
aggregate participants agreed with this statement (n = 102). Once again, all means were 
less than 3 and the lowest was the EA (2.62) while the aggregate mean was (2.75). 
Based on this result, it seems that the accounting and auditing profession is not 
efficiently fulfilling its role in meeting the demands of its clients as perceived, on 
aggregate, by the four sample groups. 
Tables (7.35 and 7.36) illustrate that just over half (52%) of the aggregate responses 
disagreed that the accounting and auditing curriculum in the Libyan education system is 
sufficient to train auditors (n = 213) (statement 3-6). Specifically, 56.8%, 43.7%, 58.8% 
and 46% of the EA, the IFA, the TBA and the BLO respectively adopted this view. 
On 
the contrast, nearly one third (31.4%) of the entire participants 
from the four groups 
believed the opposite (n =129). With regard to the response mean, all were 
less than 3 
and the average was 2.72 which indicate that participants 
from the four groups thought 
that the accounting and auditing curriculum in the Libyan education system 
is not 
sufficient to train auditors. 
The bold figures in tables (7.35 and 7.36) show that more than 
half (55.4%) of the 
participants were not decided when asked to provide 
their opinions about whether the 
accounting and auditing profession in general and auditors 
in particular enjoy reasonable 
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respect and status in Libyan society (n = 227). Despite this opinion, 18.4%, 32.9% and 
21.6% of the IFA, TBA and BLO respectively agreed that the accounting and auditing 
profession in general and auditors in particular enjoy reasonable respect and status in 
Libyan society. The only group who disagreed with this statement was the EA (40.6%). 
Table (7.37) shows that all means reported above 3 except for the EA group (2.70) and 
the average was 2.93. According to this result, it can be suggested that the accounting 
and auditing profession in general and auditors in particular are perceived to enjoy 
reasonable respect and status in Libyan society by the sample groups except for the EA 
group who perceived the opposite. 
Finally, as was expected, almost all (99%) of the participants from the four sample 
groups, as indicated in tables (7.35 and 7.36), agreed that auditor independence is very 
important in effectively and correctly completing the audit process of the audit clients' 
financial statements (n = 406). Only a small minority (4%) of the IFA group were 
undecided (n = 4). All calculated means were above 3 and the highest was the TBA 
group (4.65) while the average mean was 4.51. It appears from this result that all sample 
groups perceived the importance of auditor independence. 
Concerning the differences of perceptions and attitudes among participants from the four 
sample groups with respect to the above eight statements that investigated the 
accounting and auditing profession and its related environment in the Libyan context, as 
shown in table (7.37). The results from the one way ANOVA test revealed that except 
for statements 3-5 and 3-6 where the p values were . 126 and . 
794 respectively which are 
greater than 0.05, there were statistically significant differences for the other 6 
statements. The calculated P values for statements 3-1,3-2,3-3,3-4,3-7 and 3-8 were 
. 
045, 
. 
007, . 
000, . 
001, . 
000 and . 034 respectively. 
In order to gain more insight into 
which groups significantly differ from which, a post-hoc comparison using a Duncan 
test was conducted. The determined results from this test are provided as follows: 
Statement 3-1: The mean score of the BLO (2.38) was significantly different from those 
of the EA (2.73), the IFA (2.85) and the TBA (2.81). In these three cases the mean score 
of the BLO was less than the other three. 
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Statement 3-2: The mean responses of the EA (2.54) significantly differed from those 
of the IFA (2.69) and the TBA (2.95). The mean score of the EA in these two cases was 
lower than the other two. 
Statement 3-3: The mean score of the EA (2.24) significantly differed from those of the 
IFA (2.53) and the TBA (2.60). The mean score of the EA in these two cases was lower 
than the other two. In addition, the mean score of the BLO (2.92) significantly differed 
from those of the IFA (2.53) TBA (2.60). In these two cases the mean score of the BLO 
was higher than the other two. 
Statement 3-4: The mean response of the EA (2.14) rate significantly differently from 
those of the IFA group (2.20) and the TBA (2.55). The mean score of the EA in these 
two cases was lower than the other two. Moreover, the mean response of the IFA (2.20) 
significantly differed from those of the TBA (255) and the BLO (2.65). The mean score 
of the IFA in these cases is lower than the other two. 
Statement 3-7: The mean score of the EA (2.70) significantly differed from those of the 
IFA (3.10), the TBA (3.02) and the BLO (3.07). In these three cases the mean score of 
the EA was less than the other three. 
Statement 3-8: The mean response of the TBA (4.65) rate significantly different from 
those of the IFA (4.47) and the BLO (4.42). The mean score of the TBA in these three 
cases was higher than the other two. 
Based on the above results, it can be seen that except for statement 3-5 and 3-6, that 
there was no consensus among the responses of the participants from the four groups on 
their perceptions and attitudes about the accounting and auditing profession and its 
related environment in the Libyan context. It can be seen from table (7.37) that 18 
significant differences were produced between two or more groups at the . 05 
level with 
respect to participants' responses for statements 3-1,3-2,3-3,3-4,3-7 and 3-8. 
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Chapter seven: 
7.4: Summary. 
findings of the questionnaire. 
The results from the analysed data from the questionnaire have been presented in this 
chapter. These include results relating to part one, two and three. With regard to the 
main results of part one, the majority of the participants were male aged from less than 
30 to over 50 years, had a high level of accounting education and had good work 
experience. Therefore, participants' responses from the four groups appeared to be 
authoritative. 
Considering the main results of part two, the analysis of collected data revealed that 
most participants perceived sole practitioners and small audit firms as being less 
independent than big and medium audit firms. Similarly, the majority of respondents 
perceived that auditor independence is undermined when an audit firm has the same 
audit client for a long period of time. With regard to the effect of competition between 
audit firms and the economic dependence of auditors on their audit clients, most 
respondents perceived auditor independence to be undermined in these two situations. 
The existence of an audit committee in the audit client is believed to enhance auditor 
independence, whereas, when an audit committee is not present in the audit client's 
company, auditor independence was perceived to be undermined. The majority of 
respondents considered auditor independence to be enhanced when the audit client is in 
the state sector and when it is in a weak financial condition, than when the audit client is 
in the private sector or in a strong financial condition. Personal relationships such as 
friendship, employment and family relationships between auditors and their audit clients 
were thought to undermine auditor independence. Similar views were held on the effect 
of financial relationships between auditors and their audit clients such as shareholdings, 
receipt of interest free loans and unpaid audit and non-audit fees. Finally, the provision 
of NAS by auditors to their audit clients with different proportions of 
fees compared to 
audit fees was perceived to undermine auditor independence while not providing any 
kind of NAS by auditors to their audit clients was 
believed to enhance auditor 
independence. 
With respect to the analysis of part three of the questionnaire, the results 
indicated that 
the aggregate respondents from the four sample groups considered 
that Libyan laws did 
not include comprehensive provisions that enhance and maintain 
auditor independence. 
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Chapter seven: findings of the questionnaire. 
Similarly, the LAAA was perceived as neither playing an important role in developing 
the accounting and auditing profession nor in maintaining auditor independence. The 
role of the accounting and auditing profession in meeting its clients' demands was not 
thought by the participants to be efficiently fulfilled. More than half of the participants 
from the four groups thought that the accounting and auditing curriculum in the Libyan 
education system is insufficient to train auditors. With regard to the respect and status of 
the accounting and auditing profession in general and auditors in particular, all groups 
believed that the accounting and auditing profession and auditors enjoy reasonable 
respect and status in Libyan society except for the EA group who perceived the 
opposite. Finally, auditor independence was perceived by all participants to be very 
important in effectively and correctly completing the audit process of the audit clients' 
financial statements. 
In the end, it may be worth mentioning with regard to the collected data from the fourth 
part of the questionnaire which gathered participants' comments on the subject of the 
study and on the questionnaire (wording, layout, ambiguity and length), and to mention 
any issues they think are important and related to the subject of the study which had not 
been mentioned in the questionnaire. The analysed data of this part revealed that all 
collected data was related to personal issues such as the expression of participants' 
interest in the study and its importance, and the questions were relevant and covered the 
issues related to the subject of the research. 
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Findings of the semi-structured interviews 
Chapter eight: 
Findings of the semi-structured interviews 
8.0: Introduction. 
This chapter aims to present the results of the collected qualitative data from the semi- 
structured interviews. To achieve this, the chapter is organised into five main sections. 
The first section explains the reasons for conducting the interviews. Section two deals 
with analysing the background information of the interviewees while the third section 
reports on the effects of the nine selected factors on perceptions of auditor independence 
as held by the interviewees. The fourth section outlines the interviewees' perceptions 
and attitudes relating to the accounting and auditing profession and its related 
environments in the Libyan context. A brief summary of the main findings of the 
analysed qualitative data is provided in the fifth section. 
8.1: The purpose of conducting the interviews. 
As mentioned in chapter six, 20 semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
randomly selected members from the four sample groups. These included 6 members of 
the EA, 6 members of the IFA, 4 members of the TBA and 4 members of the BLO. 
The major purpose of conducting qualitative research is to understand and gain insight 
into the researched phenomena (Collis and Hussey, 2003; Sekaran, 2003; Easterby- 
Smith et al, 2006; Saunders et al, 2007). Thus, the main objective of collecting 
qualitative data in this study via semi-structured interviews was to give more 
insight to 
the findings of the quantitative data related to the participants' perceptions of auditor 
independence and attitudes on the auditing and accounting profession and 
its related 
environments in the Libyan context that were 
held by the four sample groups. More 
specifically, this part of the study sought to collect 
data that would help answering 
question five of the research questions which was worded as 
follows:. 
Q5 - Why such perceptions of the effects of audit 
firm size, audit firm tenure, 
competition, auditor's economic dependence on clients, audit 
committees, status 
and financial condition of the audit client, 
financial and personal relationships and 
`10 
provision of (NAS) and attitudes on the auditing and accounting profession and its 
related environments in the Libyan context were held by EA, IFA, TBA and BLO? 
8.2: Interviewees background information. 
The first question of the interview guide (see Appendix C) was intended to gather 
general information about the characteristics of the interviewees. The gathered 
information from the first question was related to the following issues: 
1- Age: Interviewees were asked to indicate the age group to which they belonged. 
The interviewees' ages were divided into four groups. These were: under 30 
years; from 30 to 39 years; from 40 to 49 years, and 50 years and over. 
2- Level of education: Interviewees' level of education was categorised as: first 
university degree; master degree; PhD and others. 
3- Working experience: Interviewees working experience was classified as: less than 
5 years; 5 to 9 years; 10 to 14 years and 15 years and over. 
Similar to the participants' background information that was collected from the 
questionnaire survey, the participants of the semi-structured interviews as can be seen 
from table (8.1) aged between 30 to over 50 years, held high levels of education and 
enjoy a long time of working experience. 
Table (8.1): Background information of the interviewees. 
E A IF A TB A BL O To tal 
D escription No % No % No % No % No 
Age 
Under 30 years 
30 to 39 years 
40 to 49 years 
50 years and over 
Total 
0 
2 
1 
3 
6 
0 
33.3 
16.7 
50 
100 
0 
2 
2 
2 
6 
0 
40 
40 
20 
100 
0 
2 
1 
1 
4 
0 
60 
20 
20 
100 
0 
0 
2 
2 
4 
0 
0 
50 
50 
100 
0 
6 
6 
8 
20 
0 
30 
30 
40 
100 
Education 
level 
Working 
First university degree 
Master degree 
PhD 
Total 
Under 5 years 
5 to 9 years 
4 
1 
1 
6 
0 
3 
66.6 
16.7 
16.7 
100 
0 
50 
4 
2 
0 
6 
0 
1 
60 
40 
0 
100 
0 
16.6 
3 
1 
0 
4 
0 
0 
80 
20 
0 
100 
0 
0 
3 
1 
0 
4 
0 
0 
0 
100 
0 
0 
100 
0 
0 
0 
14 
5 
1 
20 
0 
4 
5 
70 
25 
5 
100 1 
0 
20 
25 
experience 10 to 14 ears 
0 0 2 33.4 3 75 
4 100 11 55 
ears and over 15 3 50 3 
50 1 25 
y 
Total 6 100 6 100 4 
100 4 100 20 100 
EA = External auditors, IFA =Auditors from the Institute of 
Financial Auditing, TBA = Taxation Board auditors and BLO = 
Bank loan officers 
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Going into more detail, the majority (70%) of the interviewees were aged from 40 to 50 
years and over. In addition, only one quarter (25%) of them held a Masters degree while 
70% held a first university degree. With respect to the interviewees working experience, 
it can be seen from table (8.1) that more than half (55%) of the interviewees had 
working experience of 15 years and over while just one quarter (25%) enjoyed bet« een 
10 to 14 years of working experience. In general, the vast majority (80%) of the 
aggregate interviewees had working experience of 10 years and over. Therefore. 
interviewees' responses appeared to be authoritative. 
8.3: Interviewees' perceptions related to the effect of the nine selected factors. 
This section provides the empirical evidence regarding the perceived effect of audit firm 
size, audit firm tenure, competition, auditors' economic dependence on their audit 
clients, audit committees, status and financial condition of the audit client, financial 
relationships, personal relationships and provision of (NAS) on auditor independence 
held by the participants from the four sample groups. 
8.3.1: Audit firm size and interviewees' perceived auditor independence. 
When the interviewees were asked to express how they perceive auditor independence to 
be affected by the size of the audit firm, the vast majority (70%) believed that sole 
practitioners and small audit firms are less independent than medium or big audit firms 
(Appendix F, matrix 1). This result was consistent with that of the questionnaire. The 
interviewees believed that as the size of the audit firm becomes bigger its work increases 
and it becomes less dependent on any particular client. This 
lack of perceived 
independence with regard to the small audit firms was attributed by the 
interviewees to 
several characteristics that small audit firms enjoy. According to the 
interviewees, these 
characteristics include: a) their dependence on one or 
few clients; b) their lack of 
expertise and ability to provide different 
kinds of services; c) their personalised 
approach when carrying out an audit. The 
following comments illustrate the views of 
some of the interviewees from the four sample groups on 
the effect of the audit firm size 
on auditor independence: 
"Generally, I think the size of the audit firm seriously effects auditor 
independence. As 
the size of the audit firm increases, its revenues and reputation 
gets bigger too. This 
'1? 
puts more responsibilities on the audit firm to protect these benefits (reputation and 
revenues). On the other hand, small audit firms in order to generate more revenues to 
cover their expenditures and to maintain the business, usually compromise their independence. Thus, I believe that as the size of the audit firm increases the more 
independent it becomes ". (EA 3) 
"Of course, the size of the audit firm has a tremendous impact on auditor independence. In reality, small and new audit firms often face the threat of losing their 
independence due to several reasons such as the severe competition between audit firms, its dependence on a few audit clients and the shortage of qualified staff. On the 
other hand, big audit firms usually enjoy a unique set of characteristics that 
distinguish them from the small and new audit firms such as their capability of 
recruiting effective and experienced auditors, providing different kinds of services and 
their ability to generate income ftom more than one or few clients " (BLO 2). 
"Yes, I believe that the size of the audit firm has a huge impact on auditor 
independence. The increase of the size of the audit firm is a very good indication of its 
well-earned reputation. I think this could be seen as a result of different aspects such 
as the huge number of staff, the diversity of income resources and their adherence to 
the professional principles, whereas, small audit firms lack all these essential 
characteristics for maintaining auditor independence " (TBA 4). 
In spite of the above mentioned characteristics that big audit firms enjoy which were 
seen by the majority of the interviewees to increase their independence, one of the IFA 
interviewee believed that in reality, the Institution of the Financial Auditing does not 
take this criterion (small v big) into account when deciding to contract with external 
audit firms. Commenting on this issue, he stated: 
"I believe the size of the audit firm has a great influence on auditor independence. The 
big size of the audit firm indicates its effectiveness and capability of 
doing its work which 
means increasing its independence. In addition, the big size of the audit 
firm means it has 
a lot of clients that it could generate its income from. These characteristics are 
lacking 
when we talk about small audit firms. Regardless of these 
issues, the Institution of the 
Financial Auditing does not take these criteria in account when deciding to contract with 
any one of the audit firms. The main criteria 
for us are the integrity and the reputation of 
the audit firm and its capability of doing the audit work" 
(IFA 3). 
Although the vast majority of the interviewees perceived 
big audit firms are more 
independent than small audit firms, some of the interviewees 
had an opposite viewpoint 
(Appendix F, matrix 1). They believed that independence could 
be undermined most in 
big audit firms than small audit firms. Relating to 
this issue one of the BLO declared: 
"Yes, I think the size of the audit firm might negatively affect 
the independence of the 
audit firm especially with the 
big audit firms. As size of the audit 
firm gets bigger its 
work increases and its branches spread over 
different geographical areas. As a result, 
this will weaken the control procedures 
that relate to the protection of auditor 
213 
independence, whereas, better control procedures are implemented and practised 
among small audit firms " (BLO 1) 
According to the above discussion, it can be argued that the size of the audit firm v as 
seen by most of the interviewees to have a great impact on auditor independence. Big 
audit firms were perceived to enjoy independence more than small audit firms due to 
several characteristics that distinguish them. 
8.3.2: Audit firm tenure and interviewees' perceived auditor independence. 
When the interviewees were asked to express how they perceive auditor independence 
when an audit firm has been auditing the same audit client for a long period of time, 
mixed opinions were revealed (Appendix F, matrix 2). Half of the EA interviewees 
perceived auditor independence to be enhanced according to this situation. They 
believed that a long period of audit firm tenure with the same audit client could be 
beneficial for both the audit firm and the audit client. Long audit firm tenure ensures that 
the auditor gains more knowledge of his client's business which puts him in a position to 
objectively conduct the whole audit. Commenting on this issue, one of the EA 
interviewees stated: 
"I think long audit firm tenure does not negatively affect auditor independence. In 
contrast, I believe that more experience and knowledge of the client's business could 
be gained as a result of long audit firm tenure which in turn saves a lot of time, costs 
and efforts for both the audit firm and its client. In addition, the auditor 
becomes more 
valuable from the client's perspective and possesses more strength against any 
potential disagreement with his client " (EA 2). 
A similar opinion was adopted by one of the IFA interviewees regarding the positive 
effect of the long association between audit firms and their audit clients. 
Expressing his 
viewpoint, the IFA interviewee said: 
"I think there are a lot of advantages that could 
be gained from the long association 
between audit firms and their audit clients. For example, the comprehensive 
knowledge of 
the client's systems and operations, and savings 
in time and efforts in conducting the 
audit work. Nevertheless, I believe auditor 
independence would not be much affected 
regarding this issue because auditors perform according 
to a set of precise principles of 
the auditing profession " (IFA 5). 
On the other hand, the vast majority (80%) of the other 
interviewees perceived auditor 
independence is undermined when an audit firm performs audits 
for a long time for the 
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same audit client (Appendix F, matrix 2). The main concern of the interviewees 
regarding this issue was that an extended auditor-client relationship could result in the 
auditor becoming cosy in his relationship with his client that makes him become 
complacent in his audit performance or may result in adopting less rigorous procedures. 
This viewpoint was evident in the responses of the following interviewees: 
"Of course, auditor independence could be undermined as a result of a long audit firm 
tenure with the same audit client. A long association between auditors and their audit 
clients may create cosy relationships that make auditors adopt less rigorous 
procedures due to over confidence in their client's management or to maintain the 
current audit fees " (EA 4) 
"Definitely, auditor independence will be negatively affected when an audit firm 
continues to audit the same audit client for a long period of time. Due to the long 
period of time that associates auditors with their audit clients' employees, a cosy 
relationship might be established between them. As you know, in the end this will lead 
auditors to neglect their work, either due to excessive confidence in their clients' 
systems or to keep their income generated from such clients" (IFA 1). 
"Yes, I think the long relationship between auditors and their audit clients will 
definitely influence their independence. As the time goes on, the way that auditors 
handle their work, will change. During the first years auditors will try to be more 
careful in their performance but when the time gets longer, a cosy relationship starts 
to develop between them and their audit clients which will eventually result in 
adopting less rigorous procedures when conducting an audit due to the resulted 
confidence of their clients' systems" (BLO 3). 
To overcome these disadvantages, audit firm rotation was suggested by some of the 
interviewees. For example, one of the TBA interviewee stated: 
"Despite the advantages that could be achieved from the long audit firm tenure, 
I 
believe that the disadvantages outweigh the advantages and I suggest that a limited 
period of time, say five years, should be implemented as the maximum that an audit 
firm can perform an audit for its clients " (TBA 2). 
From the above results, it seems that auditor independence was 
believed to be 
undermined when an audit firm audits the same client 
for a long period of time due to 
the close relationship that could develop between auditors and 
their audit clients' 
management. This close relationship, as the majority of 
the interviewees thought, in the 
end would lead auditors to adopt less rigorous procedures. 
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8.3.3: Competition and interviewees' perceived auditor independence. 
It was expected, based on the results obtained from the questionnaire that nearly most of 
the interviewees would perceive auditor independence to be undermined when there is a 
high level of competition between audit firms (Appendix F, matrix 3). The main reasons 
for this opinion as expressed by the interviewees were due to: a) The absence of the role 
of the LAAA to organise and control accounting and auditing practices; b) A huge 
number of audit firms chasing a few large audit clients; c) The absence of proper related 
regulations and d) The shortage of very experienced auditors especially in small and ne«. 
audit firms. Once again, small and new audit firms were perceived by the majority of the 
interviewees to be the most influenced by the adverse effect of the high level of 
competition. The following comments indicate the interviewees' opinions concerning 
this issue: 
"Absolutely right, as the level of the competition between audit firms increases as 
auditor independence decreases and the opposite is right. For instance, the existence 
of one or a few specialised and qualified auditors in a particular business activity will 
enhance their independence especially when they face disagreement situations with 
their clients' management" (EA 5). 
"Of course a high level of competition undermines auditor independence especially in 
the case of small and new audit firms who do not have the resources to face the severe 
impact of competition such as the diversity of income recourses and lack of 
experienced auditors " (BLO 4). 
Similarly, some of the interviewees mentioned that the severe impact of competition in 
developing countries is greater than that in developed countries due to several aspects 
such as the lack of proper organisation of the auditing profession and the absence of any 
related regulations. The following comments declare these opinions: 
"I think the high level of competition among audit firms severely harms auditor 
independence especially in the developing societies where the performance of auditing 
is not properly organised. This situation has led several audit 
firms to offer lower 
audit fees than normal fee in order to keep their current clients or to get new ones. 
In 
addition, I believe that small and new audit firms suffer 
from the negative effect of the 
high levels of competition than big audit firms due to their 
lack of experience, 
reputation and qualified staff ' (TBA 2). 
"Definitely, competition among audit firms undermines auditor 
independence especially 
in small developing countries like Libya where there are a 
lot of things that could 
exacerbate the problem such as the lack of experienced auditors, 
lack of organising the 
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auditing profession and the absence of any related regulations that could solve the 
existing problems except the old 116 law that was issued in 1973 " (IFA 2). 
Interestingly, one of the TBA interviewees, despite his agreement that a high level of 
competition between audit firms undermines auditor independence, thought that big 
audit firms rather than small ones would suffer most from this situation. Relating to this 
issue he stated: 
"Yes I believe that high levels of competition between audit firms could affect auditor 
independence. As the competition increases, its negative impact on auditor 
independence will increase especially in the case of the big audit firms who use all 
means in order to keep their status and revenues within a determined level compared 
with other audit firms " (TBA 1). 
Although most of the interviewees believed auditor independence is undermined by a 
high level of competition especially in the case of small and new audit firms (Appendix 
F, matrix 3), some of the interviewees believed that the majority of audit firms 
especially the big ones do consider highly the importance of their independence and try 
hard to maintain it, as expressed in the following response: 
"I think a high level of competition between audit firms might undermine auditor 
independence with respect to some audit firms but as far as I know most audit firms and 
especially the big and medium ones in Libya seriously consider the importance of 
auditor independence and work hard to protect it when performing their it'ork" (EA 6). 
According to the previous results, it appears that auditor independence was perceived by 
the vast majority of the interviewees to be undermined when there is a high level of 
competition between audit firms. Small and new audit firms were seen as the most 
influenced by the negative effect of the high competition than big and medium audit 
firms. This perception, as expressed by the interviewees, was due to several 
characteristics that related to the small audit firms such as their 
lack of experience and of 
qualified staff. 
8.3.4: Auditors' economic dependence and interviewees' perceived auditor 
independence. 
The auditors' economic dependence on their audit clients was 
believed by the vast 
majority (80%) of the interviewees to undermine auditor 
independence (Appendix F, 
matrix 4). The interviewees believed that 
dependence on only a few clients will place the 
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auditor at the mercy of his client who feels that he is acting as the provider of the 
auditor's income and saving him from bankruptcy. Once again, this perception was 
noticed most in the cases of new and small audit firms. The following comments from 
some of the interviewees summarised their views relating to this situation: 
"Yes, I think auditor's economic dependence on one or a few clients tit-ill undermine 
their independence especially for the new and small audit firms. I believe these firms 
in order to maintain their audit fees would be willing to do any thing that keeps their 
clients happy, thus, their independence would be sacrificed" (BLO 3). 
"I believe that auditor independence would be undermined if the auditor was 
economically dependent on one or a few clients for his income. This problem could be 
worse in the case of new and small audit firms and less in the case of big audit firms 
who usually have a lot of clients. This diversity of big audit firms' clients make them 
more capable of handling disagreement situations with their audit clients than small 
and new audit firms " (IFA 4). 
"I believe that the auditors' economic dependence on one or a few clients to generate 
most of their income would definitely undermine their independence especially in the case 
of the small and new audit firms. We can describe the small audit firm's income as the 
employee's monthly salary who strongly depends on it to pay all his expenses. In contrast, 
big audit firms often have more audit and non-audit clients who they could generate their 
income from which gives them the ability to protect their independence " (EA 1). 
On the other hand, a small minority (20%) of the interviewees considered that auditor 
independence is not undermined when auditors depend only on one or a few clients for 
generating their income (Appendix F, matrix 4). They believed auditors' honesty, 
integrity, religious beliefs and their commitment to the standards and procedures of 
auditing prevent them from undermining their independence. The 
following comments 
illustrate some of the interviewees' views on this issue: 
"I do not think that auditor independence would 
be undermined when the auditor's 
income depends on one or a few clients. I believe that the process of auditing 
is 
performed according to a set of well known standards and procedures and 
auditors 
can not evade them just to keep their clients 
happy because auditors' integrity and 
religion beliefs work as forces to protect independence 
" (EA 2). 
Based on the above results, it appears that the auditors' economic 
dependence on one or 
a few clients was perceived by the interviewees 
to undermine auditor independence. 
Although this negative effect of the auditors' economic 
dependence on auditor 
independence was perceived to include most of the audit 
firms in the Libyan 
environment, small and new audit 
firms were perceived to be more affected 
by, this 
adverse impact than big audit firms. 
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8.3.5: Audit committees and interviewees' perceived auditor independence. 
As with the results of the questionnaires, all the interviewees (100%) agreed that the 
existence of an audit committee in the audit client's company will enhance auditor 
independence (Appendix F, matrix 5). They expressed the belief that the existence of an 
audit committee will provide auditors with the required protection that they need when 
being threatened by the management of the audit client in disagreement situations. In 
addition, interviewees believed that auditors will feel that there is another effective and 
qualified party other than the shareholders that would control and examine their 
performance. According to the interviewees, this would make auditors adopt more 
rigorous procedures when performing their audits. The following responses reflect these 
thoughts: 
"Of course, I believe that the existence of an audit committee in the audit client's 
company will enhance the independence of the auditor. In this case auditors will find 
some party that could support them in cases where disagreements occur with the 
client's management. Also I think auditors will try to perform auditing in a more 
responsible manner because they would know that there will be someone who is going 
to control and examine their work" (EA 3). 
"I think the existence or the lack of an audit committee in the audit client's company 
has a great effect on auditor independence. I believe when such committees do exist in 
the audit clients' companies, auditors will feel more secure and perform in a honest 
and professional manner their audit duties because of the protection that such 
committees would provide them with, especially, in cases of disagreement with the 
audit clients' management" (IFA 5). 
"Definitely, the existence of an effective audit committee in the audit client's company 
would enhance auditor independence because auditors will consider this committee as 
a control mechanism that will examine their work which in turn make them 
increase 
their care and adopt rigorous procedures. In addition, such committees would support 
the auditors' point of views when there is a disagreement situation with 
the clients' 
management" (TBA 3). 
Although all interviewees perceived the important role that an audit committee could 
play in enhancing auditor independence, some of 
them emphasised that an audit 
committee's members should be qualified, 
knowledgeable, honest, and good religious 
believers in order to be effective and efficient (Appendix 
F, matrix 5). The following 
responses of some of the interviewees outline their opinions 
regarding this issue: 
"I think the existence of audit committees could 
be helpful 
t 
in terms 
committees 
ofe enhancing 
auditor independence but only if the members of 
these 
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good religious believers, and qualified and have the required knowledge of the financial issues. Otherwise, I think the effect of these committees will be in the 
opposite direction " (BLO 2). 
"Without any doubt, audit committees have a tremendous influence on auditor independence. I believe this influence will be in a positive direction when these 
committees include members who are well experienced in the financial matters and have the desire to protect the public's interest otherwise, I think their effect will be on 
the negative direction on auditor independence " (EA 1). 
"Yes, the presence of an effective audit committee composed of non-executive 
directors who are honest, qualified and experienced members in the audit client's 
company will definitely enhance auditor independence " (IFA 2). 
Generally, the overall responses indicate that the interviewees perceived auditor 
independence is enhanced when an audit committee is composed of competent non- 
executive directors exists in the audit client's company. 
8.3.6: The status and financial condition of the audit client and interviewees' 
perceived auditor independence. 
Similar to the results from the questionnaire, most of the interviewees perceived auditor 
independence is enhanced when the audit client is in the state sector or when it is in a 
weak financial condition than when it is in the private sector or is in a strong financial 
condition (Appendix F, matrix 6). This belief was expressed by most of the interviewees 
from the four groups. The main reasons for this opinion were due to: a) the proper and 
fair appointment procedure that the state audit clients adopt when contracting with 
auditors; b) auditors' fear of litigation if they fail to conduct their audits 
in a professional 
and proper manner when clients are in the state sector or 
in weak financial conditions 
and c) the audit firms desire to maintain the current and potential revenues 
in the case 
when clients are from the private sector or 
in good financial conditions. For example, the 
following responses reveal these thoughts: 
"Of course, I think auditor independence could 
be affected by the financial condition 
of the audit client. Auditors would try not to 
lose clients who are in good financial 
condition in order to maintain their audit 
fees which in turn will undermine their 
independence. On the other hand, when an audit client 
is in a weak financial 
condition, auditors will adopt more rigorous procedures 
to be on the safe side in the 
case of any potential litigation. 
Also I think auditors will be more independent when 
the audit client is in the state sector than 
in the private sector owing to the way in 
which auditors are appointed" 
(IFA 3). 
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"I believe that auditor independence could be enhanced when the audit client is in the 
state sector because the appointment of the auditor is done by the Institute of Financial Auditing which is a government agency that will support auditors whereas in the private sector, the appointment of the auditor in reality would be through the 
management of the client. Also I think auditors will exhibit more independence when 
the audit client is in a weak financial condition in order to protect themselves in cases 
of potential litigations " (EA 2). 
"I am sure that auditor independence will be more enhanced when their audit clients 
are in the state sector because the Institute of Financial Auditing is responsible for 
their appointment and their remuneration whereas in the private sector, the client's 
management has the full authority to perform this duty. Moreover, I think when audit 
clients are in a weak financial condition, auditors will enjoy more independence due to 
their fear of litigation if these weak clients went bankrupt. On the contrary in the case 
of clients who are in strong financial condition where auditors' desire is very strong 
not to lose such clients for their generated income" (BLO 3). 
Contrary to these thoughts, one of the BLO interviewees believed that auditor 
independence would be more threatened when the audit client is in the state sector than 
when it is in the private sector. Commenting on this issue, he stated: 
"In the case of the state audit clients, auditors might counter strong pressure in order 
to deter them from giving qualified reports on the performance of the state audit 
clients that could be understood as negative indications of the government's economic 
policy. On the other hand, auditor independence would be more enhanced when the 
client is in the private sector due to the greater freedom that auditors could enjoy. 
With respect to the effect of the weakness or the strength of the financial condition of 
the audit clients, I believe auditor independence will not be influenced " (BLO 
4). 
A small minority (15%) of the interviewees believed that auditor independence will not 
be affected whether the audit client is in the state sector or in the private sector or 
whether the financial condition of the audit client is strong or weak 
(Appendix F, matrix 
6). This opinion is clearly expressed by the following interviewee's comments: 
"I believe auditor independence will not be affected whether the audit client 
is in the state 
sector or in the private sector or whether the 
financial condition of the audit client is strong 
or weak, because auditors perform their work according 
to a well determined set of 
standards and procedures that should 
be adopted with all kind of clients without 
distinguishing between them according to their status or their 
financial condition" (EA 5). 
Considering the above results which are consistent to those of 
the questionnaires, it can 
be suggested that auditor independence was perceived 
by the vast majority, of the 
interviewees from the four sample groups to be more enhanced when an audit client 
is in 
the state sector or in a weak financial condition 
than when the audit client is in the 
private sector or in a strong financial condition. 
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8.3.7: Personal relationships and interviewees' perceived auditor independence. 
As was expected based on the results of the questionnaire, the overwhelming majority 
(85%) of the interviewees believed auditor independence is undermined by the existence 
of personal relationships between auditors and their clients such as employment, close 
friendship and family relationship (Appendix F, matrix 7). Such relationships were 
perceived by the interviewees as dominant within developing societies such as Libya. In 
addition, most business relationships and economic transactions in the Libyan business 
environment were believed to be heavily dependent on these personal relationships. The 
threat to auditor independence from such relationships, as suggested by the interviewees, 
derived from the over-cosy relationship between auditors and their audit clients that 
would result in auditors reducing their professional detachment and objectivity. Also 
these relationships were perceived as potential threats to influence auditors' mental 
attitudes and opinions that may cause others to perceive them as not being independent. 
The following comments reveal some of the interviewees' thoughts regarding this issue: 
"I believe that auditor independence could be seriously undermined by personal 
relationships between the auditor and his audit client such as blood relationships and 
close friendship especially in Libyan society where most of the economic and business 
transactions greatly depend on these relationships. When such relationships are 
present in the auditing environment, auditors' mental attitude will be influenced by the 
impact of these relationships no matter how hard auditors try to be objective and 
professional" (BLO 2). 
"Definitely, personal relationships between auditors and their audit clients could 
seriously undermine their independence especially when these relationships are with 
senior persons in the audit client's company who can influence the decision-making 
process. As you know, in the Libyan society, personal relationships are very strong 
and most of the economic and business contacts are determined according to these 
relations, therefore, I think auditors would usually favour the opinion of their client's 
management in order not to upset their relatives or friends" (IFA 1). 
"To be fair, I don't deny that there are some auditors who don't let their personal 
relationships influence their professional judgments when conducting their audits but 
in a developing society such as Libya where personal relationships are very strong 
and important to determine many aspects of the social, economic and political 
activities, auditors will not be able to act in an objective manner. Even if auditors 
were being objective, others who have an interest in the audit client will raise 
questions about auditor independence if personal relationships existed between 
auditors and their audit clients " (TBA 3). 
Although the overwhelming majority of the interviewees agreed that personal 
relationships were perceived to pose a threat to auditor independence, one of the EA 
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interviewees believed that this issue is more related to new and small audit firms than 
big audit firms. Commenting on this issue, he stated: 
"Auditors are members of this interrelated society and definitely could be influenced by 
personal relationships such as close friendship and blood relationships but I think the 
negative side of the effect of such personal relationships would be more severe in the case 
of new and small audit firms than big audit firms due to different issues such as diversity 
of resources of income, excessive number of audit staff and experience " (EA 4). 
The negative impact of personal relationships on auditor independence was refuted by 
some (15%) of the interviewees who believed that such relationships will not deter 
auditors from objectively performing their professional duties. One of the EA 
interviewees stated: 
"We all know that personal relationships in Libyan society are very strong and affect 
our lives in one way or another but when it comes to the performance of auditors, the 
situation is completely different. Auditors are professional practitioners who conduct 
their work according to well established professional principles and procedures and 
will not change their opinions just to please their clients because they know that doing 
such actions would harm their reputation in the business environment in general and 
among other audit firms in particular " (EA 5). 
From the above comments, it seems that there is a general agreement between the 
interviewees except for a small minority that personal relationships were perceived to 
have an adverse impact on auditor independence due to its dominant and pervasive role 
in determining most of the social, economic and political activities in the Libyan society. 
8.3.8: Financial relationships and interviewees' perceived auditor independence. 
Consistent with the results of the questionnaire, nearly all (95%) of the interviewees 
believed that auditor independence is undermined when financial relationships existed 
between auditors and their audit clients (Appendix F, matrix 8). These relationships 
included shareholdings, the receipt of interest free loans and unpaid audit and non-audit 
fees. According to the interviewees' responses, such relationships would create a strong 
bond between auditors and their audit clients that would prevent them from objectively 
auditing their clients' financial statements because these situations make auditors think 
that they have an interest in the success and continuation of their audit clients' 
businesses. Therefore, auditors might tolerate misrepresentations in some of their 
Z2J 
clients' financial statements and not adopt rigorous procedures when conducting such 
audits. The following responses reveal some of the interviewees' opinions: 
"I believe auditor independence could be seriously undermined by the existence of financial relationships between auditors and their audit clients especially in developing countries such as Libya where most of the economic and business 
relationships heavily depend on financial and personal relationships. The presence of 
such relationships would result in creating a cosy relationship between auditors and 
their audit clients which will make auditors feel that they have an interest in the 
success and continuance of their audit clients' businesses which in turn results in 
auditors adopting less rigorous procedures when conducting their audits " (IFA 4). 
In the same vein, one of the BLO interviewees expressed his opinion when he stated: 
"Of course, financial relationships undermine auditor independence, especially when 
these relationships are with one of the members of the audit client's management or 
with persons who can effectively influence the process of decision-making" (BLO 1). 
One of the EA interviewees however, expressed less concern about the negative effect of 
the financial relationships on auditor independence especially for the big audit firms due 
to their desire to protect their reputation and the fear of litigation. Commenting on this 
issue, he stated: 
"Regardless of the potential negative effect of financial relationships between auditors 
and their audit clients on auditor independence that might occur, I believe that this 
effect will be at the minimum level and will not seriously undermine auditor 
independence, especially, in the case of the big audit firms where most of the auditors 
place high importance on their independence to protect their hard-earned reputation 
and to deter the fear of litigation " (EA 6). 
Based on the above results, it seems that the overwhelming majority of the interviewees 
believed that financial relationships such as shareholdings, the receipt of interest free 
loans and unpaid audit and non-audit fees would undermine auditor independence due to 
the auditors' interest that might be created on the success and continuation of their audit 
clients' businesses. 
8.3.9: Provision of (NAS) and interviewees' perceived auditor independence. 
When interviewees were asked about how they would perceive the effect of the 
provision of (NAS) by auditors to their audit clients on auditor independence, mixed 
views were expressed (Appendix F, matrix 9). Some (25%) interviewees believed that as 
long as auditors confine themselves only to the task of providing advice and are not 
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involved in the decision-making process their independence will not be undermined. 
Moreover, some others believed that when auditors provide NAS to their audit client, 
their independence would be enhanced due to the more knowledge and experience that 
auditors would gain of their clients' systems and operations which in turn would put 
them in a strong position to deal with any potential disagreement with their clients' 
management. The following comments reveal some of the interviewees' thoughts 
regarding this issue: 
"I think providing NAS by auditors to their audit clients will not undermine their independence as long as they avoid acting as decision makers because NAS are 
performed according to separate procedures and contracts with the audit client and have nothing to do with the audit work regardless of how much was its generated 
revenues. Also I think auditor independence could be more enhanced each time auditors 
provide successful advice because their clients would value them highly" (IFA 5). 
A similar opinion was expressed by one of the TBA interviewees when he stated: 
"Provision of NAS by auditors to their audit clients in my opinion could enhance their 
independence because auditors by doing so will gain more knowledge and experience 
of their audit client's businesses which in turn would put them in a strong position to 
resist any potential pressure or intimidation from the client's management to influence 
their opinions" (TBA 4). 
Contrary to this viewpoint, the vast majority of the interviewees believed auditor 
independence is seriously undermined when auditors provide NAS to their audit clients 
(Appendix F, matrix 9). The main reasons for this opinion, according to the 
interviewees, were that auditors will try to maintain the respectively high NAS fees 
compared with audit fees (55%), the cosy relationships that might develop between 
auditors and their audit client's personnel (60%), and that often auditors audit their own 
work or that work which they have advised to be implemented (60%). Regarding this 
issue, some of the interviewees' responses are provided in the following comments: 
"I think auditor independence could be seriously undermined when auditors provide 
NAS to their audit clients. This could be due to the sympathy that auditors would feel 
towards their audit clients that may develop as a result of comprehensive knowledge of 
their client's businesses which in many cases are the product of the auditors 
themselves " (EA 2). 
"Generally speaking, I think providing NAS to audit clients could enhance auditor 
independence, especially, if they were provided according to legal and obvious 
agreements, but unfortunately, most of the auditors in these 
days use NAS to increase 
their revenues and sometimes offer these services ftee of charge just to maintain 
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current clients or to gain more clients. Definitely, I believe such practices will undermine auditor independence " (BLO 4). 
"In general terms, I believe that providing NAS by auditors to their audit clients would not threaten auditor independence as long as they confined themselves only to the consultation process but unfortunately most auditors interfere in the decision making process. This situation puts the auditor in a position to audits his own advice which he wants always to be seen as useful and successful. Therefore, auditors might ignore or omit some or all of the financial statements' errors which he might believe were the 
product of his consultation " (TBA 1). 
In the light of the above results, it could be argued that auditor independence was 
believed by the vast majority of the interviewees to be threatened when auditors provide 
NAS to their audit clients. This belief was justified on several grounds such as the 
sympathy that auditors would feel towards their audit clients that may develop as a result 
of comprehensive knowledge of their client's businesses, to maintain current clients or 
to gain more clients and, that, often, auditors audit their own work or that work which 
they have advised to be implemented. 
8.4: Interviewees' attitudes regarding the accounting and auditing profession and 
its related environment. 
This section reports on the results of the last three questions of the interview guide (see 
Appendix C) those sought information about the attitudes of the interviewees from the 
four groups about the auditing and accounting profession and its related legal, 
professional and social environments in the Libyan context. The results of the collected 
qualitative data on these issues are presented as follows: 
8.4.1: The accounting and auditing profession and its related regulations. 
When interviewees were asked to express their opinions about whether they agree or 
disagree that Libyan laws include adequate and comprehensive rules and provisions to 
enhance and maintain auditor independence, a general agreement was indicated by 
almost all of (60%) the interviewees that Libyan laws contain some provisions to 
enhance and maintain auditor independence (Appendix F, matrix 10). The main 
problem, as the interviewees declared, however, is that even if such provisions and rules 
do exist, they are not actively and effectively implemented. Commenting on this 
issue. 
the following responses articulate some of the interviewees' thoughts: 
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"Despite the existence of some unclear and improper rules and provisions, I don't think that the Libyan laws contain the necessary comprehensive rules and provisions that could be adopted to penalise undisciplined auditors. As far as I am aware of, I have never heard of any incident where undisciplined auditors have been punished. The main reason for this is the lack of the supervising role that the Libyan Accountants and Auditors Association should perform " (EA3). 
"Yes, I think there are some provisions and rules in the Libyan laws related to the 
auditing and accounting profession to maintain and enhance auditor independence but 
the problem is that these rules and provisions have never been implemented. For example, i have never heard of any actions taken against those auditors who do not adhere to the 
principles and procedures of the accounting and auditing profession " (IFA 3). 
"I am not sure if the Libyan litigation system has any rules or provisions that could 
maintain and enhance auditor independence but the key issue is not the existence or the 
absence of such rules but the implementation of such regulations when needed. For 
instance, none of the auditing firms or their working staff in the Libyan context had faced 
any kind of punishment" (TBA 4). 
It appears from the above interviewees' responses the Libyan litigation system was 
believed not to include adequate and comprehensive rules and provisions to enhance and 
maintain auditor independence and even if such rules and provisions do exist. the 
obvious lack of actively and effectively implementing such litigation creates a real 
threatening environment that could undermine auditor independence. 
8.4.2: The accounting and auditing profession and its status in the Libyan society. 
Similar views were expressed by the vast majority (80%) of the interviewees when 
asked their opinion of how they perceive the status of the accounting and auditing 
profession in general and auditors in particular in terms of publicity, income and respect 
among other professions such as engineering, law and medicine in the Libyan society 
(Appendix F, matrix 11). A general belief was expressed that the accounting and 
auditing profession in general and auditors in particular are enjoying a reasonable level 
of respect and status in Libyan society, especially, in the last few years. According to the 
interviewees, this was due to the huge changes that the political, social and economic 
Libyan systems have witnessed during the last two decades. Some of interviewees' 
thoughts that illustrate this belief are presented as follows: 
"I think in the light of the dramatic changes that the Libyan society currently is 
witnessing in all aspects of life, an increasing acknowledgment of the 
importance of 
the auditing and accounting profession in general and auditors in particular and their 
role in the society is created. Thus, I believe in these 
days auditors are more known, 
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respected and well remunerated than they used to be a few years ago compared to 
other professions such as medicine, engineering and law" (TBA 4). 
"I believe that the accounting and auditing profession in general and auditors in particular did not enjoy sufficient status and respect in Libyan society many years ago due to the lack of information about their role in society and to the dominating 
political and economic environment which supported the state sector ownership 
philosophy. In the last few years however, the economic environment witnessed dramatic changes which resulted in the increase of the private sector's role which in turn increased the need for the services of the accounting and auditing profession. Libyan society started to recognise and consider the important role of the accounting 
and auditing profession in terms of status, respect and income compared to other 
professions such as engineering, law and medicine " (IFA 2). 
"Most of those who have connections in one way or another with the business and 
economic environment possess a reasonable knowledge of the accounting and auditing 
profession's role and they highly respect and value their role in the society. 
Nevertheless, a great portion of the ordinary people in the Libyan society are still 
unfamiliar and ignorant of the profession and its vital role compared to other 
professions such as engineering, law and medicine. This lack of knowledge, I believe, 
is due to the lack of knowledge of the profession especially in the light of the previous 
economic circumstances " (BLO 1). 
On contrast to above, some (20%) of the interviewees have different opinion (Appendix 
F, matrix 11). They think that the auditing and accounting profession in general and 
auditors in particular do not enjoy a reasonable status in the Libyan society and a great 
portion of the society still do not know what is the exact meaning of the accounting and 
auditing profession or its role in the society. Commenting of this issue, one of the EA 
interviewees stated: 
"I do not think that the auditing and accounting profession in general and auditors in 
particular are enjoying a reasonable status in the Libyan society compared with other 
professions such as engineering, law and medicine. According to me and my 
colleagues' knowledge and experience, most of the Libyan people do not know what 
the accounting and auditing profession means or what its role is. I believe that this 
lack of knowledge could be attributed to the absence of the LAAA's role in introducing 
the accounting and auditing profession and its essential role in the economic and 
business activities to the society" (EA6). 
In the light of the above analysis, and apart of a small minority of the EA interviewees, it 
seems that the overwhelming majority of the interviewees believed that the position of 
the accounting and auditing profession in general and auditors in particular 
in terms of 
publicity, income and respect is reasonably good compared with other professions 
in 
Libyan society. 
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8.4.3: The (LAAA) and its role in developing the accounting and auditing 
profession and in maintaining auditor independence. 
The role that the (LAAA) is performing in developing the accounting and auditing 
profession and in maintaining auditor independence was believed by ally (100%) of the 
interviewees to be neither adequate nor sufficient (Appendix F, matrix 12). The main 
reasons for the LAAA lack of performance, as the interviewees suggested, are due to: a) 
the shortage of professional and qualified accountants and auditors who develop 
themselves to perform such roles; b) the paucity of the LAAA's financial resources: and 
c) the absence of proper related laws that could support the LAAA in conducting its 
roles. The following comments explain the interviewees' thoughts about this issue: 
"I think the only role that the LAAA is performing since its establishment in 19-3 is 
the issue of new licences and collecting fees from its members for their membership. 
Other than this, the LAAA has never done anything which could be identified as real 
efforts to develop the accounting and auditing profession and to enhance auditor 
independence. This lack of the role of the LAAA could be attributable to different 
aspects such as the shortage of professional and qualified accountants and auditors, 
the paucity of the financial resources and the absence of proper related laws that 
could support the LAAA in conducting its roles " (EA 4). 
"I believe that the role of the LAAA in developing the accounting and auditing 
profession and supporting auditor independence, according to my naive knowledge of 
the auditing and accounting profession, and what we hear from others including 
auditors themselves, is insufficient due to several reasons such as the absence of 
qualified and specialised staff and a dearth of financial resources " (BLO 2). 
"According to my knowledge, I don't think that the LAAA is performing its role in 
developing the accounting and auditing profession and enhancing auditor 
independence as it should be. The failure to conduct any professional conferences and 
the absence of the professional principles and procedures that relate to the accounting 
and auditing practicing are clear examples of the inadequate role of the LAAA. I 
believe that this situation could be clown to different issues among them are its 
shortages of financial resources and its lack of qualified and knowledgeable 
accountants and auditors " (IFA 1). 
Based on the above results, it seems that the LAAA was believed by all of the 
interviewees not to be conducting the role in developing the accounting and auditing 
profession and maintaining auditor independence it should. This lack of 
LAAA role was 
attributed to several issues such as the shortage of professional and qualified accountants 
and auditors who could encourage themselves just to perform such roles, the scarcity of 
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its financial resources and the deficiency of related laws that could help the LA. -\. A in 
performing its roles. 
8.5: Summary. 
The results from the analysed data of the semi-structured interviewees were presented in 
this chapter. Interviewees were of similar profile, in terms of age, level of education and 
length of working experience as the respondents of the questionnaire 
The vast majority of the interviewees perceived small and sole practitioners to be less 
independent than big audit firms due to their dependence on one or few clients in 
generating their revenues and due to the personalised manner in which they approach the 
audit. Regarding the effect of audit firm tenure, most of the EA interviewees believed 
auditor independence to be enhanced due to the increased knowledge of the client's 
businesses as a result of lengthy tenure which will place the auditor in a strong position. 
Contrary to this, all other interviewees perceived auditor independence to be undermined 
owing to the negative effects of the cosy relationship that might develop between 
auditors and their client's personnel. 
Competition between audit firms were perceived by all of the interviewees to undermine 
auditors independence due to the unhealthy behaviour and practice that some of the audit 
firms conduct in order to maintain their current clients or to gain new ones. 
Concerning the auditors' dependence on their audit clients for generating their revenues, 
most interviewees perceived auditor independence to be undermined except for some of 
the EA interviewees who believed that auditor independence will not be affected due to 
the auditors' integrity, religious beliefs and their commitment to the standards and 
procedures of auditing. 
Existence of an audit committee in the audit client's company was perceived 
by all of 
the interviewees to enhance auditor independence because it will provide auditors «ith 
protection against any potential disagreement with the audit client's management. 
In 
addition, they believed that auditors will try to perform their 
duties in a more responsible 
manner because of their work will be controlled and examined 
by such committees. 
O 
Apart from a small minority of the interviewees, the vast majority perceived auditor 
independence to be enhanced when the audit client is in the state sector or in a weak 
financial condition than when it is in the private sector or in a strong financial condition. 
This belief was due to reasons such as the way in which auditors being appointed, the 
dependence on clients for income and the cosy relationship that might develop between 
auditors and their clients. 
Personal and financial relationships were perceived by all of the interviewees to 
undermine auditor independence especially in developing countries such as Libya where 
most of the economic transactions and business relationships seriously depend on such 
relationships. 
Finally, mixed perceptions were expressed by the interviewees regarding the effect of 
the provision of NAS by auditors to their audit clients. The vast majority of the 
interviewees however, believed that auditor independence was undermined due to the 
high fees from providing such services compared with the normal audit fees. On the 
other hand, a small minority of the interviewees thought that auditor independence will 
not be affected as auditors do not take part in the decision-making process. 
With regard to the interviewees' attitudes towards the accounting and auditing 
profession and its related environment in the Libyan context, the analysis of the 
qualitative data revealed that the Libyan legal system was believed not to include 
adequate and comprehensive rules and provisions to enhance and maintain auditor 
independence and even if such rules and provisions do exist, the obvious lack of actively 
and effectively implementing them creates a threatening environment that could 
undermine auditor independence. In addition, the overwhelming majority of the 
interviewees believed that the position of the accounting and auditing profession, in 
general, and auditors, in particular, in terms of publicity, income and respect 
is 
reasonably good compared with other professions such as engineering, 
law and 
medicine. Moreover, the LAAA was considered by all of the 
interviewees not to be 
conducting the role in developing the accounting and auditing profession and 
maintaining auditor independence it should be. 
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Finally, the analysis of the participants' responses from the four groups with respect to 
the last question in the interview guide (question No. 14), revealed that all the collected 
data was related to personal issues such as the expression of participants' interest in the 
study and its importance, and the questions were relevant and covered the issues related 
to the subject of the research (perceptions of auditor independence). 
ýý 
Chapter nine: 
Discussion of the main findings of the 
questionnaire and interviews 
Chapter nine: 
Discussion of the main findings of the questionnaire and interviews 
9.0: Introduction. 
This chapter aims to collate and analyse the main findings of the two data collection 
methods (self administrated questionnaire and semi- structured interviews) which were 
used in this study. In order to achieve this goal, the chapter is divided into three main 
sections. The first section presents a discussion of the main findings of the participants' 
perceptions relating to the effect of the nine selected factors on auditor independence. 
The second section assesses the participants' attitudes about the accounting and auditing 
profession and its related environment while the third section provides a brief summary 
of the chapter. 
9.1: Participants' perceptions of auditor independence. 
This section provides analyses on the main findings of the research relating to the 
perceived effect of audit firm size, audit firm tenure, competition, auditors' economic 
dependence on their audit clients, audit committees, status and financial condition of the 
audit client, financial relationships, personal relationships and provision of (NAS) on 
auditor independence held by the participants from EA, IFA, TBA and BLO. 
9.1.1: Audit firm size. 
The size of an audit firm is considered in the accounting and auditing literature as one of 
the factors that might have an impact on perceptions of auditor independence. The 
survey results of this study indicated that auditor independence was perceived by most 
of the participants to be undermined when an audit is performed by a sole practitioner or 
by a small audit firm. On the other hand, the vast majority of the participants 
believed 
that auditor independence is enhanced when an audit is performed 
by a large audit firm 
or by a medium sized audit firm. These results are consistent with previous empirical 
research which indicated that sole practitioners and small 
firms were perceived to be less 
independent than medium and large audit firms (Gul, 1989; 
Lindsay, 1990: Gul, 1991: 
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Gwilliam and Kilcommins, 1998; Beattie et al, 1999; Tahinakis and Nicolaou, 2004: 
Abu Bakar et al, 2005; Alleyne et al, 2006 a; Awadallah, 2006). This result, hoý\ eý er, is 
in contrast with previous results in the Libyan context where auditor independence NN as 
found not to be affected by the size of the audit firm (Almalhuf, 2003). This could be 
attributed to the huge changes that the Libyan economic and business environment have 
witnessed in the last few years where both audit firms and their audit clients increased in 
number and size. This environment may have influenced the participants' perceptions of 
the effect of the audit firm size on auditor independence. 
The main reasons for this lack of confidence in sole practitioners and small audit firms. 
as suggested by the interviewees, were due to the belief that small audit firms are 
economically dependent on one or few clients for their income, have a personalised 
mode of client service and close relationships with their clients, and their lack of 
experienced and qualified staff prevent them providing a high quality audit. These view s 
support those of Mautz and Sharaf (1961), Goldman and Barleu (1974), De Angelo 
(1981, b), Shockley (1982), Gul (1991) and Lennox (2005). For instance, Shockley 
(1982) and Gul (1991) contende that certain characteristics inherent in small audit 
practices may increase the danger of impaired independence, e. g. the nature of the 
typical small audit firm client or the tendency towards a more personal mode of service 
and close relationship with the audit client. 
The results of the survey also indicated that participants from the four targeted groups 
achieved a general consensus on the perceived effect of the size of the audit firm on 
auditor independence. The results from the one way ANOVA test revealed that there 
were no statistically significant differences between the responses of the participants 
from the four groups regarding the perceived effect of an audit firm size on auditor 
independence. 
9.1.2: Audit firm tenure. 
Audit firm tenure, which is the length of the relationship 
between an auditor and a 2iß en 
audit client, has been recognised in the accounting and auditing 
literature as having an 
impact on auditor independence. The results of this research 
indicated that auditor 
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independence was believed by the participants from the four groups to be undermined 
when an audit firm has been auditing the client for 2 to 4 years, 5 to less than 10 years 
and for 10 years and over. In contrast, auditor independence was perceived to be 
enhanced when an audit firm has been auditing the client for less than 2 years. These 
results are consistent with several previous empirical research (although different time 
periods were tested in some of the previous studies) that investigated the influence of the 
audit firm tenure on perceptions of auditor independence (Schleifer and Shockley. 1990; 
Mousa, 1992; Teoh and Lim, 1996; Hussey and Lan, 2001; Hudaib, 2003; Tahinakis and 
Nicolaou, 2004; Abu Bakar et al, 2005; Alleyne et al, 2006 a). Most of these studies had 
shown that the longer an audit firm has worked for the same audit client, the less 
independent its auditors were perceived to be. In contrast, this result is not in line with a 
number of previous results such as St. Pier and Anderson (1984), Geiger and 
Raghunandan (2002), Almalhuf, (2003), Ghosh and Moon (2005). For example, 
Almalhuf, (2003) in the Libyan context concluded that auditor independence was not to 
be affected by audit firm tenure. Once again, this could be attributed to the enormous 
changes in the economic and business environment in the last few years where audit 
firms and their audit clients increased in number and size. This environment may have 
made the contractual relationship between audit firms and their audit clients more longer 
term which may influence the participants' perceptions of the effect of the audit firm 
tenure on auditor independence. 
This lack of confidence in the independence of those auditors who have a lengthy tenure 
with their audit clients, as expressed by the interviewees, was due to the belief that long 
association between audit firms and their audit clients may lead to the development of an 
"over-cosy relationship" that could adversely affect auditor independence and reduce the 
reliability and quality of the audit. Similar thoughts were mentioned 
by Mautz and 
Sharaf (1961), Shockley (1982), Flint (1988) and Petty and Cuganesan (1996). For 
example, Flint (1988) contends that lengthy tenure 
in office may cause the auditor to 
develop "over-cosy relationships" as well as strong loyalty or emotional relationships 
with their clients, which could reach a stage where auditor 
independence is threatened. 
In the same vein, these concerns were raised 
by many professional bodies worldwide 
such as the ICAEW, IFAC, EFA and the 
APB. Regarding this issue, The Guide to 
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Professional Ethics Statement (GPES 1.201, Para 2.5) of the ICAE`V (1997) recognised 
that long association between auditors and their clients may be perceived as a threat to 
auditor independence and recommended that auditors should avoid situations that may 
lead them to become over-influenced or to be too trusting of the client's directors and 
key personnel which could consequently lead to audit staff being too sympathetic to the 
client interest. 
In order to protect auditor independence from the adverse effect of long audit firm 
tenure, audit firm rotation was suggested by some of the interviewees. This idea was 
previously recommended by many professional bodies. For instance, the Auditing 
Practices Board (APB, 2004) stated that UK audit engagement partners should rotate 
every five years and key audit partners should rotate every seven years. In addition, the 
EU directive (2004) also required mandatory rotation of auditors, and left the option for 
member states to require either a change of main audit partner dealing with an audited 
company every five years, if the same firm keeps the work, or a change of audit firm 
every seven years. 
The survey results also revealed a general agreement among participants from the four 
groups on the perceived effect of three of four auditor-client relationships that sought to 
investigate the impact of audit firm tenure on perceptions of auditor independence. Only 
one situation, which describes a relationship where an audit firm has been auditing the 
client for less than 2 years, produced statistically significant differences between 
participants' responses. In particular, respondents from the IFA group showed more 
confidence in the independence of auditors than the other three groups when an audit 
firm has been auditing the client for less than 2 years. 
9.1.3: Competition between audit firms. 
Competition among audit firms has been recognised as one of the main 
factors that 
might have an adverse impact on auditor 
independence by many interested parties such 
as academics, practitioners, professional, and regulatory 
bodies. For instance. the 
Commission on Auditor Responsibilities (Cohen 
Commission 1978) reported that 
excessive competition appears to present an 
independence problem to the accounting 
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profession in the US when it noticed that the pressure to attract and maintain clients had 
adversely influenced the quality of audit performed. In line with this argument, the 
empirical results of this study indicated that auditor independence was perceived to be 
undermined in three of the four auditor-client relationships that examined the effect of 
competition on auditor independence. These were: when there is a high level of 
competition, when audit firms use audit fee discounting and low-balling to get or to keep 
audit clients and when budget pressures are imposed by an audit firm on its staff (i. e. 
inadequate time to do a proper audit). The only situation that was perceived to enhance 
auditor independence in this regard was when competition among audit firms is little. 
These results are compatible with many previous empirical studies which revealed that 
auditor independence was perceived to be weakened as the level of competition between 
audit firms increases (Lindsay, 1990; Gul, 1991, Beattie et al, 1999; Hudaib, 2003: 
Awadallah, 2006; Alleyne et al, 2006 a). 
The main reasons for this perception, as explained by the interviewees, were due to 
several issues such as the absence of the role of the LAAA to organise and control 
accounting and auditing practices, a huge number of audit firms chasing a few large 
audit clients, the absence of related regulations and the shortage of qualified and 
experienced auditors. Such issues caused the interviewees' concerns that audit firms, in 
order to keep their current audit clients or to obtain new ones, might reduce the amount 
of audit work conducted or adopt less rigorous audit procedures. Similar thoughts were 
expressed by Shockley (1982) when he argued that auditor independence could be 
impaired if levels of competition in the audit market increase. 
Although the vast majority of the interviewees believed that auditor independence would 
be negatively influenced by high level of competition, a small minority thought 
that 
most of the audit firms, especially the large ones, 
do highly regard the importance of 
their independence and are trying hard to maintain it by adopting rigorous procedures 
in 
order to protect their reputation. This view was 
inline with previous results such as 
Knapp (1985), Gul (1989) and Almalhuf, (2003). In addition, the results of the sur`e% 
showed that there were statistically significant 
differences between the responses of the 
participants from the four groups regarding 
the perceived effect of the four auditor-client 
relationships that sought to examine the 
influence of competition between audit firms on 
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auditor independence. More specifically, when there is a high level of competition 
among audit firms, when audit firms use audit fee discounting and low-balling to obtain 
or to keep audit clients and when budget pressures are imposed by an audit firm on its 
staff the EA group showed less concern about auditor independence than the other three 
groups while when there is little competition among audit firms the TBA group 
expressed more confidence in auditor independence than the other three groups. 
9.1.4: Economic dependence on the audit client. 
It has been argued in the accounting and auditing literature that auditors' economic 
dependence will be very significant and may harm their independence if the percentage 
or income that auditors receive from one or few clients is very high. For example, Mautz 
and Sharaf (1961) contend that independence could be impaired if auditors were 
economically dependent upon clients for their income. The empirical results of this 
study showed that auditor independence was perceived to be undermined when auditors 
dependent heavily on their audit clients. This result is compatible with many previous 
empirical studies that sought to investigate the perceived effect on auditor independence 
when auditors depend on their audit client (Gul, 1991; Mousa, 1992: Gul and Tsui. 
1992; Bartlett, 1993; Teoh and Lim, 1996; Beattie et al, 1999; Geiger and Rama, 2003; 
Hudaib, 2003; Alleyne et al, 2006 a). 
The key reasons for this view, as revealed by the interviewees, were due to the belief 
that auditors' dependence on one or few clients will place them at the mercy of their 
audit clients who feel that they are acting as the provider of the auditors' income and 
preventing them from bankruptcy. This point of view was previously expressed by many 
academics (Mautz and Sharaf, 1961; Flint, 1988; Markelevich et al, 2005; Hoitash et al, 
2007) who considered that auditors' economic dependence on their audit clients could 
seriously damage their independence. For instance, Flint (1988) argued that 
if an audit 
firm's major source of income was provided by one client, the audit 
firm could face 
serious financial consequences. Furthermore, Hoitash et al 
(2007) contend that large fees 
paid to auditors that make them economically dependent on their clients may 
induce a 
relationship whereby the auditor becomes reluctant to make appropriate 
inquiries during 
the audit for fear of losing those fees. 
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In addition to the above academics, several professional bodies (i. e. AICPA, APB, 
IFAC) have drawn attention to the threat of economic dependence on auditor 
independence. In this respect, the APB (2004) stated that an audit firm is deemed to be 
economically dependent on a listed or non-listed audit client if the total fees for audit 
and all other services from that client and its subsidiaries which are audited by the audit 
firm represent 10% for listed clients and 15% for non-listed clients of the total fees of 
the audit firm. Similarly, the IFAC (2005) emphasised that a self-interest threat could be 
created due to the concern of the possibility of losing the client when the total fees 
generated by that client represent a large proportion of a firm's total fees. 
With regard to the different perceptions of auditor independence between the four 
groups relating to the three auditor-client relationships which examined the effect of 
auditors' economic dependence on their audit clients on independence, the survey results 
revealed that there was no consensus among the responses of the participants from the 
four groups. In particular, the responses of the EA group significantly differed from the 
other three groups indicating less threat to auditor independence when an audit firm's 
profitability depends on the retention of a specific audit client, when more than 10% of 
total firm's audit fees revenues were from one client and when an audit firm's desire is 
not to lose status by losing a key client. 
9.1.5: Audit committees. 
The existence of an audit committee in the audit client's company has been considered 
in the accounting and auditing literature to have a positive impact on auditor 
independence. The survey results of the current study indicated that nearly all of the 
participants perceived auditor independence to be enhanced when an audit committee 
composed of competent non-executive directors existed in the audit client's company. 
This result is compatible with several previous studies that aimed to 
investigate the 
perceived impact of audit committees on auditor independence 
(Jackson-Heard, 1987: 
Schleifer and Shockley, 1990; Teoh and Lim, 1996; Beattie et al, 
1999; Carcello and 
Neal, 2003; Abu Bakar et al, 2005). 
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This perception, as suggested by most of the interviewees, was due to the participants' 
belief that the existence of an audit committee will provide the auditors with the required 
protection that they need when being threatened by the audit clients' management in 
disagreement situations. In addition, they believed that auditors would feel that there is 
another effective and qualified party rather than the shareholders that could review and 
examine their performance. According to the interviewees, this would make auditors 
adopt more rigorous procedures when performing their audits. These thoughts were 
previously outlined by many authors (Goldman and Barleu, 1974; Green, 1994; 
Pomeranz, 1997; Arens et al, 2003). For example, Goldman and Barleu (1974) argue 
that if audit committees were established to deal with the selection of audit firms, the 
negotiation of fees, and matters relating to the auditor's replacement, the power of the 
client's management over the auditor would be limited. In the same vein, Pomeranz 
(1997) contended that auditor independence could be enhanced by a good link between 
the entire board of directors and the external auditor with the use of an audit committee. 
Furthermore, Arens et al (2003) contend that an audit committee opens up for the 
external auditor a direct channel of communication with the board to discuss audit 
progress and findings and helps resolve conflicts between him and client's management. 
In line with these arguments, many professional committees emphasised the crucial role 
that audit committees could perform in enhancing auditor independence. For example, 
the Cadbury Committee (1992) stated that the position of the auditor would be 
strengthened by providing a channel of communication and forum for issues of concern 
and a framework within which the external auditor can assert his independence in the 
event of a dispute with management and recommended in its 1992 Code of Best Practice 
that all listed companies establish an audit committee, composed of non-executive 
directors, a majority of whom are independent. Similar opinions were expressed 
in the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX, 2002) when stated that: 
"The audit committee of each issuer, in its capacity as a committee of the 
board of 
directors, shall be directly responsible for the appointment, compensation, and 
oversight of the work of any registered public accounting 
firm employed by that issuer 
(including resolution of disagreements between management and the auditor 
regarding financial reporting) for the purpose of preparing or 
issuing an audit report 
or related work". 
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To enable an audit committee to perform its role in an active and efficient manner, most 
of the interviewees emphasised the importance of the independence and competence of 
the audit committee's non-executive members. This result supports the argument of 
Carcello and Neal (2003) which states that audit committees whose members are more 
independent, have more governance expertise, more financial expertise, and own less of 
the company's stock, will be likely to support the external auditor when auditor-client 
disagreement arises. In addition, the results of the survey showed that there was a 
consensus among the responses of the participants when an audit committee existing in 
the audit client's company. Conversely, there was no consensus between them when 
there was no audit committee in the audit client's company. In particular, the EA group 
perceived less threat to auditor independence when there was no audit committee in the 
audit client's company than the other three groups. 
9.1.6: The status and financial condition of the audit client. 
It has been suggested in the literature that the status and financial condition of the audit 
client has an influence on auditor independence. Regarding this issue, the empirical 
results of this study showed that auditor independence was perceived to be more 
enhanced when the audit client is in the state sector or when it is in a weak financial 
condition than when the audit client is in the private sector or in a strong financial 
condition. This result is consistent with many previous empirical studies that 
investigated the impact of the status and financial condition of the audit client on auditor 
independence (Knapp, 1985; Beatie et al, 1999; Hudaib and Cooke, 2005; Abdul Nasser 
et al, 2006). 
According to the interviewees, such perceptions are due to several aspects including the 
proper and fair appointment procedures that the state audit clients adopt when 
contracting with auditors, auditors' fear of litigation if they 
fail to conduct their audits in 
a professional and proper manner in the case when clients are 
in the state sector or in 
weak financial conditions and the audit firms 
desire to maintain the current and 
potential revenues when clients are from the private sector or 
in good financial 
conditions. These thoughts were previously expressed 
by many academics. For 
instance, Hudaib and Cook (2005) contend that large audit clients who are 
in good 
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financial condition are less likely to receive a qualified audit report because of their 
ability to pay more audit fees than smaller clients that give them better bargaining 
power. In addition, Francis and Wilson (1988) argue that audit clients who are insolvent 
or are in a poor financial condition are more likely to seek auditors having high 
independence to enhance the confidence of shareholders and creditors as well as to 
lower the risk of litigation. 
In contrast, a small minority of the interviewees had a different opinion believing that 
auditor independence would not be affected whether the audit client is in the state sector 
or in the private sector or if the financial condition of the client is strong or weak. This 
finding was compatible with a number of previous empirical studies (Gul, 1989; Gorman 
and Ansong, 1998; Alleyne et al, 2006 a). The findings of the survey also revealed that 
there was no consensus among the participants from the four groups with respect to the 
effect of three of four auditor-client relationships that investigated the impact of the 
financial condition and status of the audit client on auditor independence. In particular, 
the BLO group were less confident of auditor independence than the other three groups 
when the audit client is in the private sector or in a strong financial condition while the 
IFA group expressed more confidence in auditor independence than the other three 
groups when the audit client is in a weak financial condition. The only auditor-client 
relationship that produced a consensus among the participants' responses from the four 
groups was when the audit client is in the state sector. 
9.1.7: Personal relationships. 
Personal relationships between auditors and their audit clients such as family, 
friendship 
and employment relationships have been suggested in the accounting and auditing 
literature as having an adverse impact on auditor independence. 
For instance, Flint 
(1988) argues that if an auditor-client personal relationship were 
developed, auditors' 
mental attitudes, judgments or opinions might be influenced and 
independence would be 
lost, if not in reality, the appearance of the auditors' 
independence will be questioned by 
other interested parties. In line with this opinion, the empirical results 
of this study 
showed that such personal relationships between auditors and 
their audit clients v ere 
perceived by the vast majority of the respondents 
to be undermining auditor 
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independence. This finding is also consistent with several prior studies that examined the 
influence of personal relationships on auditor independence (Lindsay et al, 1987; 
Schleifer and Shockley, 1990; Mousa, 1992; Kilcommins, 1997; Hudaib, 2003: Umar 
and Anandarjan, 2004). 
The harm that personal relationships between auditors and their audit clients could cause 
to auditor independence, as outlined by the interviewees, derived from the over-cosy 
relationship between auditors and their audit clients leading to auditors reducing their 
professional detachment and objectivity. Also these relationships (family, friendship and 
employment relationships) were perceived as potential influences on auditors' mental 
attitudes and opinions that may cause others to perceive them as not being independent. 
Several authors have drawn attention to the threat that such relationships could have on 
auditor independence. For example, Beasley et al (2000) argue that audit firms might be 
less likely to conduct an appropriate audit after an ex-auditor joins the audit client's 
management team because the remaining members of the audit team may be reluctant to 
question a former audit colleague who is now responsible for the audit, and the ex- 
auditor's knowledge of the audit firm's plans and strategies enables him to design a 
misstatement that is unlikely to be discovered by his former audit firm. 
The issue of personal relationships between auditors and their clients was also 
acknowledged by many professional bodies (i. e. AICPA, SEC, ICAEW and the IFAC). 
In this context, the IFAC (2005) stated that threats to auditor independence may be 
created when an immediate family member of the audit client is a director, an officer or 
an employee of the client and in a position to exert direct and significant authority over 
the preparation of financial statements. In addition, the IFAC (2005) warned that close 
relationships between auditors and members of the audit client other than 
immediate or 
close family members (e. g. director, an officer or an employee) may create 
threats to 
auditor independence. 
The survey findings also revealed that there was no consensus among 
the responses of 
participants from the four groups with respect to the three auditor-client 
relationships 
that sought to investigate the effect of personal relationships on auditor 
independence. 
More specifically, the participants from the EA group were 
less concerned on auditor 
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independence than respondents from the other three groups when an audit client's 
financial director was previously employed by the audit firm, when one of the client's 
executive directors is a close friend of one of the audit team and when one of the client's 
executive directors is a brother of one of the audit team. 
9.1.8: Financial relationships. 
Financial relationships between auditors and their audit clients other than audit fees such 
as shareholdings, the receipt of interest free loans and overdue audit and non-audit fees 
have been recognised in the accounting and auditing literature as possible threats to 
auditor independence. The results of this study revealed that auditor independence was 
perceived by the participants from the four groups to be undermined when such auditor- 
client relationships existed. This result is compatible with many previous empirical 
studies that investigated the impact of financial relationships between auditors and their 
audit clients (Mousa, 1992; Bartlett, 1993; Beattie et al, 1999; Hudaib, 2003; Alleyne et 
al, 2006 a). The main reason for this belief, as expressed by the interviewees, was due to 
the strong bond between auditors and their audit clients that could be developed which 
prevent auditors from objectively auditing their clients' financial statements. This is 
because such relationships make auditors think that they have an interest in the success 
and continuation of their audit clients' businesses. According to this view, auditors 
might tolerate misrepresentations in some of their clients' financial statements and not 
adopt rigorous procedures when conducting such audits. This result however, was not in 
line with Lindsay et al (1987). In this study, auditor independence was found not to be 
affected by financial relationships between auditors and their audit clients. This could be 
ascribed to culture differences between the Libyan society and the Canadian society 
which might have affected the perceived impact of financial relationships 
between 
auditors and their audit clients on auditor independence. 
This threat of financial relationships between auditors and their audit clients other than 
audit fees on auditor independence was recognised 
by several professional bodies 
worldwide. For example, in the UK the APB 
(2004) acknowledged that auditor's 
objectivity and independence could be threatened 
due to the existence of financial 
relationships between auditors and their audit clients and consequently 
prevented audit 
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firms, any partner or members of the audit firm who are able to influence the conduct 
and outcome of the audit, and any immediate family member of such persons from 
holding any direct or "material" indirect financial interest in the audit client or in an 
affiliate of an audit client. In the same vein, the IFAC (2005) adopted similar provisions 
to that of the APB and prohibited auditors or their immediate family, members from 
evolving any direct or "material" indirect financial relationship with the audit client. 
The empirical results of this study, however, indicated that there was no consensus 
among the participants' responses in two of the three auditor-client relationships which 
sought to examine the impact of financial relationships between auditors and their audit 
clients on auditor independence. In particular, when an audit firm has unpaid audit and 
non-audit fees from the previous years, respondents from the EA group were less 
concerned about auditor independence than the other three groups, whereas, respondents 
from the IFA group showed more concern than the other participants about auditor 
independence when an auditor in an audit firm has received an interest free loan from an 
audit client. 
9.1.9: Provision of (NAS). 
It has been argued in the accounting and auditing literature that among all the identified 
factors that might threaten perceptions of auditor independence is the provision of NAS 
by auditors to their audit clients. The results of this study indicated that most of the 
participants from the four groups believed that auditor independence was undermined 
when auditors provide NAS to their audit clients. This result is compatible with many 
previous empirical studies that aimed to examine the influence of the provision of 
NAS 
on auditor independence (Knapp, 1985; Jackson-Heard, 1987; 
Lindsay et al. 1990: 
Bartlett, 1993; Teoh and Lim, 1996; Beattie et al, 1999; Canning and Gwilliam. 1999; 
Hussey and Lan, 2001; Sharma and Sidhu, 2001; Hudaib, 
2003; Tahinakis and Nicolaou. 
2004; Abu Bakar et al, 2005; Quick and Rasmussen, 2005; Awadallah, 
2006; Alle` ne et 
al, 2006 a). 
The main reasons for this opinion, as outlined 
by the interviewees, were that auditors 
will try to maintain the respectively high 
NAS fees compared with audit fees. the cosh 
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relationships that might develop between auditors and their audit client's personnel, and 
that often auditors audit their own work or that work which they have advised to be 
implemented. These were previously expressed by several academics (Mautz and 
Sharaf, 1961; Shockley, 1982; Flint, 1988; Clikeman, 1998; Firth, 2002; Quick and 
Rasmussen, 2005; Soltani, 2007). In relation to this issue, Mautz and Sharaf (1961) 
argue that audit firms by providing NAS to their audit clients impair auditor 
independence because giving advice and decision making cannot be separated and the 
auditor who provides NAS cannot avoid participation in management decisions. Similar 
concerns were expressed by Firth (2002) when he contended that the provision of NAS 
to an audit client will increase auditor's economic dependence on that client. As a result. 
a decrease in auditor independence or a perception of a lack of independence will occur. 
He stated that the auditor will be reluctant to adversely report on items that are the result 
of, or partly the result of, his/her consultancy advice. 
In addition to these academics, several professional bodies (i. e. AICPA, SEC, ICAEW. 
the EU Directive and the IFAC) shared similar concerns when they argued that the 
provision of both services (auditing and NAS) by audit firms to their audit clients can 
create a conflict of interest that might undermine auditor independence. For instance, in 
the UK, the APB (2004) emphasised that a threat to auditor's objectivity and 
independence arises due to the provision of NAS by audit firms to their audit clients and 
recommended that audit firms should not undertake any engagement to provide NAS 
where auditors would place significant reliance up on those NAS as part of the audit of 
the client's financial statements. The threat to auditor independence due to the provision 
of NAS has led some countries such as Japan, France, Belgium, 
Italy and Kenya to 
prohibit auditors from supplying NAS to their audit clients. 
On the other hand, a small minority of the participants 
believed that the provision of 
NAS will not impair auditor independence as long as auditors confined 
their provision of 
NAS to advice and are not involved in the 
final decision-making process of the audit 
client. Moreover, they believed that auditor 
independence would be enhanced if auditors 
provide NAS to their audit clients. 
These results are consistent with several previous 
empirical studies (Lindsay et al, 1987; 
Gorman and Ansong. 1998; Defond et al. 2002; 
Almalhuf, 2003; Geiger and Rama, 2003; Umar and 
Anandarajan, 2004). The positi,, e 
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effect of the provision of NAS on auditor independence, as suggested by the 
interviewees of the current study, was due to the greater knowledge and experience that 
auditors would gain about their clients' systems and operations which in turn would put 
them in a strong position to deal with any potential disagreement with their clients' 
management. Similar thoughts were previously mentioned by many authors (Higgins, 
1962; Carey and Doherty, 1966; Goldman and Barleu, 1974; Grout et al, 1994; 
Arrunada, 1999; Hussey and Lan, 2001; Defond et al, 2002). For example, Arrunada 
(1999) argue that the provision of NAS by auditors to their audit clients reduces total 
costs, increases technical competence and motivates more intense competition and it 
does not necessarily impair auditor independence or the quality of NAS. Furthermore, he 
contended that the provision of such services can in fact enhance professional judgement 
through the increased familiarity the auditor will have with the client's business. 
In addition, the survey results revealed that there was no consensus among the responses 
of the participants from the four groups on the perceptions of auditor independence with 
regard to three of the four auditor-client relationships that sought to investigate the effect 
of provision of NAS on auditor independence. In particular, the respondents from the 
EA group expressed more confidence in auditor independence than the other three 
groups when an audit firm does not provide any kind of NAS to its audit clients while 
they showed less concern about auditor independence than the other three groups when 
an audit firm's fees from NAS are 100% or more of audit fees. The results also showed 
that participants from the BLO group perceived less threat to auditor independence than 
the other three groups when an audit firm's fees from NAS are 25% to 49 % of audit 
fees. The only situation that produced consensus among the responses of the participants 
from the four groups on the perceptions of auditor independence was when an audit 
firm's fees from NAS are 50% to 99% of audit fees. 
In general, it seems that the results of this study to a great extent are 
in line with 
previous research with regard to the perceived effect of 
the nine selected factors on 
auditor independence. Regarding the significant 
differences' of perceptions of auditor 
In many cases statistically significantly 
differences among groups resulted despite basic agreement 
(disagreement) of all groups on the effect of addressed auditor-client 
relationships on auditor independence. This 
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independence among the participants from the four groups, it appears that the 
respondents from the EA group perceived less threat to auditor independence than the 
other three groups in auditor-client relationships perceived to be as a threat to auditor 
independence. On the other hand, they showed more confidence in auditor independence 
than the other three groups in auditor-client relationships which were perceived to be as 
enhancing auditor independence. This could be attributed partly to the different 
perspectives of each group. Usually external auditors perceive themselves as qualified 
professional practitioners who can protect and maintain their independence from being 
affected by any kind of auditor-client relationship. In this regard, Beattie et al (1999) 
contend that due to their greater understanding of the investigated issues and the strong 
influence of professional norms on their beliefs, auditors are likely to exhibit greater 
confidence in their independence than are other interested parties. Empirically speaking, 
this result is consistent with the findings of other research (Bartlett, 1993; Lindsay et al, 
1987; Beattie et al, 1999). For example, Beattie et al (1999) found that external auditors 
perceived less threat to auditor independence compared to the other participants of their 
study (users of financial statements). 
9.2: Participants' attitudes about the auditing and accounting profession and its 
related environments. 
The purpose of this section is to analyse the key findings of the research relating to the 
attitudes of the participants about the accounting and auditing profession and 
its related 
environment in the Libyan context. 
With respect to the related regulations to the accounting and auditing profession, 
it has 
been suggested that in many developing countries accounting and auditing practices are 
directly regulated. The major influence on accounting and auditing practices 
in Libya 
has come from several regulations such as the 
Libyan Commercial Code, Income Tax 
Law, Petroleum Law, the Accounting and Auditing Profession 
Law. The survey results 
of this study indicated that a great portion of 
the respondents from the four groups 
disagreed that rules and regulations in the 
Libyan laws include comprehensive 
was caused by situations where one group perceived 
auditor independence to be seriously undermined 
(seriously 
enhanced) while all other groups perceived auditor 
independence to be slightly undermined (slightl\ enhanced) 
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provisions that could enhance and maintain auditor independence. This opinion is 
consistent with previous research on Libya, where rules and regulations in the Libyan 
laws were seen as not containing the specific and detailed provisions necessary to help 
developing accounting and auditing practices and maintaining auditor independence 
(Kilani, 1988; Mousa, 1992; Buzied 1998; Almalhuf, 2003; Ahmed, 2004). For instance, 
Buzied (1998) concluded that only little details on the form and design of the accounting 
records have been given attention in most of the accounting and auditing related Libyan 
laws and the principles and standards that should be adopted when practising the 
accounting and auditing profession were not specified. Furthermore, Mousa (1992) 
concluded that Libyan regulations are deficient in many provisions and rules that could 
contribute to develop the accounting and auditing profession and increase the level of 
auditor independence in Libya. Similar results were reached by Almalhuf (2003) when 
he found that 37% of the participants of his study disagreed with a statement saying that 
Libyan laws included objective rules and provisions that could protect and enhance 
auditor independence. 
Similarly, a general consensus was expressed by almost all of the interviewees that some 
of the Libyan laws contain few provisions to enhance and maintain auditor 
independence but the main problem, as the interviewees declared, however, is that even 
if such provisions and rules do exist, they are not actively and effectively implemented. 
The main reasons for this, as suggested by the interviewees, were due to the weakness of 
the LAAA to perform its role and to the strong financial and personal relationships that 
are dominant in Libyan society which creates a real threat to auditor independence. This 
result supports what Mousa (2005) had suggested when he mentioned that 
in addition to 
the small size and the limited authority of the LAAA, the 
lack of statutory or other 
governmental regulations requiring any form of corporation to 
have its financial 
statements examined and reported upon by an independent external auditor, are 
the main 
reasons for its weakness. In addition, Kilani (1988) contends that 
the appointment of 
external auditors in Libya depends to a great extent on social and 
family ties. 
Regarding the status of the accounting and auditing profession 
in general and auditors in 
particular in the Libyan society, the survey results showed 
that the accounting and 
auditing profession in general and auditors 
in particular are perceived to enjoy 
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reasonable respect and status in Libyan society by the sample groups except for the EA 
group who perceived the opposite. This view was shared by nearly all of the 
interviewees who showed a general agreement that the accounting and auditing 
profession in general and auditors in particular are enjoying a reasonable level of respect 
and status in Libyan society, especially, in the last few years due to the huge changes 
that the political, social and economic systems have witnessed. 
On the other hand, some of the EA interviewees had different opinions. They thought 
that the auditing and accounting profession in general and auditors in particular do not 
enjoy a reasonable status in the Libyan society compared with other professions such as 
engineering, law and medicine, and a great portion of the society still do not know what 
is the exact meaning of the accounting and auditing profession or its role in the society. 
This result is broadly in line with some previous research in the Libyan context. For 
example, Buzied (1998) concluded that the status and role of the accounting and 
auditing profession in Libya is not well recognised by the government or the public. 
Furthermore, he goes on to say that: 
"The status of current accounting in Libya is that there is no comprehensive or 
authoritative set of accounting and auditing framework on which accounting in Libya 
can be developed, organised, controlled, and evaluated" (Buzied, 1998: 168). 
Considering the LAAA and its role in developing the accounting and auditing profession 
and in maintaining auditor independence, the survey results showed that the vast 
majority of the participants from the four groups disagreed that the LAAA plays an 
important role in either developing the accounting and auditing profession or in 
maintaining auditor independence. This result is broadly consistent with previous 
research in Libya where the LAAA was seen as not sufficiently and effectively 
performing its role. For instance, several remarkable points 
have been concluded by 
many researchers such as the failure to develop accounting and auditing standards or a 
code of ethics, its limited role in conducting effective research programmes 
and its weak 
professional control over accounting practices and policies, and 
the deficiencies in 
monitoring accounting education (Kilani, 
1988; Bengharbia, 1989; Mahmud, 1997: 
Buzied, 1998; Ahmed, 2004). In this regard, Mahmud 
(1997) concludes that the 
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accounting profession in Libya is not in a position to influence the development of 
accounting practices in general and in oil and gas accounting in particular. 
The main reasons for this limited role of the LAAA as suggested by the interview ees, 
were due to several issues such as the shortage of professional and qualified accountants 
and auditors who perform such roles, the paucity of the LAAA's financial resources and 
the absence of laws that could support the LAAA in conducting its roles. This result is 
consistent and gives support to the above findings that there is a lack of regulations 
which could help the LAAA in performing its role and achieving its objectives. 
9.3: Summary. 
This chapter has provided analysis on the main findings of the questionnaires and 
interviews which were used to collect data related to the perceptions of the participants 
from the four groups with respect to the effect of the nine selected factors on auditor 
independence in addition to their attitudes about the accounting and auditing profession 
and its related environments in the Libyan context. In the light of the comparisons of the 
results of this study with other national and international research on auditor 
independence, it seems that they are compatible to a great extent. In particular, auditor 
independence was perceived by the participants of this study to be enhanced when an 
audit is performed by a big or medium audit firm, the existence of an audit committee in 
the audit client's company, the audit client is in the state sector or is in a weak financial 
condition and when the audit firm did not provide any kind of NAS to its audit clients. 
On the other hand, auditor independence was perceived to be undermined 
in when an 
audit is performed by a sole practitioner or by a small audit 
firm, an audit firm audit the 
same audit client for a long period, competition exists 
between audit firms, auditors are 
economically dependent on their audit clients, the audit client 
is in the private sector or 
is in a strong financial condition, personal and 
financial relationships and when NAS 
were provided by the audit firm to its audit clients. 
In addition, it was revealed that rules and regulations 
in the Libyan laws were seen as 
not including comprehensive provisions that could enhance 
and maintain auditor 
independence. The accounting and auditing profession 
in general and auditors in 
2j2 
particular were perceived to enjoy reasonable respect and status in Libyan society by the 
sample groups except for the EA group who perceived the opposite. Also the LAAA was 
considered to be not performing an important role in either developing the accounting 
and auditing profession or in maintaining auditor independence. 
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Chapter ten: 
Summary and conclusion 
Chapter ten: 
Summary and conclusion 
10.0: Introduction. 
The main aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of and a conclusion to the entire 
study. In order to achieve this broad aim, the chapter is divided into five sections. The 
first section provides an overview of the insights and discussions presented in the 
previous chapters. Section two presents a summary of the main findings of the empirical 
part of the study. The third section outlines the research implications and 
recommendations arising out of the literature review and the analysis undertaken 
following the field study. The contributions of the study to the auditing knowledge are 
illustrated in section four. Finally, the fifth section discusses the limitations of the study 
and provides suggestions for areas of future research. 
10.1: An overview of the study. 
This study has focused on investigating perceptions of auditor independence in the 
Libyan context as held by four groups, namely, EA, IFA, TBA and BLO. Nine selected 
factors which were deemed in the accounting and auditing literature to have an impact 
on auditor independence were examined. These were audit firm size, audit firm tenure, 
competition between audit firms, auditors' economic dependence on their clients, audit 
committees, status and financial condition of the audit client, financial and personal 
relationships and the provision of (NAS). In addition to examining the perceived effect 
of the above factors on auditor independence, the study sought to 
investigate the 
attitudes of the participants on the accounting and auditing profession and 
its related 
environments in the Libyan context. 
The study consisted of ten chapters. Chapter one addressed several 
issues including the 
identification of the area of study, research objectives and questions, 
the chosen research 
methodology and the structure of the research. 
There are several reasons for conducting 
this study. These include: 
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" The conflicting results that some of the studies have arrived at with respect to 
the effect of certain factors on the perceptions of auditor independence. 
" Relying on either quantitative or qualitative approaches instead of using both of 
them. 
" Most of the previous studies in the area of research were conducted in developed 
countries, whereas research in developing countries, among which is Libya, has 
received little attention. 
In addition to the above reasons, to the best of researcher's knowledge, no similar study 
has been conducted in Libya. The Libyan accounting and auditing profession offers a 
valuable research context as it is dealing with an emerging developing market where 
tremendous changes in the social, political and economic systems are taking place. 
Furthermore, the findings of this study are pertinent in the light of the current debate 
about the role, regulation and quality of auditing services and concerns over the possible 
effect of the latest business scandals on auditor independence. 
Chapter two presented a framework within which the study is going to be conducted. An 
overview of several aspects of the Libyan environment in relation to its geography, 
population, history, culture, political system, economic developments and accounting 
and auditing profession and the profession related regulations was outlined in this 
chapter. It was revealed that the Libyan economy was very poor and suffering 
from 
different problems before the discovery of oil in the late 1950's. A dramatic changes and 
ambitious development plans were undertaken by successive Libyan governments after 
the discovery of oil. Recently, the country is experiencing major changes 
in its socialist- 
oriented economy in order for it to become a more capitalist-oriented economy. 
With 
regard to the accounting and auditing profession 
in Libya, this chapter shows that the 
accounting and auditing profession is oriented towards those of 
the UK and the USA. 
This orientation was due to the impact of these two countries on 
the profession via oil 
companies, aid agencies, construction companies and accounting 
and auditing education 
systems. In addition, it has been found that a number of 
the accounting and auditing 
related regulations were issued a long time ago and 
that there is an urgent need for them 
to be updated. 
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Chapters three and four extensively reviewed the previous theoretical and empirical 
literature relating to the area of study. In particular, chapter three provided a review of 
the development, nature and the importance of auditor independence. Based on this 
review, it was found that the concept of auditor independence has evolved over the years 
through several stages in the history of the accounting and auditing profession which in 
turn has developed as a result of socio-economic changes. The need for auditor 
independence became an important issue in times where a separation of the management 
functions from the ownership developed, especially after the beginning of the industrial 
revolution in the late eighteenth century. The meaning of auditor independence is 
considered by the auditing professional bodies and researchers as having two separate 
dimensions, namely, `Independence in fact' and `Independence in appearance'. The 
former refers to the mental attitude of the auditor in terms of professional objectivity, 
while the latter refers to the public's perceptions of the auditor independence. 
After a comprehensive review of the previous literature, chapter four presented the most 
significant factors which were considered to be relevant for the purpose of this study'. 
These included the size of the audit firm, tenure of the audit firm, competition among 
audit firms, auditors' economic dependence on their audit clients, audit committees. 
status and financial condition of the audit client, personal relationships, financial 
relationships and provision of (NAS). In this review, inconclusive results were found 
with regard to the perceived effect of the above factors on auditor independence. 
In 
particular, some studies had found a positive effect of certain 
factors on auditor 
independence while others found the same factors to have had a negative effect. 
In 
addition to these two contradicting results, other studies concluded 
that auditor 
independence was perceived not to be influenced by these same 
factors. In the light of 
these results, chapter four has concluded that auditor 
independence is still a contentious 
issue which need further investigation, especially, 
in a developing country such as Libya 
where research on this issue is very rare. 
Chapter five described the research methodology. The two main paradigms, 
i. e. the 
Positivist and the Phenomenological, were 
illustrated in this chapter. In addition. 
1- For more details of the main criteria which were considered 
for the selection of such factors, refer to chapter 
one. 
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descriptions of the three dominant research approaches (the quantitative approach, the 
qualitative approach and the mixed research approach) were provided. These 
descriptions included the meaning and purpose, and strengths and weaknesses of each 
approach. Moreover, questionnaires and interviews as the main methods of collecting 
primary data were outlined in terms of the design and the content of the questionnaire, 
interview development and procedures, piloting the questionnaire and the interview 
questions. 
The chosen research methodology and the justification behind it are outlined in chapter 
six. This research has adopted both quantitative and qualitative methods (mixed research 
methodology) to enrich the research findings and to gain advantage from data 
triangulation. Questionnaires were used to measure perceptions of the participants from 
the four target groups with regard to the effect of the nine selected factors and the target 
groups' attitudes about the accounting and auditing profession and its related 
environment in the Libyan context. The main advantages of this method, as mentioned 
in chapter six, are: a) all completed responses could be collected within a short period of 
time; b) the quick clarification of any doubts that the respondents might have on any 
question; c) the opportunity for introducing the research topic and to motivate the 
respondents to offer their frank answers; d) administering questionnaires to a large 
number of individuals, is less expensive and consumes less time than interviewing; and 
e) it does not require as much skill to administer the questionnaire as to conduct 
interviews. 
Copies of the questionnaires were personally distributed to randomly selected members 
of 300 external auditors, 200 auditors from the Institute of 
Financial Auditing, 125 
auditors from the Taxation Board and 100 bank loan officers. 
An overall response rate 
of 57 % was achieved. To gain more in-depth understanding of perceptions 
and to 
confirm and clarify the findings derived from the questionnaire survey, 
20 semi- 
structured interviews were conducted. These 
included 6 members of the EA group, 6 
members of the IFA group, 4 members of the 
TBA group and 4 members of the BLO 
group. The field work was conducted in Libya over a period 
of three months from first 
of July to the end of September 2008. Three main analysis 
techniques where used in this 
study to produce the findings from the quantitative and 
qualitative data. These included 
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descriptive statistics, parametric tests such as the one-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) and Duncan post-hock comparison test, and content analysis. 
Chapters seven and eight reported the findings of the two data collection methods (self 
administrated questionnaire and semi-structured interviews) which were used in this 
study. In particular, chapter seven presented the results from the analysed data from the 
questionnaire. These included results relating to part one, two and three of the 
questionnaire. In part one, participants were asked to provide some information about 
their background such as gender, age, and occupation. Part two of the questionnaire has 
comprised 31 statements, which describe different auditor-client relationships followed 
by a five-point Likert scale and designed to measure perceptions of the participants 
regarding the effect of the nine selected factors on auditor independence. The last part of 
the questionnaire tended to measure the attitudes of the participants about the auditing 
and accounting profession and its related environments in the Libyan context, whereas 
chapter eight illustrated the results derived from the analysis of the semi-structured 
interviewees. The interview guide of this study included 13 questions designed to gather 
information related to the participants of the study in terms of their background, their 
perceptions of the effect of the nine selected factors on auditor independence and their 
attitudes about the accounting and auditing profession and its related environments in 
the Libyan context. 
Chapter nine covered a broad discussion on the main findings of the study relating to the 
perceptions of the participants from the four targeted groups with respect to the effect of 
the nine selected factors on auditor independence and to their attitudes about the 
accounting and auditing profession. Based on the comparisons of the results of this study 
with other previous research on auditor independence, it seems that they are in line to a 
great extent. 
Chapter ten, the last chapter of this study, is an overview of the entire study, a summary 
of the research findings, the research recommendations, highlighting the study's 
potential contribution to the accounting and auditing profession and literature. Finally, 
the chapter explained the limitations of the study and suggested areas of future research. 
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10.2: Summary of the main findings of the study. 
This section provides a summary of the main findings of the research relating to three 
main issues. These are the background information of the participants in this study, the 
perceived effect of the nine selected factors on auditor independence and the attitudes 
about the accounting and auditing profession and its related legal, educational, social 
and economic environments held by the participants from the four targeted groups. 
10.2.1: Background information. 
The first part of the questionnaire and the first question of the interview guide were 
concerned with general information about the participants of the study such as their 
gender, age, level of education, subject of study and experience. Based on the analysis of 
data gathered from both the questionnaires and the interviews, it was found that the vast 
majority of participants in the current study were 30 years old and over, possessed high 
levels of education, specialised in accounting and were experienced enough to 
understand the purpose of the study and were able to participate in it in a responsible 
manner. Accordingly, the study concluded that the responses of participants from the 
four groups appeared to be authoritative. 
10.2.2: Perceptions of auditor independence. 
With regard to the perceived effect of the nine selected factors on auditor independence, 
different views were found to be held. In particular, when participants were asked to 
express their opinions on the effect of the size of an audit firm on auditor 
independence, 
sole practitioners and small audit firms were perceived to 
be less independent than 
medium and big audit firms. The main reasons 
for this belief, as suggested by the 
interviewees, were due to the dependence of the small audit 
firms on one or few clients 
in generating their revenues, the personalised manner 
in which they approach the audit 
and to their lack of expertise and inability to provide 
different kind of services. 
An audit firm tenure was found to create a significant 
threat to auditor independence. 
The participants in the questionnaire perceived auditor 
independence to be undermined 
when an audit firm has the same audit client 
for a long period of time. This perception 
was similarly expressed by the interviewees when 
asked for their opinions on the 
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influence of an audit firm tenure on auditor independence. The interviewees believed 
that an extended auditor-client relationship could result in the auditor becoming cosy- in 
his/her relationship with his/her client and this may make him/her become complacent in 
his/her audit performance or result in adopting less rigorous procedures. Although the 
vast majority of the interviewees held this view, a small minority of them thought that 
auditor independence could be enhanced due to the long relationship between auditors 
and their audit clients. They believed that a long period of audit firm tenure with the 
same audit client could be beneficial for both the audit firm and the audit client. They 
thought long audit firm tenure ensures that the auditor gains more knowledge of his 
client's business which puts him in a position to objectively conduct the audit. 
Concerning the effect of competition between audit firms on auditor independence, it 
was concluded that a high level of competition between audit firms and related issues 
such as fee discounting (low-balling) and budget pressures to obtain or to keep audit 
clients are perceived as threats to auditor independence by the majority of the 
respondents to the questionnaire. Consistent with this result, the participants in the semi- 
structured interviews indicated several reasons why competition is perceived as 
undermining auditor independence. These included the failure of the LAAA to organise 
and control accounting and auditing practices, the large number of audit firms who are 
chasing a few large audit clients, the absence of related regulations and the shortage of 
experienced auditors, especially in small and new audit firms. 
Regarding the impact of auditors' economic dependence on their audit clients, 
respondents to the questionnaire considered auditor independence to 
be undermined 
when auditors depend heavily on their audit clients for generating their 
income. Similar 
considerations were shared by the interviewees. The 
justification for this belief, as the 
interviewees suggested, is that dependence on just one or a 
few clients will place the 
auditor at the mercy of his/her client who will feel that 
it is acting as the chief provider 
of the auditor's income and preventing him/her from 
bankruptcy. 
When an audit committee existed at an audit client, auditor 
independence was perceived 
by the sample groups to be enhanced. In contrast, auditor 
independence was perceived to 
be undermined if audit client does not have an audit committee. 
Compatible with this 
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view, the interviewees considered that the existence of an audit committee in an audit 
client would provide auditors with some of the protection that they may need NNhen 
being threatened by the management of the audit client when there is a disagreement. In 
addition they believed that auditors would feel that there is another effective and 
qualified party rather than the shareholders that is able to review and oversee their 
performance. Accordingly, the interviewees thought this would make auditors adopt 
more thorough procedures when performing their audits. In order to obtain the most 
benefit from an audit committee, i. e. being effective and efficient, the vast majority of 
the interviewees emphasised the need for members of an audit committee to be 
qualified, knowledgeable, honest, and good religious believers. 
With regard to the influence of the status and financial condition of the audit client, the 
results of the questionnaire demonstrated that auditor independence was considered to be 
undermined when the audit client is in the private sector or is in a strong financial 
condition. On the other hand, when the audit client is in the state sector or in a weak 
financial condition, auditor independence was perceived to be enhanced. The main 
reasons for this view, as expressed by the interviewees, were due to a number of issues. 
These include the proper and fair recruitment procedures that state audit clients adopt 
when contracting with auditors, auditors' fear of litigation if they fail to conduct their 
audits in a professional and proper manner (when their clients are from the state sector 
or in weak financial condition), and the desire of the audit firms to maintain the current 
and the potential revenues from clients who belong to the private sector or who are 
in 
good financial conditions. Despite these opinions, a small minority of 
interviewees 
believed that auditor independence is unaffected if the audit client 
is in the state sector or 
in the private sector or if the financial condition of the audit client 
is strong or weak. 
Personal relationships between auditors and their audit clients such as 
family, friendship 
and employment were perceived by the participants 
in the questionnaire to undermine 
auditor independence. In particular, auditor 
independence was considered to be 
negatively influenced when an audit client's 
financial director was previously' employed 
by the audit firm, when one of the audit client's executive 
directors is a close friend of 
one of the audit team and when one of the audit client's 
executive directors is a brother 
of one of the audit team. Similar thoughts were 
held by the interviewees of this study. 
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The interviewees' view is that such relationships could develop an over-cos". 
relationship between auditors and their audit clients that would result in auditors 
reducing their professional detachment and objectivity. Additionally, they considered 
these relationships as potential threats to influence auditors' mental attitudes and 
opinions that may cause others to perceive them as not being independent, especiall\ in 
developing societies such as Libya where, as outlined by the interviewees. most of the 
business and economic transactions depend heavily on such personal relationships. 
Contrary to this view, some of the EA interviewees believed that such relationships 
would not affect auditor independence because auditors consider themselves to be 
professionals who conduct their work according to well established principles and 
procedures and are not susceptible to change their opinions just to please their clients. 
As with personal relationships, financial relationships between auditors and their audit 
clients such as shareholdings, receipt of interest free loans and unpaid audit and non- 
audit fees were believed by the respondents of the questionnaire to harm auditor 
independence. This belief was shared by the interviewees who expressed that such 
relationships would create a strong relationship between auditors and their audit clients 
that could prevent auditors from objectively auditing the financial statements of their 
clients. These situations, as suggested by the interviewees, could make auditors think 
that they have an interest in the success and continuance of their audit clients' 
businesses. Thus, auditors might tolerate misrepresentations in their clients' financial 
statements or could fail to adopt proper procedures when performing such audits. 
Although most of the interviewees supported the above view, a small minority 
from the 
EA had a different opinion when they believed that most of the audit 
firms, highly place 
great importance on maintaining their independence, especially 
in of large ones. 
Finally, the provision of NAS by auditors to their audit clients was perceived 
by the 
overwhelming majority of respondents to the questionnaire 
to have an adverse effect on 
auditor independence. In particular, when NAS are provided 
on the bases of different 
proportions of fees (25%, 50% and 100%) compared 
to audit fees, auditor independence 
was perceived to be undermined. The main reasons 
for this opinion, as outlined by the 
interviewees, were due to several reasons, such as auditors will 
try to maintain the 
respectively high NAS fees compared with audit 
fees, the cosy relationships that might 
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develop between auditors and audit client personnel and that often auditors audit their 
own work or work which they have advised to be implemented. On the other hand. 
auditor independence was perceived to be enhanced when NAS are not provided by 
auditors to their audit clients. As in some previous research, some interviewees in this 
study believed that as long as auditors confine themselves solely to the task of providing 
advice and are not involved in the decision-making process their independence will not 
be undermined. In addition, they argued that when auditors provide NAS to their audit 
clients, their independence would be enhanced due to the greater knowledge and 
experience that auditors would obtain of their clients' systems and operations which in 
turn would enable them to resolve any potential disagreement with their clients' 
management. 
With regard to which of the 31 auditor-client relationships were perceived most to 
undermine or enhance auditor independence by the participants from the four groups. 
the results of this study revealed (see tables 7.33 and 7.34 in chapter seven section 7-2) 
that the first 5 of the 23 situations that were perceived as the most important 
undermining auditor independence (i. e., mean is less than 3) were when a partner or 
staff of an audit firm owns material shares in the audit client, fees from (NAS) are 100% 
or more of audit fees, one of the audit client's executive directors is a brother of one of 
the audit team, there is a high level of competition among audit firms exists and when an 
auditor has received an interest free loan from an audit client. On the other hand, the 
first 
four of the 9 situations that were perceived as the most important enhancing auditor 
independence (i. e., mean is more than 3) were when the audit firm does not provide any 
kind of (NAS) to its audit clients, the existence of an audit committee, 
being a big firm 
and when the audit client is in the state sector. 
Considering the differences of perceptions of auditor independence among participants 
from the four groups relating to the 31 proxy auditor-client relationships 
that examined 
the effect of the selected nine generic factors on auditor 
independence, the results from 
the one way ANOVA test, as shown in table (10.1), revealed 
that in 67 cases there were 
statistically significant differences among the responses 
of participants from the four 
groups. To gain more insight into which groups 
differ from which, a post-hoc 
comparison using a Duncan test was conducted 
in this study. Rank 1 as shown in table 
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(10.1), shows that the greatest number of significant differences arise in relation to the 
responses of the EA and the IFA (15 cases) followed by the EA and both the TBA and 
the BLO (13 cases each). The position of the EA could be attributed to their greater 
knowledge of the accounting and auditing practices and its related factors that might 
create a threat to auditor independence than the other three groups. In addition. external 
auditors usually perceive themselves as qualified professional practitioners who can 
protect and maintain their independence unaffected by any kind of auditor-client 
relationship. The third ranking of the differences among the groups was that between the 
TBA and the BLO (10 cases) while the fourth ranking was that between IFA and TBA 
(9 cases) and finally, the least differences accrued between the IFA and the BLO 
(7 cases). 
Rank 2 in table (10.1) shows the factors that the groups differed most with. As can be 
seen, the largest significant different between the groups occurred on their perception of 
the effect of competition between audit firms on auditor independence (14 cases) 
followed by the groups' perceptions regarding the effect of personal relationships on 
auditor independence. The third largest produced cases of differences between the four 
groups were reported for the perceived effect of the auditors' economic dependence on 
their audit clients. Based on the above results, it can be suggested, except for the factor 
of the size of the audit firm, that statistically significant differences occurred between 
the responses of the four groups regarding the perceived effect of the other eight 
factors 
(tenure of the audit firm, competition among audit firms, auditors' economic 
dependence 
on their audit clients, audit committees, status and financial condition of the audit client, 
personal relationships, financial relationships and provision of 
NAS). 
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Chapter ten: 
Summary and conclusion 
10.2.3: Attitudes about the accounting and auditing profession. 
The third part of the questionnaire and the last three questions of the intervieNý guide 
sought to investigate the attitudes of the participants from the four targeted groups about 
the accounting and auditing profession and its related legal, educational, social and 
economic environments in the Libyan context. The results of this study revealed that the 
respondents to the questionnaire disagreed that rules and regulations in the Libyan la\\ s 
include comprehensive provisions that enhance and maintain auditor independence. In 
line with this opinion, were the interviewees' points of view when they said that the 
Libyan litigation system is suffering from a shortage of adequate and comprehensive 
rules and provisions that could enhance and maintain auditor independence. 
Furthermore, they remarked that even if such rules and provisions do exist, the obvious 
failure to actively and effectively implementing such litigation creates threat to auditor 
independence. 
With regard to the status of the accounting and auditing profession in general and 
auditors, in particular, in Libyan society, the results from the analysis of the responses to 
the questionnaire revealed that a general consensus among the participants, except for 
the EA group, was achieved that the accounting and auditing profession and auditors are 
enjoying a reasonable level of respect. In addition to their agreement with the 
questionnaire respondents' opinion, the interviewees believed that the changes that the 
Libyan political, social and economic systems have witnessed in the last few years, 
made the accounting and auditing profession and auditors enjoy this status and respect. 
Contrary to the above idea, some of the EA interviewees thought that the auditing and 
accounting profession, in general, and auditors, in particular, do not enjoy a reasonable 
status in Libyan society compared with other professions such as engineering. 
law and 
medicine. Furthermore, they went on to say that a great portion of 
Libyan society still 
does not understand what is meant by the accounting and auditing profession or k\ 
hat its 
role in Libyan society. 
Finally, the LAAA was perceived by the participants of the questionnaire 
from the four 
groups as neither playing an important role in 
developing the accounting and auditing 
profession nor in maintaining auditor independence. 
The main reasons for this belief, as 
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expressed by the interviewees, were due to the shortage of professional and qualified 
accountants and auditors to perform such roles, the paucity of the LAAA's financial 
resources, and the absence of related laws that could support the LAAA in conducting its 
roles. 
In addition to the above three main topics which were investigated by both the 
questionnaire and the interview guide, a number of other issues relating to the 
accounting and auditing profession and its environment were addressed in the 
questionnaire. The results from the analysed questionnaire data revealed that the sample 
groups believed that audit firms in Libya do not efficiently adhere to independence 
requirements. Moreover, approximately (45%) of the participants from the four sample 
groups considered the accounting and auditing profession does not efficiently fulfil its 
role in meeting the demands of its clients. Similarly, over half (52%) of the aggregate 
responses believed that the accounting and auditing curriculum in the Libyan education 
system is not sufficient to train auditors. Finally, almost all (99%) of the participants 
from the four sample groups agreed that auditor independence is very important in 
effectively and correctly auditing the financial statements of the audit client. 
Considering the differences of attitudes about the above issues among participants from 
the four groups, the results from the one way ANOVA test, as shown in table (10.2). 
revealed that 18 cases were produced as statistically significant differences among the 
responses of the participants. To gain more insight into which groups differ from which., 
a post-hoc comparison using a Duncan test was conducted in this study. Rank I in table 
(10.2) shows that the greatest number of significant differences arise in relation to the 
responses of the EA and the BLO (5 cases) followed by the EA and TBA (4 cases). 
The 
position of the EA could be ascribed to their greater knowledge of the accounting and 
auditing profession and its related legal, education, social and economic environment in 
the Libyan context than the other three groups. The third ranking of the 
differences 
among the groups was reported on two occasions. These 
included that between the IFA 
and the BLO, and the TBA and the BLO (both reported 
3 cases). The fourth ranking ý\ as 
that between the IFA and TBA (2 cases) and finally, the 
least differences occurred 
between the EA and the IFA (1 case). 
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Rank 2 in table (10.2) shows which factors produced the most significant differences 
between the four groups. As can be seen, the largest significant difference between the 
groups related to their attitudes about the role that the LAAA is performin_ in 
developing the accounting and auditing profession and in maintaining auditor 
independence (4 cases). This was followed by their attitudes about the status of the 
accounting and auditing profession, in general, and auditors, in particular. and about the 
inclusion of comprehensive rules and provisions in Libyan regulations to enhance and 
maintain auditor independence (3 cases). Finally, the least produced differences 
recorded in two situations. These related to the participants' attitudes about the efficient 
adherence of the audit firms in Libya to independence requirements and to Auditor's 
independence is very important in effectively and correctly completing the audit process 
of the audit clients' financial statements (2 cases each). Notably, significant differences 
between the responses of the participants from the four groups were not reported in 2 of 
the 8 statements. These related to the fulfilment by the accounting and auditing 
profession of its role in meeting the demands of its clients and to the sufficiency of the 
accounting and auditing curriculum in the Libyan education system to train auditors. 
Based on the above results, it can be argued, except for statement 3-5 and 3-6 
(see table 10.2), that significant differences occurred among the responses of the 
participants from the four groups relating to their attitudes about the 
Libyan accounting 
and auditing profession and its related environment in the 
Libyan context in the other 
five statements (see table 10.2). 
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Chapter ten: 
Summan and conclusion 
10.3. The recommendations of the study. 
Based on the adopted methodology (mixed research methodology) in this study which 
helped in illuminating and enlightening the issues under investigation. i. e. perceptions 
of auditor independence and attitudes about the accounting and auditing profession and 
its related environment, both the quantitative and qualitative findings revealed critical 
areas where efforts are needed to improve either perceptions of auditor independence or 
the attitudes about the accounting and auditing profession in the Libyan context. 
Therefore, it is very important that some of the study conclusions are expressed in terms 
of recommendations as follows: 
1. To organise and coordinate the accounting and auditing practices, in general and 
to enhance auditor independence and, consequently improve audit qualitN in 
particular, more efforts urgently need to be taken by the Libyan Accountants and 
Auditors Association (LAAA) for developing accounting principles, auditing 
standards and professional ethics. In addition to these vital steps, the LAAA 
should closely control and supervise audit firms when performing their audit 
tasks in terms of their adherence to the requirements of auditor independence. 
Moreover, the LAAA should ensure that penalties and sanctions are taken 
against undisciplined and non-compliant auditors. 
2. To increase the confidence of financial statement users and the general public 
in 
auditor independence and the auditing profession as a whole, sole practitioners 
and small audit firms should be encouraged to merge to 
form medium and larger 
audit firms which can provide high quality audit and accounting services. 
In 
doing so, audit firms' ability to resist any kind of pressure 
from the management 
of their audit clients which might impair their 
independence, would be increased. 
3. The LAAA should consider the length of the period that audit 
firms are allo%\ ed 
to continue auditing the financial statements of 
their clients and that mandator} 
auditor rotation after a period of time 
(5-7 years) should be required as a 
safeguard to preserve and maintain auditor 
independence. 
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4. To improve the performance of corporate governance in enterprises and to 
preserve and enhance auditor independence, more emphasis has to be put on the 
issue of audit committees by parties such as the LAAA, government bodies and 
the Libyan stock market. Moreover, to achieve the maximum potential benefits 
from such committees, the importance of and the awareness of these committees 
should be raised among the various involved parties such as the shareholders. 
internal auditors, and the board of directors in order to gain their support and 
cooperation. In this regard, audit committees should be given the opportunit\ to 
oversee the recruitment process of the auditor and the conduct of the audit work. 
Also the audit committee should meet the auditor many times each year to 
discuss his work. 
5. A move to restrict audit firms from providing non-audit services to their audit 
clients or at least defining these services more specifically in terms of what 
services that can/cannot be rendered should be taken by the LAAA. Such actions 
would be likely to reduce the frequency with which conflicts of interest take 
place and also enhance the ability of auditors to resist the pressure that their 
clients' management might impose on them to undermine their independence in 
disagreement situations. 
6. The current accounting and auditing curriculum in the Libyan education system 
should be revised and updated to be appropriate to the training of auditors. 
This 
should be coordinated between academics and professional practitioners and 
linked to the practical realities of the accounting and auditing profession 
in order 
to provide current and prospective accountants and auditors with 
the required 
knowledge to effectively meet the demands of their clients. 
In addition, 
continuing training be conducted 
by the LAAA, universities and other 
specialised institutions to keep the members of 
the LAAA updated with the latest 
developments of the accounting and auditing profession, 
is very urgently needed. 
Furthermore, members of the LAAA should attend compulsory 
specified 
professional training programmes to maintain 
and enhance their ability to 
perform as qualified professional members 
of the accounting and auditing 
profession. 
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10.4: The contribution of the study. 
Summary and conclusion 
Based on the review of the relevant previous literature and the quantitative and 
qualitative findings of this research, this study has contributed towards the auditing 
literature in a number of ways. 
Firstly, little previous research has been conducted on perceptions of auditor 
independence in developing countries. This study has contributed to the knowledge by 
providing updates on information with respect to perceptions of auditor independence in 
an Arabic developing country, namely, Libya. The results of this research have given 
support to other relevant studies by indicating that auditor independence was considered 
to be threatened most in several situations. These include when an audit is performed by 
a sole practitioner or by a small audit firm, an audit firm auditing the same audit client 
for a long period, there is a high level of competition between audit firms, auditors being 
economically dependent on their audit clients, the audit client is in the private sector or 
is in a strong financial condition, the existence of personal and financial relationships 
and when NAS are provided by auditors to their audit clients. On the other hand, auditor 
independence was believed to be enhanced in situations such as when an audit is 
performed by a medium or large sized audit firm, the existence of an audit committee in 
the audit client's company, the audit client is in the state sector or is in a weak financial 
condition and when (NAS) are not provided by auditors to their audit clients. 
Secondly, this study has contributed to the Libyan accounting and auditing literature 
by 
providing the first detailed and comprehensive research on perceptions of auditor 
independence. The analysis of this study would provide a broad 
base for other 
researchers to build on. Furthermore, the findings of this study could 
be compared with 
other Arabic or developing countries who share similar socio-economic environments 
as 
well as with other developed countries. 
Thirdly, this study has made a contribution to the 
literature by applying a mixed 
research methodology. By adopting and combining 
two methods of collecting data, i. e. 
self-administered questionnaires and semi-structured 
interviews, the study was able to 
highlight issues of concern in a way that added a new element 
to the research on 
perceptions of auditor independence. 
Studies that use only one method are more 
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vulnerable to mistakes linked to that particular method than studies that use multiple 
methods (triangulation) where different types of data provide cross-data validity checks, 
besides it can explore various aspects of the same topic by looking at it from different 
sides or angles. 
Fourthly, the study has contributed to the literature by outlining a number of reasons 
why the accounting and auditing profession in Libya is still being considered as not 
enjoying a high professional status. Some of these reasons include the deficiency of the 
LAAA in performing its supposed role in developing the accounting and auditing 
profession and in protecting the interests of its members, the existence of unqualified 
practitioners, the complete absence of any kind of code of conduct for the accounting 
and auditing profession in the Libyan environment, the uncontrolled process of auditor 
recruitment and remuneration, and the ignorance and lack of knowledge among Libyan 
society about the accounting and auditing profession and its role. 
Finally, the results of this study could be helpful to interested parties on auditor 
independence since they highlighted the most significant factors that were considered 
either to undermine or enhance auditor independence in the Libyan context. For 
example, Libyan academics, practitioners and any organisations that relate to the audit 
profession could benefit from these results when making or adjusting policies regarding 
the accounting and auditing profession in general and auditor independence 
in particular. 
10.4: The limitations of the study and avenues for future research. 
Despite the fact that this study was theoretically and empirically conducted on a 
systematic basis under the supervision of a number of qualified supervisors 
and 
significant efforts were made to ensure that the objectives of 
the study were met and the 
research questions were answered, it might, as any other 
kind of research, suffer from 
some limitations. These limitations and the possible avenues 
of further areas of research 
to overcome them are outlined as follows: 
1. It was indicated from the comprehensive review of 
the previous literature that 
few studies have been conducted on perceptions of 
auditor independence in the 
Libyan environment. Therefore, the study 
has based its literature review on 
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research performed in other countries, particularly, developed ones, together with 
a few in developing countries. This literature may not be relevant «ithin the 
Libyan context. Thus, this study could be considered as a base for other research 
interested in examining the issue of independence in Libya or in any other 
country which shares a similar socio-economic environment. 
2. The current study is restricted by the number of factors which «ere selected for 
investigation. Although nine factors were chosen for the purposes of this study, 
several other factors, i. e. flexibility of accounting standards, risks to auditors 
arising from a poor quality audit, regulations concerning the appointment and 
remunerations of auditors and regulatory rights and requirements surrounding 
auditor change, which have been examined in previous other research could also 
have an influence on perceptions of auditor independence. Thus, further research 
could be undertaken to assess the effect of these other factors on perceptions of 
auditor independence. 
3. As auditor independence depends on the perceptions of several interested parties, 
the findings and conclusion of this study should be treated with a degree of 
caution because the study aimed to examine perceptions of only four groups, 
namely, EA, IFA, TBA and BLO. Therefore, the findings of this study may 
lack 
generalisation beyond these four groups. In the period of analysing the collected 
data, it was noticed that other interested groups such as financial analysts, 
financial directors and shareholders could have been included in the research. 
Consequently, further research could be conducted to investigate the perceptions 
of these other groups with regard to the issue under examination. 
4. As the nature of this study was exploratory covering several 
issues, i. e. 
perceptions of auditor independence and attitudes about 
the accounting and 
auditing profession, future research could 
be limited to a few issues or even just 
one issue. For example, an in-depth 
investigation on the effect of NAS on 
perceptions of auditor independence may 
help in identifying more specifically 
what kind of NAS are currently provided 
by auditors to their audit clients and 
what is their impact on perceptions of auditor 
independence in particular and on 
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the public's attitudes towards the accounting and auditing profession in general 
in the Libyan context. 
5. The results of this study may be valid only to the Libyan environment and may 
not be able to be extrapolated to other Arabic or developing countries due to 
cultural differences. Thus, it would be interesting to broaden the study to other 
countries with similar socio-economic environments. 
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Appendix A: Table (A. 1): Summary of the previous research on auditor independence. 
Study Country Methodology Type of 
Response Researched factors Respondents Response pT 
rate 
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27 separate situations relating to 
financial interest NAS famil 
directors of loan 
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i b h 
4: "e 
Sinning (1982) y Questionnaire (I/NI) , , y relationships, financial relationships and 
n ranc offices(N= 44) 
investment bank departments 
140,9 
28 °, NO 
occupations with conflicting interests in main office (N = 110) 000 
in branch o ffic es (N= 44) 
Quantitative. 
Knapp (1985) USA Questionnaire 
(factorial design) 
Scaled response competition, nature of conflict issues, 
client's financial condition and NAS 
Bank loan officers (N = 70) 61 40o No 
Mckinley et al USA 
Quantitative. 
Scaled response audit 
firm type and size, and provision 
(1985) Questionnaire ofNAS 
Bank loan officers (N= 900) _, go. Yes 
Provision of NAS, client size, financial 
Lindsay et al Canada Quantitative. Dichotomous response interest, low-balling, gifts and discount auditors (N = 
400) 
(1987) Questionnaire (I/NI) employment and family and financial 
financial analysts and (N = 400) 38 O No 
relationships loan officers 400) (N = 
Jackson-Heard 
(1987) 
USA 
Quantitative. 
Questionnaire Scaled response 
NAS, tenure audit firm size and audit 
committ 
financial analysts (N = 100) 23 Oo No 
experimental design ees 
New 
Quantitative. audit firm size, audit committee bank loan officers Gul (1989) Zealand 
Questionnaire Scaled response existence, financial condition of the 
( 
76% yes 
factorial design) ( audit client, NAS, and competition 
Quantitative. NAS, extent of competition among bank loan officers Lindsay (1990) Canada Questionnaire Scaled response audit firms, audit firm size and nature of 68.75 % No 
(factorial design) the accounting issue 
(n = 80) 
14 policies suggested in Cohen Big eight audit partners, non-Big 
Schleifer and USA 
Quantitative. Scaled response 
Commission re[ort relating to audit eight auditors, bank loan officers 100% No 
Shockley (1990) (Questionnaire) committees, employment, tenure, NAS, and certified financial analysts 
disclosure, competition (n = 72) 
Gul (1991) 
New 
Zealand 
Quantitative. 
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Audit firm size, non-audit services, size 
of audit fee and competition 
bank loan officers (n = 72) 67 `o yes 
(factorial design) 
Agacer and 
USA, 
Germany 
Quantitative. 
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Clint size, NAS, past due fees and 
USA accountants (n = 500) 
Germany accountants (n = 400) 
26.5% 
23 % No 
Doupnick (1991) 
Philippine experimental 
design personal relationships Philippines accountants (n = 200) 54% 
Gul and Ts i 
Quantitative. the financial condition of the audit 
u Hong Kong Questionnaire Scaled response client, size of audit fees and audit Bank loan officers (N = 40) 95 % No (1992) 
(factorial design) tendering 
Mousa (1992) Libya 
Quantitative. 
Questionnaire 
Scaled response 
Personal and financial relationships, 
NAS, audit fees and audit firm tenure 
External auditor, state auditors 
Taxation Board auditors (n- 110) 
40"0 
Size of fees, NAS, contingent fees, joint 
Bartlett (1993) USA 
Quantitative. Scaled response ventures with audit client and budget bank loan officers 
(n = 600) 40% yes 
Questionnaire pressure 
Teoh and Lim Malaysia 
Quantitative. 
Questionnaire Scaled response 
NAS, audit committee, rotation of audit 
firm, size of audit fees and disclosure of 
public accountants (n = 100) 
non-public accountants (n = 100) 
69% 
33% 
No 
(1996) 
(factorial design) NAS 
Quantitative and client employment, audit firm size, corporate 
lenders, investment 
qualitative. audit committees, audit market managers and 
financial analysts o 75.5 /o Yes 
Kilcommins (1997) Ireland Questionnaire and Scaled response competition, audit tenure, and provision 
(n =196) 
semi-structured of non-audit services 30 semi-structured 
interviews 
interviews 
Quantitative and corporate lenders, investment 
Gwilliam and Ireland 
qualitative. 
Questionnaire and Scaled response audit firm size and audit committees 
managers and financial analysts 
(n = 196) 
75 5% yes 
Kilcommins (1998) 
semi-structured 30 semi-structured interviews 
interviews 
Gorman and Quantitative. Scaled response 
Fees, ownership of client, personal 
relationships, client status and financial 
Auditors (n = 300) 31 % no 
Ansong (1998) Canada Questionnaire relationships 
45 audit-client relationships relating to 
financial directors, audit partners 69 % No 
Beattie et al (1999) UK 
Quantitative. Scaled response economic and regulatory factors and 
financial journalists (n = 657) 
Questionnaire 
Quantitative and corporate 
lenders, investment 
qualitative. managers and 
financial analysts 75 5% Yes 
Canning and Ireland Questionnaire and Scaled response provision of 
NAS (N =196) 
Gwilliam (1999) 
semi-structured 
30 semi-structured interviews 
I interviews 
? 96 
Stud Study Count Country Methodolo gy 
Type of Researched factor Response Response s Respondents DI 
rate 
Hussey and Lan UK Quantitative. 
Provision of NAS, audit firm rotation, 
(2001) Questionnaire Scaled response responsibility of issuing auditing finance directors (N =3000) _5 9% No standards 
Almalhuf (2003) Libya 
Quantitative. Dichotomous response Provision ofNAS, audit firm size, audit 
External auditor, state auditors 
Taxation Board auditors and bank Questionnaire (yes/no) firm tenure and competition loan officers(n- 145) 
67°0 No 
Saudi qualitative auditors, , shareholders, credit 
Hudaib (2003) Arabia 
(unstructured Open ended questions eighteen 
different auditor-client 
it i 
managers, investment analysts, ° 100 N interview) s uat on fund managers, and government ° o 
bodies (n = 43) 
Tahinakis and Greece 
Quantitative. 
Questionnaire Scaled response size of audit 
firm, provision of NAS, certified auditors, 
bank executives 
Niwlaou (2004) (factorial design) competition and tenure 
in loan decisions and financial 24 % \o 
analysts (N = 601) 
auditor's competitive environment, 
Umar and Quantitative. client's 
financial condition, provision of 
Anandarajan 
USA and 
A strali 
Questionnaire Scaled response 
NAS, relative revenue contribution of USA's auditors (N = 151) N 
2220% 
(2004) u a experimental design the audit client and perception of the Australian auditors (N = 171) 
o 26 56 % 
auditor's peers and superiors in the 
audit firm 
Abu Bakar et al 
Quantitative. audit firm size, competition level, 
(2005) 
Malaysia Questionnaire Scaled response tenure, size of audit fees, provision of bank loan officers (N = 240) 35 3 °b NO 
(factorial design) non audit services and audit committee 
state authorized auditors. 
Quick and 
Rasmussen (2005) 
Denmark 
Quantitative. 
Questionnaire Scaled response provision of NAS 
management directors, bank loan 
officers, privet shareholders and 52 0. No 
business journalists 
(N = 927) 
Quantitative. provision of non audit services, level of 
Awadallah (2006) Egypt Questionnaire Scaled response 
competition among audit firms, size of 
audit firms and corporate governance 
Auditors (N = 150) 70.66° o No 
(factorial design) 
structure in place 
auditors financial directors, credit 
Alleyne et al Barbados 
Quantitative. Scaled response 
39 audit-client relationships relating to 
managers, investment analysts, 
fund managers, shareholders, and 
Not 
`o 
(2006) Questionnaire economic and regulatory factors government departments 
mentioned 
(N=211) 
D/I: Definition of independence. 
UNI: Independent/ Not Independent. 
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Appendix B.: A questionnaire on perceptions of auditor independence 
Liverpool John Moores University 
Faculty of Business and Law 
Business School 
Perceptions of Libyan External Auditor Independence 
Questionnaire 
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Dear Sir/Madam Reference number (............ ) 
Re: Study on perceptions of auditor independence in Libya. 
I am a lecturer at Aljabel Algarbi University Faculty of Accountancy and I am 
currently conducting a study on perceptions of Libyan external auditors' 
independence at Liverpool John Moores University in England. 
The main aim of this study is to provide additional empirical evidence relating to 
perceptions of external auditor independence, specifically, the study examines the 
effect of a number of selected factors on the perceptions of external auditor 
independence in Libya. 
I should be grateful if you would cooperate with me in this study by completing the 
attached questionnaire. Your response would be of significance to the completion of 
this study. This should not take more than twenty five minutes of your time. I can 
assure you that all responses will be treated with complete confidentiality and will 
not be used for other than research process. 
I hope you find completing the questionnaire enjoyable, and thank you for taking the 
time to help. If you have any queries or would like further information about this 
project, please feel free to contact: 
Abdo Alhakim B Almalhuf 
Te-0927601866 
E-mail. A. A. Almalhuf@2006. Ljmu. ac. uk 
Thank you again for your kind cooperation in providing assistance. 
Your sincerely 
Abdo Alhakim B Almalhuf PhD student 
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Introduction: 
- Information about your opinions and perceptions are sought in this questionnaire. 
-If possible, please respond to each question, but don't spend too much time on any one 
question. 
Your first thoughts are usually your best. 
-There are no wrong or right answers; it is your perceptions which are important. 
Explanation of some of the terms that follow: 
(You may wish to refer to these as you complete the questionnaire) 
Auditor: External auditor who is working in the private audit firms that are legally 
allowed to audit the financial statements of companies. 
Auditor independence: The auditor's ability to be, and to be seen to be, objective and 
unimpaired, i. e., free from bias towards any of the parties in relation to whom he is acting. 
Size of the audit firm: Being a sole practitioner, small audit firm (less than three partners 
or up to 5 auditors), medium audit firm (three to five partners or up to 10 auditors), big 
audit firm (more than five partners over 10 auditors or a representative of one of the big 
four international audit firms). 
Audit firm tenure: The length of time that an audit firm has been meeting the audit 
needs of a given client. 
Competition: Competition is set at two levels; high and low. High level of competition 
refers to when the immediate audit market is characterised by a number of large audit 
firms 
that are aggressively pursuing expansion programmes in terms of increasing client number 
whereas, low competition refers to when there are few or no competing 
firms in the audit 
market. 
Low balling: Setting audit fees below total current costs on initial audit engagements 
to 
get or keep the client. 
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Audit committee: This is a committee composed of non-executive directors whose role is 
to act as a proxy for shareholders in matters concerning the audit, including questions of 
appointment, remuneration and accountability of auditors. 
Financial condition of the audit client : Financial condition of the audit client is 
described as strong and weak. Strong financial condition refers to when the firm's entire 
solvency and profitability ratios compare favourably to industry averages and the Net 
income has shown a modest but steady growth pattern over the last few years, whereas 
weak financial condition is the opposite. 
Non audit services (NAS): Management services, computer services, investigation of 
significant acquisition, design and implementation of accounting systems, budget and 
inventory control systems, assist client in decisions about accounting for complex 
transactions, etc. provided by the audit firm. 
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Section one: General information. 
Please answer by filling in or ticking as appropriate: 
1- Please tick to indicate your gender: 
a) Male Q b) Female Q 
2- Which of the following statements describe your job? 
a) External auditor Q b) Auditor from the Institute of Financial Auditing Q 
c) Bank loan officer Q d) Taxation Board auditor Q 
f) Others (please state) ............................................................ 
3- Please tick one answer to indicate your age: 
a) Under 30 years Q b) 30 to 39 years Q 
c) 40 to 49 years Q d) 50 years and over Q 
4- Please tick one answer to indicate your highest education level achieved: 
a) First university degree Q b) Masters Degree Q 
c) PhD Q d) Other Q 
If your answer is (d) Please specify: ............................................................................. 
5- Was your subject of study? 
a) Accounting Q b) Management Q 
c) Economics Q d) Others Q 
If your answer is (d) please give your subject of study 
6- Pleas tick one answer to indicate your experience in your job: 
a) Under 5 years Q b) 5 to 9 years 
Q 
c) 10 to 14 years Q d) 15 years and over 
Q 
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Section two: Situations affecting auditor independence. 
Questions in this part relates to auditor-client relationships, please indicate the extent to which of these situations 
in your personal opinion will affect auditor independence. Use the following scale to indicate the degree to 
which independence is undermined or enhanced in each situation by placing tick under your selects. 
Seriously undermines independence. 
Slightly undermines independence. 
Neither undermines nor enhances independence. 
Seriously enhances independence. 
Slightly enhances independence. 
No The audit situation 
Seriously 
undermines 
Slightly 
undermines neither 
Slightly 
Enhances 
Seriously 
Enhances 
independence independence independence independence 
Size of the Audit Firm. 
2-1 Being a sole practitioner. 
--------- 
2-2 
---------------------------------------- 
Being a small audit firm (less than 3 partners 
----------- ------------ ----------- ------------ ------------ 
- -- 
or up to 5 auditors) 
-- - ---- -- 
2-3 
- ----------------------------------- 
Being a medium firm (3 to 5 partners or up 
---------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ------------ 
---------- 
to 10 auditors) 
----------------------------------------- ------------- ----- Being a big audit firm (more than 5 partners, 
-------- ------------ I ------------ ------------- 
2-4 over 10 auditors or a representative of one of 
the big four international audit firms). 
The audit firm's tenure. 
If the audit firm has been auditing the client 2-5 
--------- 
for less than 2 years. 
---------------------------------------- ------------ ------------ ----------- ------------ ------------ 
If the audit firm has been auditing the client 2-6 
--------- 
for 2 to 4 years. 
---------------------------------------- ----------- ------------ ----------- ------------ ------------ 
If the audit firm has been auditing the client 2-7 
--------- 
for 5 to 10 years. 
---------------------------------------- ----------- ------------ ----------- ------------ ------------ 
If the audit firm has been auditing the client 2-g for more than 10 years. 
Competition within the external audit 
market: 
There is a high level of competition among 2-9 
audit firms. 
---- ---------- ------------ - -------- ----------------------------------- There is little competition among audit 2-10 
--------- 
firms. 
-------------------------------------- -- --- --- --- -- -- --- --- -- - ---------- ------------ 
------------ 
- There is audit fee discounting and low- 2-11 
--------- 
balling to get or keep the client 
---------------------------------------- ----------- --- - --- --- - - 
----------- ------------ 
Budget pressures imposed by an audit firm 
2-12 on staff (i. e. need to spend less than 
adequate time to do a proper audit) 
Economic dependence of the audit firm on 
the audit client. 
An audit firm's profitability depends on the 2-13 
retention of a specific audit client 
------------------------ -- ----- -- -- - 
----------- ------------ 
--------- -------------- Greater than 10 % of total firm's audit fees 2-14 
revenues are from one client. ----------- ------------ 
-- - 
---------- ------------------------------ An audit firm's desire is not to lose status by 2-15 losing a key client 
;o 
Audit committee 
Seriously 
undermines 
Slightly 
undermines neither 
Slightly Seriously 
Enhances Enhances independence independence independence independence 
Existence of an audit committee composed of 2-16 
competent non-executive directors 
2-17 No existence of an audit committee. 
----------- ------------ ------------ 
Status and financial condition of the audit 
client: 
2-18 
---- 
The audit client is in the state sector. 
- -- ----- 
2-19 
-------------------------------- 
The audit client is in the private sector. 
----------- ------------ ----------- ------------ ------------ 
------- - ---------------------------------------- Te au it client is in a strong financial ----------- ------------ ----------- ------------ ------------ 2-20 
--------- 
condition. 
---------------------------------------- - The audit client is in a weak financial 
---------- ------------ ----------- ------------ ------------ 
2-21 
condition. 
Personal relationships 
If an audit client's financial director was 2-22 
--------- 
, 
previously employed by the audit firm. 
---------------------------------------- ------------ ------------ ----------- ------------ ------------ 
If one of the audit client's executive directors 2-23 
----- 
is a close friend of one of the audit team. 
------------- ---------- -- ---- - --- ----------- 
If one of the audit client's executive directors 
----------- ------------ ----------- ----------- ------------ 
2-24 is a brother of one of the audit team. 
Financial interest in the audit client: 
If there is unpaid audit and non-audit fees 2-25 
--------- 
from the previous year s. 
---------------------------------------- ------------ ------------ ----------- ------------ ------------ 
If a partner or staffs of an audit firm owns 2-26 
- 
material shares in the audit client. 
------------------ ----------- ------------ ----------- ------------ ------------ - ------- ---------------------- 
If an auditor in an audit firm has received an 2-27 interest free loan from an audit client. 
Provision of non-audit services (NAS) 
The audit firm does not provide any kind of 2-28 
non-audit services to its audit clients 
------- = 9 - -------------------------------------- Fees from non-audit services are 25% to 49 
----------- ------------ ---------- 
2-2 
--------- 
% of audit fees. 
---------------------------------------- ----- ------- ------------- ----------- 
------------ ------------- 
Fees from non-audit services are 50% to 99 2-30 
--------- 
% of audit fees. 
---------------------------------------- ----------- ------------ - 
Fees from non-audit services are 100% or 2-31 
more of audit fees. 
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Section three: Accounting and auditing related surrounding 
environments. 
Questions in this part relate to your attitudes about the accounting and auditing profession and its related surrounding legal, 
social, economic and educational environments. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following 
statements. Use the following scale to indicate your point of view in each statement by ticking the appropriate response 
Strongly disagree. Disagree. Neutral Agree. Strongly agree. 
No The statement 
Strongly 
disagree Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
3-1 
Roles and regulations in Libyan laws include comprehensive 
provisions that enhance and maintain auditor independence. 
--------- ------------------------------------------------------------- Audit firms in Libya efficiently adhere to independence --------- ---------- --------- -------- --------- 
-------- 
requirements. 
------------------------------------------------------------ --------- -------- ------- -------- --------- 
3-3 
The Libyan Accountants and Auditors Association plays an 
- 
important role in developing the accounting and auditing profession. 
------------------- ------ - 
3-4 
----------------------------------------- The Libyan Accountants and Auditors Association plays an 
--------- -------- ------- ------- --------- 
-------- 
important role in maintaining auditor independence. 
------------------------------------------------------------ --------- -------- ------- ------- --------- 
3-5 
The accounting and auditing profession is efficiently fulfilling its 
-------- 
role in meeting the demands of its clients. 
------------------------------------------------------------ --------- -------- ------- ------- --------- 
3-6 The accounting and auditing curriculum 
in the Libyan education 
system are sufficient to train auditors. 
-------- ------------------------------------------------------------ the accounting and auditing profession in general and auditors in --------- -------- ------- -------- 
--------- 
3-7 particular are enjoying a reasonable respect and statues in the Libyan 
--- ---- 
society 
---------------------------------------------------- --------- -------- ------- ------- --------- 
Auditor's independence is very important in affectively and correctly 3-g 
completing the audit process of the audit clients' financial statements. 
Section four: 
If you have any other comments, please feel free to write them down in the space provided 
below or 
attach any extra sheets. 
Would you like to receive a summary of the findings, when available? 
Yes () 
No () 
If your answer is yes, please provide the appropriate correspondence address. 
Thank you for completing this questionnaire 
ý0 
Appendix C: Perceptions' of Libyan external auditor independence The interview 
questions. 
The following range of questions was used during the interviews with the participants of this 
study. 
1. Could you please tell us about yourself (e. g. age, level of education, experience, 
acceptation position. etc)? 
2. Does the size of the audit firm affect auditor independence? 
3. Do you think auditor independence would be affected if the auditor has been 
auditing the same client for a long time? 
4. Does a high level of competition among auditors within the external audit market 
affect auditor independence? 
5. Do you think that economic dependence of the auditor on one or a few audit clients 
for generating revenues might affect auditor independence? 
6. What effects would the existence of an audit committee composed of non-executive 
directors have on auditor independence? 
7. Does the status and financial condition of audit clients affect auditor independence? 
8. Do personal relationships between auditors and their audit clients affect auditor 
independence? 
9. Do financial relationships between auditors and their audit clients affect auditor 
independence? 
10. What effects does the provision of non-audit services (NAS) by auditors to their 
audit clients have on auditor independence? 
11. Do you think that roles and regulations in Libyan laws include comprehensive 
provisions that could enhance and maintain auditor independence? 
12. Do you think that the Accounting and Auditing Profession in general and auditors 
in 
particular are enjoying a reasonable respect and statues in the Libyan society? 
13. Do you think that the Libyan Accountants and Auditors Association plays an 
important role in maintaining auditor independence and developing the accounting 
and auditing profession? 
14. Is there any thing else you would like to mention which has not 
been covered 
regarding the auditors' independence issue? 
Thank you for answering the questions and be sure that your answers 
would be treated 
with complete confidentiality. 
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Appendix D: The Arabic version of the questionnaire. 
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Appendix E: The Arabic version of the interview guide questions 
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Appendix F. Interviewees' perceptions of auditor independence and their attitudes about 
the accounting and auditing profession. 
Matrix 1: Audit firm size and perceptions of auditor independence 
Population group a b c d e f g h I 
EA I X 
EA 2 X X 
EA 3 X X X 
EA 4 X X 
EA 5 X 
EA6 X X X X 
IFA 1 X X X X 
IFA 2 X X X 
IFA 3 X X X X 
IFA 4 X X 
IFA 5 X X X 
IFA 6 X 
TBA1 X X X 
TBA 2 X X X 
TBA 3 X X 
TBA 4 X X X X X 
BLO 1 X 
BLO 2 X X X X 
BLO 3 X X X 
BLO4 X X X X X 
No 14 7 9 6 10 2 4 3 1 
Total 
% 70 35 45 30 50 10 20 15 5 
For more details, refer to codes on page 315. 
314 
Matrix 1: Audit firm size and perceptions of auditor independence 
Key to code: 
EA: External auditor. 
IFA: Auditor from the Institution of Financial Auditing. 
TBA: Auditor from the Taxation Board 
BLO: Bank loan officer. 
a) More confidence in the independence of the medium and large audit firms than small 
and new audit firms. 
b) Small audit firms are less independent than large audit firms because small firms are 
dependent on one or few clients for their income. 
c) Small audit firms are less independent than large audit firms because small firms lack 
expertise to provide different types of services. 
d) Small audit firms are less independent than large audit firms because small firms 
approach their duties in a personalised manner. 
e) Large audit firms are more independent than small audit firms because large audit 
firms consider highly their reputation. 
f) Our perception of auditor independence is not effected by the size of the audit firm. 
g) Big audit firms are less independent than small audit firms because the former firms 
lack control over their branches. 
h) Big audit firms are less independent than small audit firms because the former firms' 
desire to keep their income up to fixed level. 
i) Auditor independence is not affected by the size of the audit firm because auditors are 
professional practitioners who work according to well determined procedures and 
standards. 
315 
Matrix 2: Audit firm tenure and perceptions of auditor independence 
Population group a b c d e f g h i 
EA1 7 X X X X 
EA2 X X X X 
EA3 X X X 
EA 4 X X X X 
EA5 X X X X 
EA 6 X X 
IFA 1 X X X X 
IFA 2 X X 
IFA 3 X X X 
IFA 4 X X X X 
IFA 5 X X X 
IFA 6 X X X 
TBA1 X X X X 
TBA2 X X X X 
TBA 3 X X X 
TBA 4 X X X 
BLO1 X X X 
BLO 2 X X 
BLO 3 X X X X 
BLO4 X X X X 
Total 
No 
% 
4 
20 
F4 
20 
3 
15 
4 
20 
16 
80 
16 
80 
8 
40 
7 
35 
5 
25 
For more details, refer to codes on page 317. 
316 
Matrix 2: Audit firm tenure and perceptions of auditor independence. 
Key to code: 
EA: External auditor. 
IFA: Auditor from the Institution of Financial Auditing. 
TBA: Auditor from the Taxation Board 
BLO: Bank loan officer. 
a) Long audit firm tenure does not undermine auditor independence. 
b) Long audit firm tenure ensures that auditors have good knowledge of their audit 
clients. 
c) Long audit firm tenure makes auditors to become more valuable to their audit clients 
which give them more strength in disagreement situations. 
d) Long audit firm tenure is favoured because it saves time and costs for both the auditor 
and his client. 
e) Long audit firm does undermine auditor independence. 
f) Long audit firm tenure may result in the development of a cosy relationship between 
auditors and their audit clients. 
g) Long audit firm tenure may result in auditors become complacent in their performance. 
h) Long audit firm tenure may result in auditors adopting less rigorous procedures. 
i) Audit firm rotation should be implemented to prevent development of cosy 
relationships between auditors and their audit clients. 
317 
Matrix 3: Competition between audit firms and perceptions of auditor independence 
Population group a b c d e fghi 
EAl X X X X 
EA2 X X X X 
EA 3 X X 
EA 4 X X X X 
EA 5 X X X X 
EA6 X X 
IFAI X X X X 
IFA 2 X X X X 
IFA 3 X X X X 
IFA 4 X X X X 
IFA 5 X X 
IFA 6 X X X X X X 
TBA 1 X X 
TBA2 X X X X 
TBA3 X X X X X 
TBA4 X X X X 
BLO1 X X 
BLO 2 X X X X 
BLO 3 X X X 
BLO 4 X X X X 
No 16 11 78 10 10 244 
Total 
% 80 55 35 40 50 50 10 20 20 
For more details, refer to codes on page 319. 
318 
ix 3: Comnetiti 
Key to code: 
EA: External auditor. 
en audit firms and perceptions of auditor independence. 
IFA: Auditor from the Institution of Financial Auditing. 
TBA: Auditor from the Taxation Board 
BLO: Bank loan officer. 
a) High level of competition between audit firms undermines auditor independence. 
b) High level of competition between audit firms undermines auditor independence due to 
the absence of the role of the LAAA in organising and controlling the auditing 
profession. 
c) High level of competition between audit firms undermines auditor independence 
because there are a huge number of audit firms chasing a small number of large audit 
clients. 
d) High level of competition between audit firms undermines auditor independence 
because there are no proper related regulations. 
e) High level of competition between audit firms undermines auditor independence 
because the shortage of qualified auditors. 
f) Small and new audit firms are more affected by competition than large audit firms. 
g) Large audit firms are more affected by competition than small audit firms. 
h) Competition would not affect auditor independence because audit firms fear litigation. 
i) High level of competition does not affect audit firm independence because they 
consider high their independence and reputation. 
319 
Matrix 4: Auditors' economic dependence on their audit clients and perceptions of auditor 
independence. 
Population group a b c def 
EA I X X X 
EA 2 x xx 
EA 3 X X X 
EA 4 X X X 
EA 5 X X 
EA6 x X x 
IFA 1 X X X 
IFA 2 X X 
IFA 3 X X X 
IFA4 X X 
IFA5 X X 
IFA 6 X X X 
TBA I X X X 
TBA 2 
TBA 3 
TBA 4 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X X X 
BLO 1 X X 
BLO 2 X X 
BLO 3 X X X 
BLO 4 X X 
X 
-ýýd 
No 16 15 11 4 4 
4 
Total 
% 80 75 55 20 
20 20 
For more details, refer to codes on page 
3 21. 
320 
trix 4: Auditors' economic dependence on their 
independence. 
Key to code: 
EA: External auditor. 
IFA: Auditor from the Institution of Financial Auditing. 
TBA: Auditor from the Taxation Board 
BLO: Bank loan officer. 
it clients and perceptions of auditor 
a) Auditors' economic dependence on one or few audit clients would undermine auditor 
independence. 
b) Auditors' economic dependence on one or few audit clients would undermine auditor 
independence because it would place auditors under their clients" mercy. 
c) Small and new audit firms would lose their independence more than large audit firms 
because they economically depend on one or few audit clients. 
d) Large audit firms would not lose their independence because they have more audit 
clients than small and new audit firms to depend on. 
e) Economic dependence on one or few clients would not undermine auditor 
independence. 
f) Economic dependence on one or few clients would not undermine auditor 
independence because of the auditors' honesty, integrity and religious beliefs. 
g) Economic dependence on one or few clients would not undermine auditor 
independence because of the auditors' commitment to the standards and procedures of 
the auditing profession. 
321 
Matrix 5: Audit committees and perceptions of auditor independence 
Population group a b c d ef 
EA I X X X X 
EA 2 X X x 
EA 3 X X X X 
EA 4 X X 
EA 5 X X X 
EA6 X X X 
IFA I X X 
IFA 2 X X X X X 
IFA 3 X X X 
IFA4 X X X X 
IFA 5 X X X 
IFA 6 X 
TBA I X X X X X X 
TBA 2 X X 
TBA 3 X X X 
TBA 4 X X X 
BLO 1 X X X 
BLO 2 X X X X X 
BLO 3 X X X X 
BLO 4 X X X X 
No 20 14 13 10 64 
Total 
% 100 70 65 50 30 20 
For more details, refer to codes on page 323. 
322 
Matrix 5: Audit committees and perceptions of auditor independence 
Key to code: 
EA: External auditor. 
IFA: Auditor from the Institution of Financial Auditing. 
TBA: Auditor from the Taxation Board 
BLO: Bank loan officer. 
a) The existence of an audit committee in the audit client company would enhance 
auditor independence. 
b) Audit committees would enhance auditor independence because they provide auditors 
with some kind of protection against the client's management. 
c) Audit committees make auditors perform in responsible manner and adopt more 
rigorous procedures because of the oversight role of the audit committees. 
d) Auditor committees would enhance auditor independence only if their members are 
qualified and knowledgeable. 
e) Auditor committees would enhance auditor independence only if their members are 
honest and good religious believers. 
f) Auditor committees would enhance auditor independence only if their members are 
independent. 
323 
Matrix 6: Status and financial condition of the audit client and perceptions of auditor 
independence. 
Population group a b c d e f g h i 
EA I X 
EA2 X X X 
EA3 X X X X X 
EA 4 X X X 
EA 5 X 
EA 6 X X X 
IFA I X X X X X X 
IFA 2 X X X X 
IFA 3 X X X X 
IFA 4 X X X X 
IFA 5 X X X X X 
IFA 6 X X X X 
TBA I X X X X X 
TBA 2 X X X X X 
TBA 3 X 
TBA 4 X X X X X 
BLOI X X X X X 
BLO 2 X X X X X 
BLO 3 X X X X X 
BLO 4 X X 
No 16 12 9 9 13 2 11 1 3 
Total 
% 80 60 45 45 65 10 55 5 15 
For more details, refer to codes on page 325. 
324 
, ý, 
Matrix 6: Status and financial condition of the audit client and perceptions of auditor 
independence. 
Key to code: 
EA: External auditor. 
IFA: Auditor from the Institution of Financial Auditing. 
TBA: Auditor from the Taxation Board 
BLO: Bank loan officer. 
a) Auditor independence would be enhanced if the audit client is from the state sector 
because of the proper and fair appointment of the auditor. 
b) Auditor independence would be enhanced if the audit client is from the state sector 
because of the auditor fear of litigation. 
c) Auditor independence would be enhanced if the audit client is in weak financial 
condition because of the auditor fear of litigation. 
d) Auditor independence would be undermined if the audit client was from the private 
sector because of the auditor's desire not to lose current and potential fees. 
e) Auditor independence would be undermined if the audit client was from the private 
sector because of the appointment procedures of auditors. 
f) Auditor independence would be undermined if the audit client was from the state 
sector because of the strong pressure on auditor from the government. 
g) Auditor independence would be undermined if the audit client was in good financial 
condition because of the auditor's desire not to lose current and potential fees. 
h) Auditor independence would not be affected by the financial condition of the audit 
client. 
i) Auditor independence would not be affected whether the audit client was from the 
state or the private sector or whether it was in good or weak 
financial condition. 
325 
Matrix 7: Personal relationships and perceptions of auditor independence. 
Population group a b c d e f g h i 
EA 1 x x 
EA2 X X X X X 
EA 3 X X X 
EA 4 X X X X 
EA5 X X 
EA 6 X X X X 
IFA I X X 
IFA 2 X X X X X 
IFA 3 X X X X X X 
IFA 4 X X X X 
IFA 5 X X X X X 
IFA 6 X X 
TBA 1 X X X X X X X 
TBA 2 X X X X X X 
TBA 3 X X X 
TBA 4 X X X X X 
BLO1 X X X X X 
BLO 2 X X X 
BLO3 X X X X X X X 
BLO 4 X X X X X X 
No 17 12 8 10 13 8 12 3 3 
Total 
% 55 60 40 50 65 40 60 15 15 
For more details, refer to codes on page 327. 
326 
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Matrix 7: Personal relationships and perceptions of auditor independence 
Key to code: 
EA: External auditor. 
IFA: Auditor from the Institution of Financial Auditing. 
TBA: Auditor from the Taxation Board 
BLO: Bank loan officer. 
a) Auditor independence would be undermined by personal relationships. 
b) Auditor independence would be undermined by personal relationships because of the 
cosy relationship. 
c) Personal relationships would result in auditors reducing their professional objectivity. 
d) Personal relationships may influence auditors' mental attitudes and opinions. 
e) Most of the economic activities in Libya are dependent on personal relationships and 
may undermine auditor independence. 
f) Personal relationships would make outsiders to raise questions about the auditor 
independence. 
g) Personal relationships may more undermine independence in the case of small and new 
audit firms than large ones. 
h) Personal relationships would not undermine auditor independence. 
i) Personal relationships would not undermine auditor independence because auditors are 
professional practitioners who highly evaluate and protect their reputations. 
327 
Matrix 8: Financial relationships and perceptions of auditor independence 
Population group a b c d e f 
T 
g 
EA I X X X 
EA 2 X X X X X 
EA 3 X X 
EA 4 X X X X X X 
EA 5 X X X 
EA 6 X X X X X 
IFAI X X X X X 
IFA 2 X X X X 
IFA 3 X X X X 
IFA 4 X X X X X X 
IFA 5 X X X X X X 
IFA 6 X X X X X X 
TBA 1 X X X X 
TBA 2 X X X X X X 
TBA 3 X X X X 
TBA 4 X X X X X 
BLOI X X 
BLO 2 X X X X X 
BLO 3 X X X X X 
BLO 4 X X X X X 
No 19 20 10 7 10 9 16 
Total 
% 95 100 50 35 50 45 80 
For more details, refer to codes on page 329. 
328 
Matrix 8: Financial relationships and perceptions of auditor independence 
Key to code: 
EA: External auditor. 
IFA: Auditor from the Institution of Financial Auditing. 
TBA: Auditor from the Taxation Board 
BLO: Bank loan officer. 
a) Financial relationships would undermine auditor independence. 
b) Financial relationships would create a strong connection that might undermine auditor 
independence. 
c) Financial relationships would make auditor to feel that they have an interest in their 
clients' businesses. 
d) Financial relationships would make auditors to perform in biased manner. 
e) Financial relationships may more undermine independence in the case of small and 
new audit firms than large ones because large audit firms highly consider their 
reputation. 
f) Financial relationships may more undermine independence in the case of small and 
new audit firms than large ones because large audit firms fear of litigation. 
g) Most of the economic activities in Libya are dependent on financial relationships 
between auditors and their audit clients and may undermine auditor independence. 
329 
Matrix 9: Provision of NAS and perceptions of auditor independence 
Population group a b C d e f g 
EAl X X X X 
EA 2 X X 
EA3 X X X 
EA 4 X X X X 
EA5 X X X 
EA 6 X X 
IFA 1 X X X 
IFA 2 X X X 
IFA 3 X X X 
IFA 4 X X X 
IFA 5 X X X 
IFA 6 X X 
TBA I X 
TBA 2 X X 
TBA3 X X X 
TBA 4 X X 
BLOT X X X 
BLO 2 X X 
BLO 3 X X X 
BLO 4 X 
No 5 4 4 3 11 12 12 
Total 
%] F 25 20 20 15. 
_j 
55 60 60 
For more details, refer to codes on page 331. 
330 
Matrix 9: Provision of NAS and perceptions of auditor independence 
Key to code: 
EA: External auditor. 
IFA: Auditor from the Institution of Financial Auditing. 
TBA: Auditor from the Taxation Board 
BLO: Bank loan officer. 
a) Provision of NAS would not undermine auditor independence as long as auditors do 
not involve in the decision making process. 
b) Provision of NAS would enhance auditor independence. 
c) Provision of NAS would enhance auditor independence because auditors would gain 
more knowledge and experience of their audit clients' systems. 
d) Provision of NAS would not undermine independence because auditors provide these 
services according to special procedures which do not interfere with the audit work. 
e) Provision of NAS would undermine auditor independence because auditors would try 
to maintain the NAS high fess compared with audit fees. 
f) Provision of NAS would undermine auditor independence because of the developed 
cosy relationship between auditors and their audit client. 
g) Provision of NAS would undermine auditor independence because auditors often audit 
their own work or the work which they have consulted to be implemented. 
331 
Matrix 10: The attitudes about the accounting and auditing profession and its related 
regulations. 
Population group a b c d e f 
EA I x x 
EA 2 X X X 
EA 3 X X X 
EA 4 X X X X 
EA 5 X X 
EA 6 X X X X 
IFA 1 X X 
IFA 2 X X X X 
IFA 3 X X X 
IFA 4 X X 
IFA 5 X X X X 
IFA 6 X X 
TBA I X X 
TBA 2 X X X X 
TBA 3 X X X X 
TBA 4 X X 
BLO 1 X X X X 
BLO 2 X X X 
BLO3 X X 
BLO 4 X X X 
Total 
---ý] 
% 
12 
60 
11 
55 
8 
40 
4 
20 
20 
100 
4 
20 
For more details, refer to codes on page 333. 
332 
Matrix 10: The attitudes about the accounting, and auditing profession and its related 
regulations. 
Key to code: 
EA: External auditor. 
IFA: Auditor from the Institution of Financial Auditing. 
TBA: Auditor from the Taxation Board. 
BLO: bank loan officers. 
a) Libyan laws include some provisions and rules to enhance and maintain auditor 
independence. 
b) Libyan laws include some provisions and rules to enhance and maintain auditor 
independence but they are not clear and obvious. 
c) Libyan laws include some provisions and rules to enhance and maintain auditor 
independence but they have never been implemented. 
d) Not sure if Libyan laws include some provisions and rules to enhance and maintain 
auditor independence. 
e) Never heard of any actions against undisciplined auditors. 
f) Libyan laws do not include provisions and rules to enhance and maintain auditor 
independence. 
333 
Matrix 11: The attitudes about the accounting and auditing profession and its status in the 
Libyan society. 
Population group a b c d e f 
EA I X X X X 
EA 2 X X X X 
EA 3 X X X X 
EA 4 X X X 
EA 5 X X X 
EA 6 X X X 
IFA 1 X X X 
IFA 2 X X X 
IFA 3 X X X 
IFA 4 X X X X 
IFA 5 X X 
IFA6 X X X X 
TBA I X X X X 
TBA 2 X X X X 
TBA 3 X X X X 
TBA 4 X X X X 
BLO 1 X X X X 
BLO 2 X X X 
BLO 3 X X X 
BLO 4 X X X X 
No 16 4] 
_17 
15 13 5 
Total 
% 80 20 85 75 65 25 
For more details, refer to codes on page 335. 
334 
Matrix 11: The attitudes about the accounting and auditing profession and its status in the 
Libyan society. 
Key to code: 
EA: External auditor. 
IFA: Auditor from the Institution of Financial Auditing. 
TBA: Auditor from the Taxation Board 
BLO: Bank loan officer. 
a) The accounting and auditing profession in general and auditors in particular are 
enjoying a reasonable level of respect and status in Libyan society. 
b) The accounting and auditing profession in general and auditors in particular are not 
enjoying a reasonable level of respect and status in Libyan society. 
c) The accounting and auditing profession in general and auditors in particular are not 
enjoying a reasonable level of respect and status in Libyan society in the past because 
of the lake of their role. 
d) The last dramatic changes in the Libyan society contributed to good respect and status 
of the profession and its members because of the increase of the need for the auditors' 
services in the society. 
e) The accounting and auditing profession in general and auditors in particular are 
enjoying a reasonable level of respect and status among those who have knowledge of 
their role. 
f) The accounting and auditing profession in general and auditors in particular are still 
unknown among ordinary people because the deficiency of the LAAA in performing 
its role. 
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Matrix 12: The attitudes about the (LAAA) and its role in developing the accounting and 
auditin g profession and in maintainin g auditor inde pendence 
Population group a b c d e 
EA I X X X X X 
EA 2 X X X X 
EA 3 X X X 
EA 4 X X X X X 
EA 5 X X X 
EA6 X X X X 
IFA 1 X X X X 
IFA 2 X X X X 
IFA 3 X X X X 
IFA 4 X X X X 
IFA 5 X X X X 
IFA 6 X X X 
TBA 1 X X X X X 
TBA 2 X X X X 
TBA 3 X X X X X 
TBA 4 X X X X X 
BLO 1 X X X X 
BLO 2 X X X X 
BLO 3 X X X X 
BLO 4 X X X X 
No 20 20 16 15 11 
Total 
% 100 100 80 75 55 
For more details, refer to codes on page 337. 
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Matrix 12: The attitudes about the (LAAA) and its role in developing the accounting and 
auditin g profession and in maintainin g auditor inde pendence 
Key to code: 
EA: External auditor. 
IFA: Auditor from the Institution of Financial Auditing. 
TBA: Auditor from the Taxation Board 
BLO: Bank loan officer. 
a) The Libyan accountants and auditors association is not performing its proposed role in 
maintaining and enhancing auditor independence. 
b) The Libyan accountants and auditors association is not performing its proposed role in 
developing the accounting and auditing profession. 
c) The Libyan accountants and auditors association is not performing its proposed role in 
maintaining and enhancing auditor independence and developing the accounting 
profession because of its lake of expertise. 
d) The Libyan accountants and auditors association is not performing its proposed role in 
maintaining and enhancing auditor independence and developing the accounting 
profession because of its lake of financial recourses. 
e) The Libyan accountants and auditors association is not performing its proposed role in 
maintaining and enhancing auditor independence and developing the accounting 
profession because of the absence of related laws to support the LAAA. 
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